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Abstract
Despite the vast amount of literature concerned with the Attlee government’s management of the British 
Empire, there are still a number of key knowledge gaps, not least concerning Anglo-Iranian relations during 
this period. Although generally perceived as an independent nation, this thesis argues that Iran should be 
considered part of the informal empire, thanks to the disproportionate influence wielded there by the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. The company, a state owned, but privately managed organisation, was the leading 
source of taxes and foreign currency for the Iranian Exchequer and supplied not only jobs, but also roads, 
housing and even policing through its private security force. At the end of the Second World War it seemed 
to be in an insurmountable position: a totem of informal domination. Indeed, the vast Abadan oil refinery 
was Britain’s largest single overseas asset. 
However, within just six years the oil company had been nationalised and Britain’s informal hold in Iran 
destroyed. This thesis sets to outline why this happened and to argue that British power collapsed due to a 
noxious mixture of orientalism and mismanagement within both the government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company itself. It will argue that the British failed to understand the Iranian political system or Iranian 
society and applied wrongheaded policies with little by way of a long-term vision. As economic and political 
conditions in Iran deteriorated, the Foreign Office found it impossible to align the oil company’s goals with 
its own, exacerbating fissures between them. At the root of the crisis was a clash between Iranian nationalism 
and the Attlee government’s seemingly irreconcilable goals of building a New Jerusalem at home while 
simultaneously raising living standards across the empire. Watching from the sidelines, the United States, 
Britain’s most important ally, grew increasingly concerned that unrest in Iran could lead to communism, 
necessitating that they become ever more embroiled in an area with which they had few identifiable interests. 
Utilising primary research carried out in public and private archives on both sides of the Atlantic, plus a wide 
range of secondary materials, this thesis provides new insights into the collapse of British power in Iran and 
a valuable contribution to wider arguments as to the success of the Attlee government’s foreign policy. 
Particular emphasis is given to discussing the plurality of empire, the interplay between diplomatic and non-
diplomatic actors operating at its fringes and the challenges of fusing the interests of the public and private 
sectors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis examines British policy towards Iran between the election of Clement Attlee’s Labour 
government in 1945 and the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951. Although a 
valuable case study in the limitations of informal empire and the weaknesses of British foreign policy under 
Attlee, the post-war Anglo-Iranian relationship is an under-explored subject. To date no substantive studies 
have been published in this area, and instead it is treated as an adjunct in Cold War histories or as a 
subsection of analysis of the Middle East at large. 
This is surprising given that the Anglo-Iranian relationship during this period was quite unique. By no means 
a formal colony or protectorate, Iran was instead part of the informal empire thanks to the AIOC’s 
disproportionate influence there. The oil company was not only a major employer and source of tax 
revenues, but the leading source of direct foreign investment and a supplier of key services including roads, 
schools and hospitals. The importance of Iranian oil to Britain was also undeniable. For example, the Abadan 
oil refinery was Britain’s largest single overseas asset: a testament to British power and the Royal Navy’s  
leading source of fuel.
Although nominally a state-owned asset, the AIOC was run very much as a private company. For example, 
the British government had no active representatives on its board of directors, and communication channels 
between the company and the state were limited with civil servants from the Ministry of Fuel and Power 
serving as reluctant intermediaries. The company was, however, a major source of tax revenue which, when 
coupled with the de facto representation it offered in the Middle East, was traditionally seen as something of 
a justification for maintaining the status quo. In turn, the AIOC became independent of both the government 
in London and its equivalent in Tehran.
Upon their election in 1945, Attlee’s government looked to alter this situation and to simultaneously 
strengthen relations with Iran through a comprehensive development program. It was hoped that by raising 
living standards and improving workplace conditions they might be able to improve Anglo-Iranian relations 
and engender a sense of goodwill towards London. However, by the end of 1951, just six years after 
Labour’s election, Britain’s informal empire in Iran had collapsed, the AIOC’s assets there nationalised and 
the union flag at Abadan lowered ignominiously. Although Britain would eventually salvage a stake in an 
internationalised oil company their monopoly over Iranian oil was very much over.
This thesis’ original contribution is to suggest that the decline of British power in Iran was largely the result 
of two factors: institutional division leading to mismanagement and orientalism. Although the AIOC was a 
vital representative of British power overseas and a nationally owned enterprise, policy makers in Whitehall 
had little control over its direction. The company’s management was headstrong in its approach and focused 
solely on maximising its profits with little interest in the effect this could have on Anglo-Iranian relations.
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With the Labour government, driven by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, determined to adopt a more 
conciliatory stance in Iran friction was an inevitability. Additionally, although Bevin’s policy was well 
intentioned, it failed to understand fully the challenges facing Iran and was applied in a haphazard fashion. 
Plans for reform were made without consulting the Iranian people and without considering the possibility of 
resistance from the AIOC, which was keen to reject micromanagement and unnecessary government 
interference. The division between the company and the state became particularly acute during discussions 
on the terms of the Supplemental Agreement, an amendment to the pre-existing Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Agreement. Despite successive efforts to shape AIOC policy and growing pressure from the United States to 
achieve a more equitable settlement, the British government was unable to exert any influence over the 
company, illustrating a fundamental weakness of informal empire. 
British disunity and mismanagement helped to create conditions in which nationalism could prosper. With 
Supplemental Agreement negotiations dragging, fringe nationalists were able to gain a foothold, rallying 
support from across Iranian society and tapping into latent anger towards Britain’s informal hold there. 
However, even as nationalist ideas festered on the streets and in the bazaars, British diplomatic actors, formal 
and informal alike, repeatedly failed to comprehend them.
The Iranian people were routinely orientalised and perceived as unable to succeed without British guidance. 
Paternalism was a pernicious influence, one that meant otherwise skilled policy makers grew complacent, 
overlooking the oncoming nationalist tide. The AIOC’s leadership were not immune from such shortcomings 
and, even at a time when cooperation was desperately needed, they refused to engage with the British 
government to develop a more cooperative and conciliatory policy.
The collapse of British power in Iran is an important case study for two reasons. First, it illustrates the 
limitations and frictions that can undermine informal empires. Second, it demonstrates an area of critical 
weakness for the Attlee government and for Ernest Bevin’s leadership in particular. While Bevin’s tenure as 
Foreign Secretary is perhaps best remembered for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and 
implementation of the European Recovery Plan it is important to remain vigilant and to probe those areas of 
failure as well as success. It is hoped that in doing so this thesis will prove a useful addition to the canon of 
literature available and provide a lasting contribution to a generally overlooked area of study. 
Historiography 
It is important to understand the research that has taken place to date and to locate this thesis within the 
wider historiography. To do this a historiographical review will be undertaken, utilising four subsections. The 
first will outline the importance of understanding Britain’s informal empire and Iran’s place within it, and 
discuss the significance of British orientalism. The second will explore the historiography of Anglo-Iranian 
relations and discuss its limitations. The third subsection will analyse the development of the Labour Party’s 
approach to foreign policy and the impulses, both traditional and novel, which shaped the Attlee 
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government’s approach in this field. Finally, the fourth subsection will investigate the Anglo-American 
relationship and how it influenced British policy in the Middle East. 
1. Britain and Iran: Informal Empire and Orientalism
Understanding the Informal Empire
Although one of the salient features of international relations for some three hundred years, defining what 
constituted the British Empire remains an important subject of academic discourse. To the popular 
imagination the empire generally refers to those nations coloured red on nineteenth century globes, and 
denotes London’s formal rule over far-flung dominions. However, the notion of the British Empire as a 
constitutional entity fails to take into account the diversity of a system that was far from uniform in its 
makeup and management. 
It is important to recognise that nations and territories could be drawn into the imperial system through 
economic, social and religious ties to Britain even if they were not formal dominions. A. G. Hopkins 
describes imperialism as involving “the diminution of sovereignty through the exercise of power” with 
sovereignty defined as “control over the key elements of statehood.”1 In an informal empire, the influence of 
foreign citizens and businesses over the flow of information, the provision of credit facilities or economic 
development may all impede a nation’s ability to exercise its own sovereignty and statehood. Acknowledging 
the existence of the informal empire, directed by non-state actors, is vital to understanding the British Empire 
more fully. 
The term “informal empire” was originally used in 1934 by Charles R. Fay to explain why the British did not  
seek to subjugate profitable trading partners, but Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher were the first to use it  
to explain the underpinning of Britain’s imperial system itself.2 Their co-authored 1953 article ‘The 
Imperialism of Free Trade’ proposes that, during the mid-Victorian period, maintaining British investment 
overseas was the overriding imperial goal. However, while the goals of the “official mind” of empire were 
based on continuity and mutuality between those working within it, the means of achieving them were fluid. 
In particular, Robinson and Gallagher stress the importance of non-state actors in the development and 
maintenance of a pluralist empire, one shaped by both excentric and metropolitan influences.3 John Darwin 
goes further, noting that although the “official mind” was “guided by its own memories, traditions and 
values”, it was reactive to changing circumstances, particularly at the peripheries where the influence of 
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1 A. G. Hopkins, ‘Informal Empire in Argentina: An Alternative View,’ Journal of Latin American Studies 26, No. 2 (1994) 476.
2 Charles R. Fay, Imperial Economy and its Place in the Foundation of Economic Doctrine, 1600-1932 (New York, 1934) referenced 
in Robin Winks, ‘On Decolonization and Informal Empire,’ The American Historical Review 81, No. 3 (June, 1976), 544; John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade,’ The Economic History Review 6, No. 1 (1953).
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foreign policy and the institutions from which they operated. The role of excentric influences on imperial expansion is explored 
further in: Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,' in Roger 
Owen and Bob Sutcliffe eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972); John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Africa and 
the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1961).
settlers, missionaries and traders was strongest.4 In this sense, individuals and non-governmental 
organisations were able to exert influence over the empire’s governance, shape and development. Working 
beyond Whitehall’s control, the form the empire took at its peripheries owed much to their own attitudes and 
experiences, as well as the conditions, whether economic or social, that they faced. 
While successive British governments had utilised traditional methods of imperial governance, including 
annexation, to guarantee their economic interests, the integration of overseas regions into Britain’s economic 
sphere was no less important a process. It created a network of informal power driven by the private sector 
and maintained with little government influence. In turn, a number of historians have argued that areas of 
British economic predominance, though not necessarily formalised control, should be considered in studies 
of the empire. William Roger Louis has crystallised this belief, stating that “looking at maps in imperial 
colours in order to judge the nature of imperialism...is like gauging the size of icebergs only by the parts 
above the waterline.”5 As Frank Ninkovich suggests, empires are built by the “effective control of an outside 
power” and while this may include annexation and constitutional subordination, it can also include “the 
workings of private social forces without overt political control.”6
Susan Strange posits that historians tend to concern themselves with relational power between states i.e. the 
contests and bargaining between given authorities, usually national governments.7 Concurrently structural 
power and the context of relations is too often ignored. She identifies four aspects of structural power: 
control over credit, control over production, control over security, and control of knowledge, beliefs and 
ideas.8 In an informal empire private actors may establish the structural framework in which all future 
relations take place. Thus while relational power between two nations appears even, perhaps because of 
agreed upon trade and security treaties, a structural imbalance exists beneath the surface. Relations are 
complicated further by Edmund S. K. Fung’s suggestion that private individuals and organisation attempt to 
seek the benefits of empire, “without assuming the responsibilities - administrative, financial and military - 
of formal rule.”9
Latin America is readily identified as an example of an area where the “informal techniques of free trade” 
brought nations like Argentina into Britain’s imperial system.10 Although not a formal dominion, Argentina 
relied disproportionately on British trade and investment, thereby engendering a sense of dependence on 
London from Buenos Aries. As A. G. Hopkins notes, by 1914 around half of Argentina’s fixed assets were 
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(June, 1997), 615.
5 William Roger Louis, ‘Robinson and Gallagher and Their Critics’ in William Roger Louis ed. Ends of British Imperialism: The 
Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (New York, 2006), 911.
6 Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism (New York, 2001), 5.
7 Hopkins, ‘Informal Empire in Argentina’, 477.
8 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London, 1998), 26.
9 Greg A. Barton, Informal Empire and the Rise of One World Culture (London, 2014), 14.
10 Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Introduction’ in Robin Winks ed. The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. V Historiography (Oxford, 
1999), 7.
owned by foreigners, primarily the British, while Argentine investors controlled an “infinitesimal share of 
British assets.” Similarly, while Argentina conducted around “28 per cent of her foreign trade with Britain in 
1913...less than 5 per cent of Britain’s overseas trade was accounted for by Argentina.”11 This structural 
imbalance was driven by private enterprise and not by government forces. However, it created an 
unambiguous relationship of British dominance and the integration of Argentina into their imperial system. 
In this equation the British government’s role was limited with little by way of planning or governance 
emanating from Whitehall. 
The expansion of informal empire was beneficial to Britain because it integrated new markets into the 
imperial system and enabled the exploitation of valuable foreign commodities. However, it also created a 
tension between the firms and individuals operating at the fringes of the empire and the government in 
Whitehall. There were no guarantees that British firms, pursuing short term profits, would act in the 
country’s long-term interests, or that the structures they created overseas would offer the optimal 
environment for British diplomacy.  Alexander Schölch has suggested that in pre-modern and modernising 
states the “men on the spot”, whether diplomatic, economic or military, had the ability to alter relations 
between states and to pursue policies with limited metropolitan influence.12 Thomas Otte has developed this 
line further and suggested a reservoir of insularity in the far-flung reaches of the British Empire where the 
power of the state was challenged by private bodies and individuals.13
Similarly, the informal empire was difficult to place within wider government strategy overseas. While the 
Colonial Office had been created to deal with colonial affairs and Britain’s foreign possessions (excluding 
India, which was managed by the India Office), it had no remit over the informal empire. Robin Winks notes 
this dichotomy, acknowledging that the informal empire grew independently from Colonial Office 
planning.14 Territories within the informal empire were also not included in Colonial Office plans for 
economic development or integration, areas that would become particularly important after the Second 
World War. Despite the economic value of the informal empire its existence beyond the scope of government  
and the reality of administration by private actors meant that little systematic analysis of its place within the 
wider imperial system took place.
When analysing the informal empire it is important to acknowledge subimperialism as an alternative means 
of expanding British power oversea through private means. Although related, the subtle but important 
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differences between these terms should be recognised. As John Darwin notes, subimperialism is a process 
carried out by “agents” working at the fringes of empire who, whether engaged in mercantile or missionary 
endeavors, undertake acts of “lobbying” to gain official support for their actions.15 While informal empire 
sees “influence worked almost entirely through private interests and enterprise, with at best spasmodic 
intervention by diplomats and advisors”, subimperialism sees the development of a “strategic lobby” as 
private individuals seek to “enlist support from home.”16 In turn, a “hinge or ‘interface’” is created at the 
fringes of empire between individuals and organisations drawn from both public and private spheres. D. K. 
Fieldhouse agrees, stressing the importance of lobbying requests made by sub-imperialists working at the 
“imperial periphery” and suggesting that “Europe was pulled into imperialism by the magnetic force of the 
periphery.”17 John McKenzie describes this process in nineteenth century Africa, arguing that Europeans 
“cajoled and eventually convinced their mother government to extend imperial rule” offering them a degree 
of protection.18 In his analysis of Japanese imperialism, G. W. Beasley makes similar claims, suggesting that 
subimperialism involved those “initiatives taken by men in positions of responsibility overseas, confident 
that a successful fait accompli would be ratified by their government at home.”19 
Throughout this study the term informal empire, as opposed to subimperial empire will be used when 
referring to Iran. Although there was a large degree of interaction between the British government and the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the latter was run as a private body and did not seek to leverage support for its 
actions from the state. The “strategic lobby” described by Darwin did not exist in Iran, where competition 
and conflict between the company and Whitehall was a hallmark of the post-war period.20 Where the British 
government took a proactive role in Iran, for example in their efforts to restructure the Iranian trade union 
movement, it did so of its own volition and without instruction or invitation by the AIOC. Similarly, even in 
times of difficulty, for example during the late stages of discussions on the Supplemental Agreement, the oil 
company was loath to call for government support and remained fiercely independent.
The interface between the public and private sectors has been of particular interest to Peter J. Cain and 
Anthony G. Hopkins. In their study British Imperialism (2002), Cain and Hopkins propose that the British 
Empire was created and sustained by the actions of a “gentlemanly capitalist” class, made up of bankers, 
merchants and government officials, operating from within the City of London.21 They suggest that the 
class’ makeup was reinforced by private schools, elite universities and networks of social clubs, creating a 
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17 D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (Ithaca, New York, 1973), 460.
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sense of mutual reliance between actors from the public and private spheres. It is tempting to suggest that the 
informal empire was also built upon this gentlemanly capitalist class and the strong relationships within it. 
However, this would be something of a misreading given the diversity of the informal empire and those who 
helped to build and manage it.
As Nicholas J. White argues, the empire’s governing class was not as discrete as Cain and Hopkins’ theory 
suggests. In Malaya he notes that “hairy kneed - and often Scottish - rubber planters had separate bars in the 
European clubs and were not expected to fraternize with the linen-clad - and mainly English - civil 
servants.”22 Antipathy was, according to White, shared not only between the different nationalities which 
made up the empire, but also between different sectors of imperial governance, hindering the solidification of 
the gentleman class. It should, for instance, be recognised that “many business leaders were contemptuous of 
public servants and politicians.”23 The sharp differences identified by White became particularly clear when 
tested by pressure overseas. In the post-war era, as nationalist movements emerged across the globe and the 
Cold War posed a new and dangerous threat, the lack of formalised communication between the public and 
private sectors became increasingly clear, as too did the former’s inability to influence and guide the latter. 
Sarah Stockwell notes that British business interests were “much more than bystanders” in the rapid political 
and social change that followed the Second World War.24 The management of the empire was then a fluid 
process that could be influenced by nominally independent and unaligned bodies. Notably, Stockwell rejects 
“the collaborative model of business-government relations” and, like White, is sceptical towards the 
existence of a “cosy City-Whitehall nexus.”25 
Informal and Subimperial Empire in the Middle East
Across the Middle East, the British Empire was constructed and sustained through informal and subimperial 
means. Peter Sluglett, for example, notes that Britain “had no colonies of settlement in the Middle East” and 
instead maintained its interests there through “unequal treaties...and....sizable economic interests.”26 As John 
Gaddis suggests, a lack of formal dominions or colonies is no barrier to the construction of empire, a system 
he defined as one in which “a single state shapes the behaviour of others, whether directly or indirectly, 
partially or completely, by means that can range from the outright use of force through intimidation, 
dependency, inducement or even inspiration... [A nation] need not send out ships, seize territories, and hoist 
flags to construct an empire.”27 
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Although nominally independent, countries like Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan were, according to James 
Onley, “just as integrated into Britain’s imperial system as British protected states. Their state infrastructures 
- from their militaries and civil services to their postal offices and schools - were often organised and run 
along British lines.”28 These structures were complemented by substantive British economic interests, which 
increased greatly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In 1875 Britain purchased the Egyptian 
government’s shares in the Suez Canal and in 1882 invaded the country, ostensibly to defend it from a 
nationalist uprising.29 Occupation followed, enabling Britain to control the levers of power in Egypt with the 
word of British advisor given primacy over Egyptian ministers. Subsequently, British soft power rose 
exponentially thanks to substantial investment in key industries like cotton and the extension of credit, 
usually with “unfavorable terms” attached.30
The depth of British interests in the country leads Philip D. Curtin to describe Egypt as a “veiled 
protectorate.”31 In 1914, the outbreak of the First World War and resultant threat to the Suez Canal from the 
Ottoman Empire, led Britain to formalise this status. The protectorate was short lived and in 1922 Britain 
unilaterally announced Egypt’s independence.32 However, British influence remained resolute. Not only did 
London retain control of the Canal Zone and strong links within the government, but also, thanks to the soft-
power of British entrepreneurs, dominated the upper echelons of Egyptian business.33 Additionally, Egypt’s 
inclusion within the Sterling Area limited the country’s economic sovereignty and provided “a sustained 
framework for international monetary relations” orchestrated by the Bank of England.34 It is clear that, 
despite Egypt’s nominal independence, its inclusion within the empire was, in the words of William Roger 
Louis, “just as much a reality as that of the Raj in India.”35
As in Egypt, the First World War enabled Britain to extend its influence in what was then the Ottoman 
Empire. Strategic imperatives here included military bases, the defence of British oil companies and shipping 
firms operating in the Persian Gulf.36 The Mesopotamian Campaign was launched in November 1914 and 
saw British Empire forces (largely Indian and Anzac) invade and occupy modern-day states including Israel, 
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Jordan and Iraq. Under the 1916 Asia Minor Agreement the former Ottoman territories were divided between 
Britain and France. This partition was codified during the 1920 San Remo Conference and saw London take 
control over United Nations mandates in Mesopotamia and Palestine. However, in the latter, a distinction 
was subsequently drawn between the semiautonomous Palestine and Transjordan regions.37
The mandate system enabled the British to shape the administration and business of much of the Middle 
East. For example, the Iraqi government did not receive any equity in the oil stocks uncovered there by the 
Turkish Petroleum Company in 1925, despite Baghdad’s demand that they receive at least a 20 percent stake 
in any concession. In contrast, British firms AIOC and Royal Dutch/Shell were awarded a majority share of 
the extraction and refinement rights under the terms of the Red Line Agreement.38 More subtly, Iraq’s 
inclusion in the Sterling Area meant that the country had no control over money supply and struggled to 
build an effective private sector banking structure: weakening investment and economic sovereignty.39
Underwriting Britain’s economic preponderance was political muscle. In 1921, for example, a British council 
of ministers, on the advice of T. E. Lawrence, selected the former King of Syria, Faisal I bin Hussein bin Ali 
al-Hasimi, to govern the country and even after Iraq declared its independence in 1932 Faisal remained King, 
ensuring the continuity of British influence.40 After Faisal’s death in 1933 his son Ghazi, a pan-Arab 
nationalist, took the throne, but struggled to contend with the difficulties caused by military and civic 
rebellions. These reached a crescendo in 1941 when a coup overthrew the pro-British Prime Minister Nuri 
as-Said, replacing him with Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, a sympathiser to Nazi Germany. Concerned that Iraq 
could become a staging post for a German invasion of the Middle East, the British opted to invade the 
country, returning as-Said to power and reaffirming their authority.41 
Such was their presence that the Middle East became “honeycombed with British military installations”, 
including, what Labour’s Secretary of State for War, Emmanuel Shinwell, termed, “the main base” on the 
Suez Canal, naval bases at Bahrain and Aden, and air fields in Iraq.42 It is unsurprising that the region 
developed into a key strategic theater during the Second World War. Although the bulk of forces under 
instruction from Middle East Command were dispatched to Egypt to fend off invasion from Italy and later 
Nazi Germany, the Vichy-French colonies of Syria and Lebanon were also occupied following the invasion 
of Iraq, described above.43 Ostensibly these nations remained independent, but Britain’s military presence 
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helped to reinvigorate London’s informal influence. Importantly, at the end of World War Two, there was 
little will to relinquish this.44 
Informal Empire in Iran
While British power in Egypt and the Palestine and Mesopotamian mandates had, where necessary, been 
supported by the state’s diplomatic, military and economic apparatus such subimperial codifications of 
influence were largely absent in Iran. Instead, British power was sustained almost solely through the power 
wrought by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The first British oil concession in Iran was secured in 1901, by 
gold magnate William Knox D’Arcy. Although ostensibly a private venture, D’Arcy received the backing of 
the British government to reach an agreement with Shah Mozzafer al-Din in the hope that it would give them 
a strategic advantage in the Middle East. It was felt that a productive British oil concession would serve as a 
useful tool of economic diplomacy, strengthening ties with Iran and dissuading Russia from advancing 
southwards to the Persian Gulf. 
According to a 1952 World Bank report, the terms were “very favourable” to Iran and the British were 
considered “far too liberal” in their negotiations. Iran not only received £20,000 cash, but also 16 percent of 
future net profits and shares equivalent to around 10 percent of the concession’s value.45 However, with no 
immediate successes D’Arcy’s capital quickly depleted and in 1905 he joined the Glaswegian firm Burmah 
Oil, which already had a limited commercial agreement to provide oil to the Admiralty through a commercial 
syndicate christened the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Alongside a change in ownership APOC transferred its 
exploration, refinement, production and marketing rights to a new firm: First Exploitation Company. This 
meant that the Iranian government no longer had a 10 percent interest in the operating concern, but only in 
the royalties received by First from APOC.  This technicality was, according to the World Bank, “the first 
step in watering down what was considered an unnecessarily generous agreement.”46
Even with new investment from Burmah Oil, APOC grew fitfully. However, the appointment of Winston 
Churchill to First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1911 saw a marked improvement in its fortunes. 
Churchill was dedicated to naval reform and establishing a fleet that could be run on oil, rather than coal. As 
such, the Admiralty began the search for a stable and cost-effective source of oil. Despite fierce competition 
from Royal Dutch/Shell, APOC emerged as the leading candidate, in part because of new studies revealing 
the scale of Iran’s untapped mineral deposits. Negotiations between APOC and the Admiralty were swift and 
on 20 May 1914 an agreement between them was signed for the British government to purchase 51 percent 
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of the company for £2.2 million. Although the deal took APOC into public hands, it was agreed that the 
company would continue to be run as a nominally private entity with the state taking a hands off approach. 
The idea of the government acting as a sleeping partner quickly became a defining feature of the AIOC’s 
ownership model.
APOC’s growth following nationalisation was rapid. Between 1912 and 1918 Persian oil production 
increased from 1,600 barrels per day to 18,000 (273,000 to 897,000 tons) and by 1916 APOC was meeting 
approximately 20 percent of the Royal Navy’s oil needs.47 The company’s profits also began to rise. In 
1916/17 they had totalled little over £400,000, but by 1920/21 they had risen more than tenfold to £4.2 
million, reaching £7.3 million by 1926/27.48
As APOC grew so too did resentment towards the company amongst the Iranian people. One source of 
particular dissatisfaction was the fluctuation in royalties received by the Iranian government. In 1929 the 
amount received was £1,437,000 dropping to £1,288,312 the following year and just £306,872 in 1931 as the 
company felt the effects of the Great Depression.49 To resolve this, a new oil concession was developed, 
passing into law on 28 May, 1933. The 1933 agreement can be interpreted as a victory for the Iranians 
because it reduced the area under APOC control to100,000 square miles, guaranteed royalty payments of at 
least £750,000 per annum (or 20 percent of net profits), included a one-off payment of £1 million and 
promised to ‘Iranise’ the company. However the agreement also saw APOC’s concession in Iran extended to 
1993 and included a clause preventing any alteration unless discussions were instigated by the company, 
theoretically blocking any protest from the Iranian government in future. Finally, the new terms exempted 
APOC from both duty payments on exports and national taxes for thirty years. 
Britain’s informal power in Iran was strengthened further by the Second World War thanks to the joint 
occupation of the country with the Soviet Union from June 1941 onwards. Occupation was justified as a 
necessity to prevent a German fifth column seizing control and to preserve Iran’s “real neutrality.”50 As part 
of this process, Shah Reza Pahlavi, a Nazi sympathiser, was forced to abdicate his throne to be replaced by 
his 22 year old son, Mohammad Reza Palhavi. Occupation unsurprisingly helped add to resentment amongst 
many Iranians towards the British who, despite Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s statement that their goal 
was not “to steal pries or pilfer”, were readily identified as taking from the country while returning very 
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little.51 It was widely felt that the British had an invisible hand in constitutional affairs, whether in the Royal 
Court or within the Majlis.52
Between 1941 and 1944 crude oil production more than doubled from 6,605 to 13,274 thousand tons and the 
refinement of 100-octane aviation spirit at the Abadan refinery also increased, from just 67,000 tons in 1941 
to 858,000 tons in 1944 and over one million tons per annum in 1945.53 Burgeoning demand reinvigorated 
investment levels in Iran and as investment increased so too did the links between AIOC leadership and 
Britain’s military leaders. S. H. Longrigg, for example, suggests that it was “not possible easily to distinguish 
between the strictly industrial operations of the company...and those designed to help the complex and 
massive operations of the military command.”54 
Simultaneously, Iranian grain yields fell by more than 20 percent against prewar levels, leading to food 
shortages across the country.55 As part of the war effort, Iran’s railway network and half of the country’s 
trucks, whether public or privately owned, were appropriated, removing approximately three quarters of 
Iran’s food distribution network and crippling private enterprise.56 Outbreaks of sporadic protest and even 
violence were not uncommon. However, they were generally suppressed, creating a sense that foreign forces 
were in control of Iran’s economic and political direction, but unaccountable to the Iranian people.57  
By the end of the Second World War, the AIOC’s economic strength had reached its zenith. In 1946 alone the 
company contributed £7.13 million to the Iranian Exchequer in direct payments, the single largest source of 
both tax income and foreign currency, and oil comprised up to 90 percent of Iranian exports in the years after 
World War Two.58 The company was also Iran’s biggest employer. In Abadan, a town with a population of 
around 115,000, more than 30,000 of 39,000 adult males were employed in extraction and refinement, and an 
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estimated 60,000 were dependent on these activities. A further 10,000 were believed to be earning their 
living indirectly from the company, for example as shop keepers.59 
Tellingly, the AIOC, not the state or regional government, was the leading provider of Iran’s infrastructure. 
Roads were constructed between oil fields and plants, housing, schools and hospitals created for employees 
and order maintained by a company-managed police force. According to World Bank observers, the AIOC 
had established itself as an “independent power in the territories surrounding its concession” and, given its 
contribution to the economy, the Iranian government had little ability to correct this.60 The British 
government tacitly supported this development. According to the Chiefs of Staff “without access to these 
supplies [of oil], neither the United States nor the United Kingdom could again provide supplies comparable 
with that forthcoming in the last war...the Southern Persian and Kuwait oilfields possessed the largest and 
most prolific sources of oil supply in the world.”61 By the late 1940s Iran produced 6.8 percent of the world’s 
oil, the loss of which would have, according to historian Steve Marsh, led to an additional dollar oil charge 
across Europe of up to £700 million per annum.62
Although the AIOC emerged from the Second World War in a position of unprecedented strength, its 
relationship with the British government remained distant at best and Whitehall lacked any means of 
influencing the AIOC’s policy. In the post-1945 era of nationalism and decolonisation, this arrangement was 
exposed as inadequate. As William Roger Louis notes, while “on the surface there might seem to be every 
reason for the accomplishments of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to be a source of British pride and an 
indication of the healthy state of British capitalism, in fact there was considerable tension between the 
company and the Labour government.”63 As Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted “[the AIOC] is virtually a 
private company with state capital and anything it does reacts [sic] on the relationships between the British 
government and Persia.”64 The company was similarly suspicious of the government. Ronald Hyam refers to 
chairman Sir William Fraser’s “fire-eating contempt” for ministers and civil servants, in whom he had little 
confidence.65 A “Scotsman to his fingertips” he was described by The Times as an “obstinate, narrow old 
skinflint” who personified the distant, single-minded nature of the AIOC itself.66  The divisions between the 
company and the British government are fundamental to understanding the collapse of British power. Unable 
to influence the direction of AIOC policy, Whitehall’s approach in Iran floundered and cooperation proved 
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impossible. At a time when collaboration was needed, little was forthcoming, even as the strength of Iranian 
nationalism threatened British power. However, while poor management and a lack of communication 
hindered Britain’s interests in Iran, so too did a pervasive tendency to orientalise the Iranian people and to 
view them as incapable of managing their own affairs. 
Orientalism and Hierarchy
Drawing on the work of Palestinian-American literary and cultural critic Edward Said, Kim W. Phillips 
suggests that orientalism can be interpreted in three ways. First, as the European study of Asian society, art 
and culture, second as a tendency to “group the diverse cultures of ‘the east’ under one heading....to produce 
the binary distinction of ‘orient’ and ‘occident’” and third, as the “discourse by which western societies have 
extended, developed, and justified political, economic, and other domination over eastern territories.”67  It is 
the third interpretation that is most relevant to this study. As will be seen, the British, whether in the employ 
of the government or the AIOC, had a tendency to characterise the Iranians as of weak moral character and in 
need of a guiding European hand. It is notable that while the British did not possess formal control in Iran 
there was a deep sense that, due to the passive nature of the Iranian people and their underdeveloped 
understanding of political ideology and national identity, Britain’s informal empire there was relatively 
secure and at greater risk from external, rather than internal, pressures. As a result, mismanagement in Iran 
became commonplace with policies devised and implemented without fully understanding how they would 
be received by the Iranian people themselves. Most damagingly, the condescending attitude held towards the 
Iranians made it difficult to recognise and respond to the onset of nationalism.
As David Cannadine notes, “hierarchy offered a cogent and appealing vision of imperial society and also 
therefore of imperial purpose” and a hierarchical approach to governance was a salient feature across the 
empire.68 In his 2007 study The British Left and India, Nicholas Owen highlights orientalist depictions of the 
Indian people as “very common”, even amongst otherwise-enlightened figures. There was, for example, a 
tendency not only to make “amateur speculations on caste and religion”, but also to “use racial 
categorisations, which came straight from colonial ethnography.”69 While Cannadine and Owen’s research 
focuses on the formal empire, a similar mindset was present in Iran. It will be noted, for example, that 
Iranian led development efforts were dismissed offhand, in favour of paternalistic programmes of 
improvement. The seemingly all pervasive nature of orientalism in Iran is perhaps unsurprising, given Said’s 
proposal that there was “scarcely any dissent, any departure, any demurral” from this attitude across the 
empire and when transgressions did take place they were on too small a scale to invoke wider change.70 
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The importance of racial classifications to the empire’s management has been questioned by Ronald Hyam. 
In Britain’s Declining Empire (2007), Hyam alludes to issues of race and identity, but concludes that “the 
most that can be said that race was a useful supporting mechanism for the imperial structure.71 He also 
questions whether derogatory attitudes truly coloured policy, arguing that “we need to distinguish between 
words and actions, ideas and implementation”, and is sympathetic towards colonial officials, who “did their 
often lonely jobs faithfully, fairly, and humanely.”72 While Hyam’s critique should not be discounted, there is 
wide-ranging evidence to suggest that racial hierarchy directly influenced policy, both in Iran and elsewhere. 
For example, Frederick Cooper suggests that across the British government there existed an “explicit and 
generalized assumption of African backwardness”, which helped to sustain an unreserved belief that the 
route to modernisation relied not on “the African present, but with the British imagination.”73 As a result 
institutions that could support African development, for example trade unions, were co-opted by the British 
and developed along European lines without consultation.
The idea of Britain exerting control over the African labour movement been explored in detail by Paul 
Kelemen who, in his essay ‘Modernising Colonialism: The British Labour Movement and Africa’ (2006), 
suggests that British policy in Kenya was “based on the idea of encouraging the emulation of British style, 
non-political trade unions...to inhibit the development of nationalist politics.”74 Like Cooper, Keleman 
focuses on trade union movement as a battle ground between competing ideas of modernity and the 
divergence between British and indigenous analysis of how workers should be represented. Keleman notes 
that British efforts to shape Kenyan trade unionism were married to “better welfare provision” and a general 
belief in building a labour force that was not only “disciplined and efficient”, but which could integrate into 
modern political society.75 As will be revealed, a similar effort to influence and control domestic trade 
unionism took place in Iran. It was believed that by codifying the unions their political strength could be 
managed and developed in a more favourable direction. Orientalism helped to underpin this outlook and 
shaped British perceptions of the Iranian people, their needs and their abilities. 
2. The Anglo-Iranian Relationship in the Secondary Literature
Although there is a vast amount of work dedicated to explaining the history of the British Empire, the 
historiography of Britain’s informal empire in Iran is patchy and it is treated as a minor subject even in 
notable surveys, such as Darwin’s Britain and Decolonisation (1988) and Hyam’s Britain’s Declining 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
21
71 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge, 2007), 39.
72 Ibid., 10 and 40.
73 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa, (Cambridge, 1996), 
212.
74 Paul Kelemen, ‘Modernising Colonialism: The British Labour Movement and Africa,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 34, No. 2 (June, 2006), 231.
75 Ibid., 232.
Empire.76 Tellingly Hyam’s four volume source collection, British Documents on the End of Empire, 
includes passing references to Iran, but no documents of any great use to historians of Anglo-Iranian 
relations or informal empire specifically.77 In part, this is reflective of wider geopolitical trends. The 1946 
Azerbaijan Crisis was, for example, perhaps the first Cold War crisis, meaning that subsequent events in Iran 
have been viewed through the lens of great power politics, rather than decolonisation.78 Similarly, although 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has received some attention, it is generally seen as the 
first step towards the 1953 Anglo-American Ajax Coup, which saw nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mussadiq ousted, rather than the culmination of a series of events in Anglo-Iranian and Anglo-American 
history.79 Finally, despite the influence the AIOC had over Iranian politics and its economic value to Great 
Britain, Iran is popularly viewed as an independent nation with economic links to Britain, and not part of the 
informal empire. However, given the disproportionate influence the AIOC held over the country’s political 
system and economy this is a misguided perspective.
One of the few scholars to have investigated Britain’s informal empire in Iran in depth is William Roger 
Louis. Louis argues, alongside Ronald Robinson, that after the Second World War the Labour government 
embraced the politics of continuity and sought to “reconstruct the imperial system in the familiar Victorian 
style of trade without rule where possible, rule for trade where necessary.”80 Implementing this policy would 
be “a network of client dynasties that were in the political, military, and financial grip of British diplomatic 
missions, military bases and oil companies.”81 In Iran, specifically, this approach manifested itself in a 
reliance on the AIOC to represent British interests and a trepidation on the government’s part to intervene in 
the company’s affairs.82 Concurrently, Louis suggests that the Labour administration undertook action to 
align itself with moderate Iranian nationalists, believing that this would weaken the threat of more radical 
forces gaining hold, and sought to illustrate the strategic value of their interests in Iran to the United States. 
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Louis argues that this was part of a wider British pattern of demonstrating the empire’s utility in preserving 
international stability, and a means of gaining leverage in resisting calls from some in Washington for it to be 
disbanded. Concurrently, he notes the weaknesses of this strategy, stressing that the government and AIOC’s 
strategies were too often misaligned. Additionally, he suggests that British policy makers were too optimistic 
in their assessments of collaboration with the United States, where sympathy for the informal empire was 
limited.83 
Louis’ analysis is shared by Simon Davis, who argues that the British government refused to shake off “their 
historic entitlement to bring the Middle East into the world” and instead looked to reorientate their empire 
around it after the Second World War.84 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in particular, was determined to 
follow this course, but also to cast the empire as a “progressive force”, both in Iran and elsewhere.85 
However, as Edward Henniker-Major notes, efforts to adopt a more “progressive” policy in Iran were 
undermined by Britain’s reliance of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was, by the late 1940s, “an 
outdated remnant of imperial power” and seemingly beyond reform.86 Henniker-Major casts doubts on 
Britain’s ability to collaborate with moderate nationalists, as suggested by Louis, concluding that the Attlee 
government was “blinded by their determination to uphold their control of the Iranian oil industry” and, in 
turn, failed to fully understand the depth and scale of Iranian nationalism.87 
A shared characteristic of Louis, Davis and Henniker-Major’s research is their tendency to focus heavily on 
the role played by British officials in shaping Anglo-Iranian relations and, perhaps even to romanticise them. 
According to Peter Sluglett, Louis, in particular, is also disposed towards portraying British diplomats in a 
“heroic” light.88 This is particularly true of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin whose limitations, whether 
strategic or operational, are not fully discussed. Louis, Davis and Henniker-Major’s mutual focus on the 
importance of high diplomacy and the Anglo-centric nature of their research also means that analysis of 
domestic political developments in Iran are marginalised. It is notable, for example, that little attention is 
paid to the growth of, or Britain’s reaction to, the Iranian trade union movement. Similarly, although the 
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theme of development in Iran is touched upon in each study, it is not analysed in depth, despite Louis’ 
recognition of the Labour government’s desire to build regional strength through collaboration.89
In contrast, Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran Between Two Revolutions (1982) focuses on understanding how the 
changing nature of Iranian politics and society influenced the country’s relationship with Britain.90 
Abrahamian stresses that British intervention was not the only source of political unrest, but fused with 
economic discord, corruption and an increasingly active urban political class to create a sense of social 
turbulence that challenged both traditional society and the informal empire upheld by the AIOC. 
Abrahamiam emphasises the limitations of Britain’s understanding of Iran and suggests that the British were 
hamstrung by orientalism and an inability to look beyond preconceived notions of what could be achieved 
there. Fakhreddin Azimi’s Iran: The Crisis of Democracy (1989) touches upon similar themes and suggests 
that political dislocation undermined British efforts to collaborate with the Iranians. This study is particularly 
useful as, what Azimi himself calls, an analysis of “how Iran was ruled” between the toppling of Reza Shah 
and the nationalisation of the AIOC and highlights the turbulent nature of domestic politics.91 
Further insight into Iranian politics and society is offered in Habib Ladjervardi’s Labor Unions and 
Autocracy in Iran (1985), which looks at the social make up and political influence wielded by the Iranian 
trade unions during and after the Second World War.92 Ladjervardi demonstrates that the British were 
ignorant of how Iran’s labour movement functioned and, with their judgement clouded by orientalism, 
struggled to influence its course. Mostafa Elm’s Oil, Power and Principle (1992) is similarly focused on 
Britain’s incomprehension of Iranian society and suggests that orientalism and paternalism clouded every 
aspect of Anglo-Iranian relations, from inter-government relations to the treatment of AIOC staff by their 
managers.93 Highly triumphalist in tone, Elm champions the role played by nationalist stalwart Mohammad 
Mussadiq in the collapse of British power, suggesting that the AIOC and British government overlooked his 
political genius and popular support.
Completing the diplomatic and socio-economic studies discussed above are business histories, which have a 
focus beyond British imperialism and decolonisation, but contain useful insight and analysis. Francis 
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Bostock and Geoffrey Jones’ Planning and Power in Iran (1989), for example, focuses on the work of 
Abolhassan Ebtehaj, the first Governor of Bank Melli, Iran’s national bank and a leading proponent of 
Iranian-led development in the postwar period. It is argued that Ebtehaj challenged the foundations of British 
hegemony in Iran, particularly their control of banking and currency. The Imperial Bank of Persia (IBP) was 
perhaps the most obvious example of Britain’s informal empire in this sector. Although opposition to the 
IBP had been present under Reza Shah, Ebtehaj pushed for the Bank Melli to “take its rightful position as 
Iran’s central bank” and the “dominating factor” in Iran’s economy with “full powers over the country’s 
monetary and credit policy.”94 By 1944, dogged by accusations of running a haphazard service, the IBP was 
ignominiously closed. As Bostock and Jones note, Ebtehaj’s victory has been largely ignored by historians 
and identified as a technocratic, but perhaps not political milestone. With the benefit of hindsight it is 
possible to equate the establishment of Bank Melli as Iran’s central bank as a challenge to British hegemony 
and the foundations underpinning the informal empire there. Ebtehaj’s success should perhaps have been 
seen as a warning and an indication that Britain’s position was in fact quite vulnerable. The work of Iranian 
scholar Ali Ansari corroborates with this suggestion, not least his assertion that Ebtehaj’s influence “may be 
usefully compared to that of Mossadeq.”95 
A further contribution by Bostock and Jones is British Business in Iran, 1860s-1970s (2003). This volume 
charts Britain’s “business presence” in Iran and the role of the IBP as an “agent of empire” that added to 
“tensions” between the British and Iranian governments and the AIOC.96 Again, it is argued that the informal 
empire in Iran had parameters and British power there was perhaps not as strong as the AIOC’s profitability 
would suggest. Certainly, Bostock and Jones establish that opposition to British intervention, informal or 
otherwise, was not a new feature of the Anglo-Iranian relationship after World War Two, but rather a long-
term, albeit background aspect of it. 
Finally, J.H. Bamberg’s The History of the British Petroleum Company (1994) charts the evolution of British 
Petroleum and dedicates several chapters to analysing the triangular relationship among AIOC, the British 
government and Iran.97 Bamberg utilises a range of company records and interviews with key stakeholders to 
map the AIOC’s relationship, not only with Iran and the British government, but also other oil companies. In 
doing so he helps both to expose the AIOC’s deep rift with the British government and draw attention to 
under researched areas of collaboration i.e. in the production of sustainable housing for employees. An 
officially sanctioned ‘autobiography’, Bamberg’s tone can be excessively complementary to successive 
AIOC board members. This thesis challenges this perspective by providing a more critical narrative of how 
their policies influenced and conflicted with British foreign policy.
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3. The Labour Party, the Empire and Development
The analysis above demonstrates the significance of imperial reorientation after the Second World War and it 
is important to understand not only the Attlee government’s policies, but why the Labour Party adopted this 
approach. It will be suggested that, although the Labour had initially embraced a foreign policy coloured by 
both internationalism and pacifism, the changing international situation meant that by the mid-1930s realism 
had become critical to the party’s outlook. The Second World War offered an opportunity for further 
evolution and meant that by 1945 preserving Britain’s status as an international power was the principal goal 
of the party’s foreign policy with the empire identified as a key resource in achieving this. However, some 
traces of internationalism lingered. In particular, it was hoped that imperial reorientation could be beneficial 
to the empire as a whole, rather than to Britain alone. It was hoped, for example, that economic development 
schemes would lift millions from poverty and engender a sense of goodwill towards London while also 
providing the Exchequer with a steady source of revenue.
The Roots of Labour’s Foreign Policy
In the first volume of her overview of the evolution of Labour’s foreign policy, Rhiannon Vickers notes that 
the party “emerged in a very specific context, namely to represent the working class of the most powerful 
nation of its day.”98 John Callaghan concurs, stating that the “Labour Representation Committee was 
formed...for the purpose, as its name indicates, of promoting independent working-class representation in 
Parliament.”99 According to Vickers, the party was “born out of domestic discontent” and its policy was 
shaped by “the beliefs and standpoints of the various groups that came together to create it, and the dynamics 
between them, rather than necessarily the external world and experience and appraisal of international 
affairs.”100 In turn, a degree of insularity emerged. Analysing Labour’s early years, Henry Pelling suggests 
that the party had a tendency to focus solely domestic labour issues and while its Conservative and Liberal 
opponents developed highly evolved foreign policies, Labour’s focus remained parochial.101 A. J. P. Taylor 
highlights this position by suggesting that upon entering parliament in 1892, Keir Hardie, “kept quiet about 
foreign affairs....lest he compromise his essential commitment to the cause of labour at home.”102
Kenneth O. Morgan identifies the “end of the First World War” as the point at which the Labour Party began 
to develop a clear and coherent narrative on foreign policy.103 He suggests that Labour increasingly saw its 
position as to “embody the decent, pacific instincts of ordinary people, free from the intrigues of 
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multinational capitalism or the inbred world of public-school diplomacy.”104 Callaghan agrees with this 
conclusion, but also identifies the party’s efforts to establish an International Labour Organisation to 
“promote decent standards on matters affecting workers” as evidence of internationalist ambitions.105 There 
was also resistance from Labour towards the Treaty of Versailles, and, according to Callaghan, broad 
agreement towards the findings of J. M. Keynes in his The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), 
which suggested that the postwar settlement could have dangerous economic repercussions for Europe by 
reinforcing an international system based on great power politics.106
The First Labour Governments
The “pacific instincts” described by Morgan would manifest themselves under the first Labour government, 
which in 1924 brokered a truce between France and Germany and agreed to a trade treaty with communist 
Russia.107 These actions were conciliatory and reforming, demonstrating a clear break with the past. It may 
be suggested that the party’s focus on domestic affairs inadvertently created a foreign policy designed to 
avoid entanglements overseas, which would detract from issues of domestic empowerment. In the words of 
party leader Ramsay MacDonald, Labour should be “a responsible instrument of radical thinking” and 
pursue rational policies which would guarantee stability and conditions favourable for the betterment of 
Britain’s working classes.108 Although the first Labour government lasted just nine months, Vickers describes 
its foreign policy as successful and as marking “the beginning of a policy for Great Britain of the promotion 
of peace and reconciliation among the peoples.”109
Throughout the 1920s this outlook became more entrenched. In 1926, for example, the Labour Party 
Conference voted in favour of a general strike should war break out.110 Similarly, the party consistently 
opposed rearmament and, despite early opposition to the organisation due to its perceived weaknesses, the 
League of Nations became readily identified as the lead institution for deterring international aggression. In 
1929 the party formed its second government, again as a minority. Labour’s manifesto explained that the 
party stood “for arbitration and disarmament”, demonstrations of which included removing British troops 
from the Rhineland and agreeing to a revision of the Young Plan to reduce German reparations payments.111
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Perhaps most important for the British Empire was McDonald’s decision to call a round table conference on 
the future of India in 1930. These talks can be interpreted as the first effort to remodel the imperial system 
and enable a colony to move towards becoming a self-governing, federal state.112 It would, however, be a 
mistake to view the Labour government’s policy as designed to breakup the empire. Rather, it was part of an 
effort to reconcile socialism at home with the competing impulses of internationalism and imperialism 
overseas. The result was a somewhat paternalistic view of the empire and a determination to allow colonial 
states a degree of autonomy within the imperial system and, where possible, provide the education and 
capital needed to aid their development. This policy can be seen as a continuation of the party’s 1918 
manifesto pledge to “extend to all subject peoples the right of self-determination within the British 
Commonwealth of Free Nations” and would colour Labour’s foreign policy for decades to come.113 
The Fabian Society and Internal Disunity
Although Labour had gradually come to concern itself with foreign affairs, they remained a secondary issue 
when compared with domestic matters. Despite this limitation, a number of affiliated think tanks became 
forums for discussions of foreign policy in a socialist context. The most important was the Fabian Society, a 
distinctly metropolitan organisation whose members saw themselves as something of a vanguard for the 
masses, stressing that socialism would arrive through the ideas of the few, rather than the action and 
organisation of the many.114 The Fabians’ first major statement on the future of the empire came in 1900 with 
the publication of George Bernard Shaw’s Fabianism and the Empire. This document makes for interesting 
reading. Not only does it suggest that “native governments” were unable to guarantee the “international 
rights of travel and trade”, but also that British guidance was essential to do so. It should also be noted, 
however, that the pamphlet railed against the “purely piratical conquests of weaker states”, insisting upon an 
empire in which foreign subjects would be “awakened by socialism.”115  
The Fabian’s focus on guided development, for Britain’s working classes and colonial subjects alike, 
resonated strongly within the party, and parallels can be drawn between this outlook and that adopted by the 
1924 and 1929 Labour governments.116 In 1956, Labour MP, Richard Crossman would describe the party’s 
tradition in the arena of foreign affairs as based on the belief “that Britain must stand for applying morality in 
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international affairs and, in particular, for helping small nations to achieve their independence; that rich and 
fortunate nations have an obligation to raise up the backward colonial peoples.”117 
However, while Labour’s approach to foreign affairs had been refined, the formation of the National 
Government in 1931, and subsequent expulsion of Ramsay MacDonald, retarded its progress by exposing 
deep rifts within the party. Increasingly the trade union movement, represented most clearly by the Trade 
Unions Congress (TUC), demanded a more strident approach to policy overseas and a recognition of the 
increasingly dangerous international climate.118 In contrast, George Lansbury, party leader from 1932 until 
1935, advocated unilateral disarmament and the dismantling of the British Empire.119 A clear schism 
emerged between the camps, the depth of which was revealed by a TUC delegate who, referencing the 
emerging menace of Nazi Germany, suggested that “pacifism in the face of that is absolute cowardice.”120
Foreign Policy Under Attlee
Increasingly divisive, Lansbury opted to resign as party leader in November 1935, to be replaced by deputy 
leader Clement Attlee. Described by historian Andrew Davies as “quiet, unassuming and with the appearance 
of a suburban bank manager”, Attlee was a conciliatory figure who was able to draw the TUC back into the 
fold, thanks in large part to his excellent working relationship with General Secretary Ernest Bevin.121 Attlee 
also recognised the importance of Labour re-examining its approach to foreign affairs. He established a 
Defence Committee and announced his determination to “take steps to create a better knowledge of defence 
problems in the party.”122 Bevin’s suggestion at the 1936 TUC conference that “we are not going to meet the 
fascist menace by mass resolution” was evidence of a hardening resolve, as was his call for an increase in the 
pace of rearmament, which gained support from Attlee.123 Unlike many within the British political 
establishment, Bevin was quick to highlight the dangers of appeasing Hitler’s gains in Czechoslovakia and, 
according to his biographer Alan Bullock, embodied the trade union movement’s belief that pacifism, though 
an intellectually pleasing philosophy, had limited practical application.124 
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On 10 May, 1940 Labour agreed to enter a coalition government under Winston Churchill’s premiership, 
solidifying the transformation from a divided basket case to a party of government. Broad consensus exists 
amongst scholars that Labour’s greatest influence during the war was in the realms of domestic affairs. 
Bevin, for example, became Minister of Labour and was vital in the centralisation of Britain’s workforce.125 
Meanwhile, Attlee served as Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Prime Minister. However, it would be a mistake to 
suggest that analysing the party’s position on foreign affairs was anything but an ongoing process. 
According to a subsection of the party’s 1944 conference review “there were terrible risks in being weak” 
and “it is better to have too much armed force than too little.”126 Similarly, there was an emphasis on 
“unprecedented development and progress under the guidance of the Mother Country” in the colonies, to 
both raise living standards overseas and reinvigorate Britain’s post-war economy.127 Again it was Bevin who 
underlined Labour’s realist outlook in the field of foreign affairs, telling the 1945 party conference that, if 
elected, they would “form a government which is at the centre of a great empire and Commonwealth of 
Nations” and have to seize the responsibility for its management.128 In what Morgan terms the choice 
between “consolidation and socialist advance”, Labour opted for the former and attempted to maintain 
Britain’s position at the centre of international affairs.129 
The Second World War also saw an explosion of intellectual activity, as Labour members and affiliated 
organisations began to think about how to build a new, improved society in peacetime. One of the most 
important organisations was the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB). Formed by Arthur Creech Jones and Rita 
Hinden in 1940, the FCB was the leading forum for discussions of socialism and the British Empire. The 
group’s outlook bares the hallmarks of the Fabian’s early colonial philosophy in that it sought to reconcile 
imperialism with development and raising the living standards of colonial subjects  According to Hinden it 
was the duty of socialists to serve as “trustees” and to “develop and enrich” the colonies. She would later 
summarise the FCB’s priorities as “the establishment of trade unions and cooperative societies, schools and 
welfare services and the money to pay for them, [and] grand projects of colonial development.”130  
J. F. Milburn argues that the FCB was the “sole political research group devoting its efforts to colonial 
affairs” and the “only traceable Fabian influence upon the thinking of Members of Parliament” during the 
Attlee years.131 Milburn contends that “by occasionally recommending a course of action on a specific issue” 
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the FCB was able to maintain influence in specific, albeit sometimes niche areas.132 Under Attlee its 
cofounder, Creech Jones, would be appointed Colonial Secretary, giving him an opportunity to implement 
many of the ideas he had devised within the FCB. Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton suggest that the 
FCB’s influence would emerge particularly clearly in social development projects in post-war Africa and 
formed the basis for both short and long term British planning there.133 
The 1945 publication Fabian Colonial Essays gives a flavour of the Bureau’s interests on the eve of 
Labour’s election. H. N. Brailsford’s ‘Socialists and the Empire’ outlines the necessity of a “positive policy” 
towards the empire, and the need to “find for these backwards races a function which fits them and yet 
assures the prospect of reaching equality with liberty.”134 Support for this message from within the Labour 
government was clear. In July 1946, for example, Colonial Secretary George Hall remarked that “I can say 
without hesitation that it is our policy to develop the colonies and all their resources so as to enable their 
peoples speedily and substantially to improve their economic and social conditions, and, as soon as may be 
practicable, to attain responsible self government.”135 It should be noted that throughout these discussions the 
will and desire of the colonised were not considered. This was reflected across Britain’s political class, but 
can also be seen as an extension of the Fabian’s belief in the need to serve as a vanguard for the masses.
The notion of a “positive policy” indicates a certain optimism as to what could be achieved in peace. 
However, it is clear that despite the FCB’s rigorous planning for colonial Africa, little analysis of the 
situation in the Middle East was undertaken and, as a result, development plans there were prepared in 
something of an ad hoc manner. Similarly, the FCB, and indeed the Labour Party itself, failed to 
acknowledge the influence that British business could have on overseas policy. Certainly, potential points of 
dispute were not analysed in any great detail. It seems then that while Labour’s 1945 manifesto Let Us Face 
the Future promised that Britain would “play the part of brave and constructive leaders in international 
affairs” how this would be achieved went largely undiscussed with ill-defined and abstract goals favoured 
over rigorous planning.136
As Kathleen Paul notes, the Labour Party was confident that it could reap “political and economic benefits” 
of the formal and informal empire and use them not only to preserve Britain’s international stature, but also 
to fund domestic development.137 They hoped, according to Michael Collins to “have their cake and eat it 
too.”138 Collins argues that the FCB believed overseas development would lead to “increasing dollar earning 
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exports” and be of “benefit [to] the metropole” while also helping to create “‘de-tribalised’ societies with 
functioning civil society.”139 In the long term “formal constitutional decolonisation” would eventually give 
way to a “looser, but still substantial economic and political cooperation” between Britain and the colonies, 
founded on this sense of collaboration.140 
This line of argument has been rigorously pursued by, amongst others, John Darwin who, in Britain and 
Decolonisation, highlights the importance of the informal empire and Labour’s unwillingness to relinquish 
control over it.141 The Attlee government had “no disposition to seek a post-imperial future” and instead 
hoped that informal paramountcy abroad would help to fund welfare development and the payment of war 
debts at home.142 Illuminating this point, Darwin suggests that the Labour government anticipated that “the 
signs of British domination...would be replaced by tactful self-effacement.”143 However, this policy was 
neither uniformly administered, nor universally successful. As will be seen, while the Colonial Office led 
unprecedented investment efforts in Africa, this pattern was not repeated in either Iran, despite it being a key 
source of valuable raw materials. 
Britain’s efforts at retrenchment were stymied further by dwindling prestige. Darwin suggests that the end of 
the Raj “tore a gaping hole in the fabric of the old pre-war imperial system” and saw an upsurge not only of 
nationalism, but also of insecurity, the pertinent question being: “if British power could be levered out of 
India, why should it not be blown out of the Gold Coast, or Kenya or Malaya?”144 He contends that Labour 
failed to comprehend Britain’s declining global stature, and continued to pursue an unbending imperialist 
foreign policy. In part this calculation was economic and rested on the assumption that British recovery 
required the direct protection of profit-generating assets overseas, but it was also the result of a failure to 
understand the growing strength of nationalism, even in areas beyond London’s formal control.
This theory was further refined in Darwin’s The Empire Project (2011), which suggests that by the end of the 
Second World War Britain had become “caught in a vice” in the Middle East.145 Darwin argues that “the 
logic of their economic and geopolitical position had deepened their dependence upon their Middle East 
assets...the British largely hid from themselves the inconvenient truth that the burden they imposed upon 
Middle East politics was actually growing at a time when those polities were under intense social and 
political strain.”146 There was, in this sense, a failure on London’s part to recognise the impact of their 
policies or the growing antipathy towards their intervention in the informal empire. Certainly in Iran the 
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rising tide of nationalism was directed towards the AIOC, an organisation that the British government 
simultaneously relied upon as a source of power and struggled to exert influence over.
The idea of the Attlee government using the empire as a means of maintaining its international role has 
subsequently become recognised by scholars in various fields of history. For example, while Alan Bullock 
and John Saville have identified this trend in studies of the Labour Party specifically, it is also recognised by 
historians focusing on the history of the British Empire more generally.147 Indeed, given the depth of material 
available, it may be argued that a broad consensus has emerged with the empire’s resources at the heart of 
Labour’s plans to remain an international power. As Ronald Hyam notes, far from implementing a socialist-
internationalist foreign policy, Labour’s plans hinged on continuity and utilising whatever tools available to 
them to preserve British power.148 
Labour and Iran
The evolution and, in some respects, hardening of Labour’s approach to foreign policy was clear in the 
Anglo-Iranian relationship under the Attlee government. This thesis proposes that, between 1945 and 1947, 
the Foreign Office under Bevin’s leadership attempted to revitalise Anglo-Iranian relations through concerted 
development efforts. It was hoped that these would win favour amongst the Iranian people and allow for the 
continued exploitation of Iranian oil by the AIOC. Additionally, and in some respects owing to Bevin’s own 
legacy, trade unionism became a focal point in efforts to improve Iranian civic society and increase political 
participation there. These efforts, however, failed due not only to underinvestment, but also a lack of 
planning. Although a broad vision for Iran existed, few steps had been taken towards achieving this. In part, 
Iran suffered from its position within the informal empire. Had it been incorporated into the empire, it is 
likely that development there would have fallen under the remit of the Colonial Office, a department heavily 
influenced by the Fabian Colonial Bureau.  
As will be revealed, a clear gulf emerged in overseas development policy in Iran and the formal colonies 
under the Attlee government. While development in the former was an ad hoc process governed by 
circumstance and curtailed by both economic discord at home and a lack of direction within the Foreign 
Office, the latter benefitted from greater consistency and planning. No less important, Labour’s plans for 
development in Iran were highly paternalistic, reinforcing Britain’s image as a domineering force and 
fuelling opposition towards them. While Labour figures often spoke of the need for a socialist foreign policy 
at no point did this appear to include consultation, discussion or negotiation with those nations that were 
considered undeveloped. In Iran, this problem was exacerbated further by the limited ability of successive 
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ambassadors to understand Iranian political society or develop positive working relations with the AIOC. 
With Iran still something of a diplomatic backwater, the role of ambassador was central to shaping the 
direction of British policy there.
Labour’s focus on development, both as a means of maintaining international power and strengthening ties 
overseas, also failed due to the costs involved in this strategy. By 1947, Britain was in dire economic straits 
and it was not only unfeasible to continue funding Iranian development projects, but increasingly important 
that British oil interests in Iran remained profitable. A contradiction was thus created between the socialist-
internationalism in which the party’s outlook was anchored and the realist approach to foreign affairs that 
had grown increasingly influential since the 1930s. This schism grew more pronounced as funds for 
development dwindled and Anglo-Iranian relations appeared ever more one-sided. Allied to this was a 
further oversight: Labour’s failure to calculate for the impact of non-state actors on international policy. In 
Iran, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company did not act in parallel with the state, but in opposition to it. Cooperating 
with a business that was at times openly hostile to government intervention would prove a great challenge to 
Bevin’s tenure and illustrate an inherent weakness in his earlier estimations of what could be achieved. The 
AIOC’s unilateralist instincts towards relations with the Iranian government helped to dampen development 
efforts, sowed seeds of mistrust within the Foreign Office and tested the strength of the Britain’s relationship 
with the United States, its closest ally.
4. Anglo-American Relations and the Emerging Cold War
As Anthony Adamthwaite notes, establishing “a policy independent of the United States and the Soviet 
Union” was fundamental to Britain maintaining its status as a great power. However, the Attlee government 
was also determined to cooperate with the USA wherever possible.149 In Iran this proved to be a difficult 
balancing act. Wary that domestic unrest could lead to communism, the United States attempted to coerce 
Britain into establishing a more equitable oil agreement with Iran. In doing so, it is clear that policy makers 
in Washington failed to acknowledge either the strength of AIOC unilateralism or Whitehall’s inability to 
exert influence over the company. Subsequently, Labour became caught between their goal of maintaining 
Britain’s status as a preeminent international power, Iranian political unrest and the demands of the American 
government. Given the importance of the Anglo-American relationship, both to Britain’s position in Iran and 
more generally, the friction between the allies merits deeper analysis.
Although Anglo-American relations have often been characterised in glowing terms - from Margaret 
Thatcher’s “extraordinary alliance” to Harold Wilson’s “close relationship” - it is Winston Churchill’s 
description of a “special relationship” that has proved most enduring. The term, first coined in February 1944 
and later popularised by Churchill’s March 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri, has become part of the lexicon 
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of Anglo-American relations and remains a popular yardstick against which relations between London and 
Washington are measured.150 
The image of “specialness” was reinforced by what Alex Danchev calls the “evangelical” literature of the 
1950s.151 H. C. Allen’s Great Britain and the United States (1955) described “a tale of closeness and 
intimacy unparalleled in history” in which a shared language, history and culture helped to cultivate bonds 
across the Atlantic.152 Evangelical literature served not only to explain the past, but also to apply a positive 
value to it. Writing almost twenty years after Great Britain and the United States’ publication, Allen would 
admit that his study had been “sanguine, not to say sentimental.”153 
In the United States assessments were, perhaps unsurprisingly, less charitable. As David Reynolds has 
demonstrated, the work of Leon Epstein and Richard Gardner illustrates British unease towards their new 
position as a junior partner and declining international stature.154 Epstein argues that in the post-war era 
American leaders grew gradually “less concerned about the reaction of our British allies than of the 
continental nations”, suggesting that British power was noticeably diminishing.155 In the 1960s Epstein and 
Gardner’s research gave way to more forceful revisionism. Gabriel Kolko, for example, stresses that the 
British Empire was, along with the Soviet Union, one of the key barriers to American international 
hegemony and that their relationship at the end of World War Two was one of antagonistic compromise, 
rather than closeness.156 
The 1967 amendment of the 1958 Public Records Act meant that in 1972 British government documents for 
the years 1941 to 1945 were made public, releasing an explosion of new scholarship on the Second World 
War. William Roger Louis’ Imperialism at Bay (1977) is a particularly strong example of this.157 Louis 
employs a regional approach to suggest that, despite Kolko’s claims to the contrary, British and American 
attitudes towards colonialism at the end of World War Two were not too dissimilar and, despite public anti-
imperialist rhetoric, American leaders were unwilling to force the British to give up their interest overseas. 
Two factors contributed to this position. First, American leaders increasingly recognised that Britain’s 
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colonial dependencies were not ready for independence. Second, the growing threat of the Soviet Union led 
to a volte face on the benefits of empire as the United States came to recognise its importance as a shield 
against communist expansion and guarantor of stability. As Louis states, “from about 1943 into the period of 
the Cold War the general policy of the American government...tended to support rather than to break up the 
British imperial system.”158 Louis’ findings are supported by Kathleen Burk, who argues that as the Cold 
War intensified positive relations with the British became of ever greater value to the United States, where “a 
new appreciation of the value of the British Empire” had developed. Quoting a State Department policy 
statement from June 1948, Burk suggests this was the result of Britain’s “worldwide network of strategically 
located territories of great military value.”159 
Collaboration between Britain and the USA was not guaranteed, but, in the words of Alex Danchev, 
“reactionary to circumstance” and underwritten by “functionality.”160 Although both nations were able to 
benefit from the relationship their outlooks, goals and approaches were different and had the potential to 
conflict with one another, leading Christopher Thorne to characterise it as “remarkably close and yet 
particularly strained.”161 During the 1980s, descriptions of a relationship based on functionality, rather than 
emotion or culture, became particularly popular. David Reynolds’ The Creation of the Anglo-American 
Alliance (1981) redefined the early wartime Anglo-American relationship as driven by “competitive 
cooperation” and “continual manoeuvring for advantage.”162 Rather than viewing relations with the USA in 
fraternal or familial terms, Reynolds suggests that a “bitterness” and an “anti-American grain” existed within 
the British government.163 Meanwhile Robert Hathaway’s Ambiguous Partnership (1981) argues that 
ambivalence between London and Washington was deep-seated, and made it difficult to develop mutually-
agreeable policies in both war and peace.164 For many American policymakers the yoke of anti-colonialism 
was difficult, if not impossible, to completely shake off. Meanwhile, in Whitehall a sense of superiority 
towards their inexperienced and idealistic counterparts across the Atlantic. In recent years a consensus 
around the functionality of the Anglo-American relationship has developed, thanks in large part to what 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
36
158 Louis, ibid., 46-47, 56, & 99-100. The links between American foreign policy and British imperialism are something of a constant 
theme in Louis work and are also central to ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’ and The British Empire in the Middle East. It is 
hoped that this study will positively contribute to/ this canon of research.
159 Burk, Old World, New World, 577-578.
160 Danchev, ‘On Specialness’, 739.
161 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 725.
162 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (London, 1981), 
3.
163 Ibid., 58 & 90.
164 Robert Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and American, 1944-1947 (New York, 1981). See also: Tuvia Ben-Moshe, 
‘Winston Churchill and the ‘Second Front’: A Reappraisal,’ The Journal of Modern History 62 No. 3 Sept. 1990 and Laila Amin 
Morsy, ‘Britain’s Wartime Policy in Egypt, 1940-42,’ Middle Eastern Studies 25, No. 1 (Jan, 1989).
Nigel Ashton calls the “fascination” surrounding this topic.165 However, despite the burgeoning canon of 
literature, some areas of the relationship remain under researched, not least how it operated in Iran.
Anglo-American Relations in Iran
Of those studies that concern themselves solely with the Anglo-American relationship in Iran, the most 
extensive are Simon Davis’ Contested Space (2009) and Mary Ann-Heiss’ Empire and Nationhood (1997).166 
The former is the only comprehensive study of the Anglo-American relationship in the Persian Gulf between 
1939 and 1945 and suggests that it was shaped by two interrelated factors. First, British statesmen saw their 
American colleagues as inexperienced in Middle Eastern affairs and incapable of creating a successful policy 
there. Second, American figures in the Middle East were sceptical about Britain’s ability to govern the 
region, viewing London’s policies as a potential cause of instability. An undercurrent of, what Davis terms, 
“Wilsonian internationalism” influenced American planners and fuelled their desire to reduce Britain’s 
influence over the region’s affairs. It was hoped that doing so would promote free trade, enterprise and 
democratic governments friendly to American interests.
Like Davis, Heiss argues that the primary American goal in Iran was guaranteeing economic and political 
stability. However, she identifies this goal as inherently linked to global security, rather than 
internationalism, Wilsonian or otherwise. Domestic chaos, she argues, was seen as providing fertile ground 
for communism to prosper and identified as a danger to regional security. Although the two were initially 
divergent in their outlooks, Anglo-American relations began to converge after the AIOC’s nationalisation. 
Fearful that Iran’s new Prime Minister, Mohammad Mussadiq, would align himself with the Soviet Union 
the American government toppled him in cooperation with London. Meanwhile, recognising that they would 
be unable to dominate Iran unilaterally, the British came to recognise that working in tandem with the USA 
was the best means of restoring any semblance of the old order there. 
Neither Contested Space or Empire and Nationhood frame the Anglo-American relationship in anything 
other than functional terms. To Heiss in particular, the relationship was valued by the United States when it 
could provide geopolitical stability and prevent Soviet expansionism and discounted when it could not. 
Despite their strengths, these studies each have a number of weaknesses. First and most importantly, they fail 
to recognise the division between Britain’s diplomatic and non-diplomatic actors in Iran. Although the AIOC 
was ostensibly a nationalised company its policies repeatedly brought it into conflict with the British 
government, something that is not made clear in either volume. Second, both works place too great an 
emphasis on the Cold War in shaping both British and American policy with limited consideration of the 
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importance of other influences i.e. economic pressures or Iranian nationalism itself. Third, neither Davis nor 
Heiss recognise the strength of excentric influences on the American-Iranian relationship. Max Thornburg, 
an American advisor to the Iranian government, is for example, treated as something of a footnote in both 
accounts despite being the foremost non-diplomatic actor in Iran.
The limited discussion of the differences between corporate and public policy in the volumes above is 
corrected, to a degree, by David Painter’s Oil and the American Century (1986), which charts “the tension 
between increasing corporate dominance of the United States’ economy and the nation’s liberal democratic 
heritage.”167 In doing so, Painter explores the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East through the 
lens of oil, stressing the often-competitive nature of their interactions and the plurality of ideas that existed 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Painter’s recognition of plurality within administrations and institutions and the 
development of partnerships that blur the lines between the public and private sectors is of great importance; 
illustrating the tensions that existed between, for example, governments and companies of the same nation. It 
is hoped that by assessing the relationship between the AIOC and the British government more deeply this 
thesis will be able to build upon Painter’s approach, albeit with a more Anglocentric focus. 
Although studies of the Anglo-American relationship in Iran are relatively few in number, several accounts 
of the American-Iranian relationship after the Second World War are available and of relevance to this thesis. 
The most substantial of these come from Mark Hamilton Lytle and James F. Goode. The former’s The 
Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance (1987) argues that security, not economics, shaped American 
policy towards Iran.168 This focus, he continues, was in itself flawed and misjudged the Soviet Unions 
interest in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The main strength of Lytle’s work is its analysis of the anti-
communist ideology that underpinned American action in Iran. He stresses that it informed decision making 
at every level and was apparent in Iran from the early 1940s: fundamentally shaping the judgement of United 
States officials there. Goode shares this assessment, arguing that the American government overestimated the 
Soviet threat to Iran and, as a result, their policies there were incoherent and inappropriate.169
The key point of difference between the two scholars is in their assessment of the strength of American 
support offered to Iran. Lytle’s contends that the United States held a “commitment to an Iranian alliance”, 
however, he provides limited evidence to support this assertion.170 It is notable that Iran was not only 
excluded from the Truman Doctrine, but that the State Department refused to provide any direct aid, pointing 
Tehran towards the World Bank as a more appropriate source.171 In contrast, Goode argues that the United 
States not only failed to provide enough support for Iran, but in doing so strengthened Tehran’s reliance on 
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Britain, thereby accelerating the growth of Iranian nationalism.172 Goode, in The United States and Iran: In 
the Shadow of Mussadiq (1997) repeats and expands upon these arguments.173 Although sometimes fawning 
in his praise for Mussadiq, Goode uses this study to dissect the history of American orientalism in the Middle 
East and to underline the misunderstanding that pervaded foreign policy there, particularly regarding the 
threat posed by communism and the bipartisan nature of Iranian nationalism. As will be revealed, 
nationalism crossed political boundaries and unified otherwise disparate groups.
In spite of the useful research above, the historiography of the Anglo-American relationship in Iran remains 
limited. This relationship existed in a state of flux with each nation working towards their own goals with 
little consideration as to how they might affect their ally. It is notable that the American government sought 
to exert tacit pressure on Britain and force it to adopt a more malleable position vis-a-vis Iran, particularly 
concerning the terms of the Supplemental Agreement. How this might trouble the Exchequer’s takings or 
Whitehall’s relationship with the AIOC was given little consideration in Washington, illustrating the 
functionality at the heart of Anglo-American relations.174 Investigating this further will help to achieve a 
more nuanced understanding of their association and new insights in an underdeveloped research area.
Source Review
In completing this thesis, the most valuable sources used were official government documents from Great 
Britain and the United States. To avoid confusion these will be discussed separately along with a brief 
outline of the other primary documents sources used and their limitations. 
British Government Sources
The primary source on British policy in Iran is the Foreign Office: Political Departments: General 
Correspondence, 1906-1966 file (FO 371). This file contains documents relating both to Foreign Office 
policy towards Iran and the United States, specifically, and documents regarding British foreign affairs 
generally. Its value, in the context of this project, is enhanced greatly when used in conjunction with 
Correspondence and Papers of the Prime Minister’s Office, 1940-1945 and 1945-1951 respectively 
(references PREM 7 and PREM 8). These documents include correspondences to and from the prime 
minister and help to achieve a better understanding of how the upper echelons of government developed and 
implemented policy. Additionally, the Cabinet Minute and Cabinet Memoranda files (references CAB 128 
and CAB 129) offer a useful source to track internal policy debates. To gain a better understanding of 
conditions in Iran the Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy and Consulates, Iran 
file (reference FO 248) is essential. Not only does it contain documents sent from London to Tehran and 
vice-versa, but it also records of meetings between Embassy staff and figures from the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company and the Iranian government. These sources were accessed at the National Archives, Kew.
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One notable omission in the British sources used are those derived from intelligence source. As Calder 
Walton’s Empire of Secrets (2013) demonstrates, the intelligence community was a vital cog within the 
British Empire, formal and informal alike.175 However, as Chikara Hashimoto notes, wartime intelligence 
agencies “were dismantled in peacetime” with the “first casualty” of this process the Combined Intelligence 
Centre Iraq/Iran.176 For this reason there are simply too few files relating to British intelligence activity in 
Iran to make a substantive contribution to this study.
American Government Sources
The most important file series in completing this study was General Records of the State Department 
(Record Group [RG] 59). This series contains a wide range of diplomatic cables including internal State 
Department minutes, memoranda of discussions between Embassies, and documents sent to and from private 
experts, for example letters sent from Max Thornburg of Overseas Consultants Inc. to Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson discussing the ownership of Iranian oil. 
However useful RG 59 is, it was not used in isolation. Valuable supplementary material came from the 
General Records of the Department of the Treasury, RG 56. These documents were particularly important in 
analysing the development of American corporatism and efforts to integrate Iran into the Western economic 
system. RG 56 was also helpful in understanding why American aid to Iran was so limited. 
Finally, this thesis utilised the United States Congressional Serial Set: the official collection of reports and 
documents of Congress. These documents were accessed through the National Archives, College Park, 
Maryland, and the John F. Kennedy Institute Library, Berlin. 
Personal Papers
Although official sources are useful to gain a more nuanced understanding of the past, other sources are 
needed. Particularly important are personal papers and diaries, which enabled individuals to express thoughts 
and opinions that would otherwise go unrecorded. These documents can help to reveal internal discourse that  
goes unreported in official sources and track communication with individuals outside government, helping to 
illustrate the influence of non-state actors on the mind of government. 
In the United States the most useful source of personal papers was the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 
home to the personal papers of the following: Henry Grady, R. K. Davies Dean Acheson, Harry Truman, 
Arthur C. Gardiner, and Max Ball. Additionally, records held at the John F. Kennedy Library, Berlin, were 
used where appropriate.
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Personal papers in Britain are more widely dispersed. For example, St Anthony’s College, Oxford is home to 
Sir Francis Shepherd’s unpublished diaries while Hugh Dalton’s are kept at the London School of 
Economics. Full details of those documents used will be referenced in the bibliography.
In addition to unpublished personal papers, this thesis also made use of published autobiographies. Although 
it is essential to take care when using biographies and recognise any bias or efforts to rewrite history they can 
provide useful insights and offer their subjects a chance to reflect on the decisions they made. While relying 
on them alone would not be prudent, they can provide a useful point of comparison with other sources.
Media Sources
Of the many individuals featured in this thesis Max Thornburg was perhaps the most prodigious when it 
came to media appearances. Between 1945 and 1951 he appeared in a number of magazines, including Time, 
Reader’s Digest and Fortune, as well as newspapers, such as The New York Times and The Washington Post. 
Thornburg’s output provides scholars with a vast range of sources to draw from to better understand his 
outlook and that of the American private sector. As such it was important to analyse these sources through 
the British Library and John F. Kennedy Institutes’ vast periodical archives. Newspapers were assessed 
through their respective online collections. 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Documents
Given the transnational nature of this project utilising sources from non-government sources has been 
essential to its completion. The British Petroleum Archive at the University of Warwick contains records 
charting expenditure and production levels in Iran which provide vital insights into the AIOC’s position. 
Unfortunately, however, this archive did not contain sufficient quantities of minutes or diaries to provide a 
useful comparison with British government records.
Despite requests to access the archives of Chevron Corp, the parent company of Texaco and Standard Oil of 
California, and Exxon Mobile, formerly Standard Oil of New Jersey, these were rejected with no explanation 
given as to why. As such, secondary literature and other primary sources, particularly published interviews 
with figures from within the oil industry and exchanges between government and oil company officials, will 
be relied upon to understand the American oil industry’s outlook. 
Iranian and Russian Sources
Accessing Iranian government archives is difficult, if not impossible. This thesis relies largely on secondary 
literature, as detailed above and in the bibliography, complemented with documents from the Iranian 
government held in British and American archives and interviews with Iranian leaders, particularly those 
held through the Harvard University Iranian Oral History Project. Although this can be seen as a limitation, it 
should also be acknowledged the focus of this thesis is British policy and action. Similarly, due to language 
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limitations no Soviet primary sources were used in completing this thesis. However, where possible, the 
growing range of literature on the Soviet Union and Iran during and after the Second World War was utilised.
Chapter Outline
This thesis is presented in a broadly chronological structure, in which individual key themes can be analysed 
and discussed.
Following this introduction, chapter two will outline Britain’s dire economic position at the end of the 
Second World War and the Attlee government’s determination to use the empire’s resources to improve it. 
Iranian oil was a key component in this strategy because it was both immensely profitable and a source of 
scarce foreign capital. Given his highly personal approach to foreign policy, this chapter will also analyse 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s background, character and ambitions. It will suggest that although he is 
often lionised for his role in crafting the postwar settlement in Europe, Bevin’s tenure had weaknesses, 
particularly in Iran.  Analysing the British response to two crises - the creation of a Soviet backed state in 
Azerbaijan and the rise of the Tudeh Party - will demonstrate this. It will be argued that Bevin and other 
British policy makers struggled to see beyond their entrenched bias and failed to recognise either the Iranian 
people’s fundamental mistrust of their intentions or desire for self-determination. This is particularly true in 
the British reaction to the Tudeh, which was identified as a manifestation of workplace grievances and not 
nationalism.
Chapter three looks in more depth at British efforts to galvanise the upswell in political energy that followed 
in the Tudeh’s wake and their attempts to craft a new labour movement in Iran. It will argue that Bevin’s 
strategy failed and that by the end of 1947 Iranian trade unionism lacked both legitimacy and popular 
support, largely because of British intervention. Similarly, it will be suggested that the Attlee government’s 
efforts to raise living standards in Iran, thereby winning favour with the Iranian people, were also failing 
thanks to stagnant wages and spiralling living costs. Importantly, development plans drawn up by the Iranian 
government itself were entirely ignored, reflecting the British government’s ingrained orientalism 
uncooperative attitude. 
This chapter also examines Britain’s growing economic dislocation and suggests that safeguarding the AIOC, 
one of Britain’s few profitable assets, began to take on a new importance as the postwar recovery faltered. 
Complicating matters was the Iranian government’s decision to open discussions on the Supplemental 
Agreement, an amendment to the 1933 Anglo-Iranian Oil Concession. Negotiations would last for some four 
years and reveal deep divisions between London and Tehran and the British government and AIOC. Like the 
Sword of Damocles, the Supplemental Agreement hung dangerously over Anglo-Iranian relations: a 
malevolent presence souring an already challenging situation.
Chapter four analyses the Anglo-Iranian relationship from 1949 to 1951, a period in which new Cold War 
tensions provided further difficulties for the Attlee government in Iran. With the United States becoming 
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increasingly hostile to communism, the Persian Gulf was identified as an area of acute vulnerability. Faced 
with its own fiscal constraints, Washington chose not to engage directly with Iran, but began to pressure 
Britain to alter its policy and adopt a more conciliatory approach to its relations with Tehran. The AIOC 
came under particular scrutiny and was identified, along with the Supplemental Agreement, as exploitative 
and dangerous to international stability. 
Determined to maintain their independence and in desperate need of capital, the British government 
attempted to resist American coercion and urged the Iranians to sign the Supplemental Agreement. By this 
stage British policy had become repetitive and unfit for purpose, characterised by mismanagement, internal 
conflict and blinding orientalism. As Britain faltered, Iranian nationalism grew more pronounced. A new 
wave of leaders, particularly Mohammed Mussadiq, called for the removal of all foreign influence from the 
country and tapped into a deep well of anger amongst the middle and urban working classes who had once 
made up Iran’s trade union movement. Unable to restrain the nationalist march, British power crumbled and, 
in March 1951, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its assets were nationalised.
The concluding chapter will provide an epilogue, charting the fallout from nationalisation and seek to make 
sense of the events outlined above and draw new interpretations regarding Britain’s Iranian policy. In doing 
so, it will acknowledge the limitations of Britain’s informal empire in Iran and the challenges posed by 
relying on non-state actors to support foreign policy, and again acknowledge the importance of orientalism 
and mismanagement in the collapse of British power in Iran. 
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Chapter II: The British Response to National Movements, 1945 - 1947
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the British Government responded to postwar nationalism 
and mass political movements in Iran following the Second World War and suggest that Britain’s response to 
events in Iran was steeped in orientalism and mismanagement. It will analyse the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis and 
the emergence of the Tudeh Party to suggest that British policy was not only clouded by a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the impulses that shaped Iranian politics, but also stymied by its creators’ entrenched 
bias. In the first case, Ambassador Reader Bullard’s ill-informed and condescending reporting hindered the 
creation and implementation of a policy appropriate to meet the Soviet challenge while preserving Iranian 
stability. Meanwhile in the second, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s passionate commitment to trade 
unionism clouded his judgement of why the Tudeh took the form it did and, subsequently, Britain’s response 
to it.
Underpinning British policy in Iran were three factors: economic fragility, imperial reorientation and Ernest 
Bevin’s highly personal leadership style. These will be analysed below to demonstrate the impulses that 
influenced the creation and implementation of Labour’s foreign policy.
Part I: Establishing Britain’s Position in 1945
Economic Fragility and Imperial Reorientation
A Financial Dunkirk: The Cost of War
At the end of the Second World War Britain’s economic outlook was, in the words of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Hugh Dalton, “pretty bleak.”177 Financially exhausted by war, Britain faced the dual problems of 
indebtedness and a long-term negative balance of payments forecast. Although a prewar creditor Britain’s 
total debt had grown to £24.7 billion by 1946, roughly two and a half times its gross domestic product. 
Somewhat humiliatingly, Britain had also become a debtor to nations in both the formal and informal 
empires. For example, the Treasury owed over £1 billion to India (a fourfold increase on prewar figures) and 
a further £475 million to Palestine, Egypt and Sudan.178 
Adding to these difficulties was the cost of war itself. War damage totalled an estimated £3 billion, but 
perhaps more importantly created unparalleled international economic dislocation.179 In June 1944 the Board 
of Trade reported that as a result “we cannot expect any appreciable long-term improvement of the import/
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export position for at least two-thirds of Britain’s manufacturing industry.”180 Although John Maynard 
Keynes, Britain’s most eminent economist and head of their delegation to the World Bank, optimistically 
suggested “to cheer ourselves up, we make bold to assume that by 1949 we have reached the goal of 
increasing the volume of exports by 50 per cent, the value of exports in that year, at double prewar prices, 
would be £1450 million” even he admitted that such growth was something of a “pipe dream.”181 Stymying 
growth was international economic chaos and domestic shortages of materials and manpower. The rate of 
demobilisation had proven slow and in 1947 over 1.2 million men (some twelve percent of the working 
population) remained under arms and unable to engage in economically productive labour.182
Britain’s financial difficulties were added to by the United States’ decision to terminate Lend-Lease aid: 
cutting off a vital source of support and increasing pressure on London’s depleted foreign reserves. Although 
provisions had been made in 1943 to allow for the extension of Lend-Lease aid until July 1946, in August 
1945 Leo Crowley, Director of the Foreign Economic Administration, sent a letter to the heads of each 
Foreign Economic Administration informing them that, with the end of hostilities approaching, they should 
prepare for an end to American economic assistance. President Harry S. Truman also directed that all 
outstanding orders be cancelled, “except where the allied governments agree to take them over, where it is in 
the interests of the United States to complete them.”183 Subsequently, the President agreed to the immediate 
cancellation of Lend-Lease shipments except in “certain unavoidable cases where the abrupt cessation of aid 
would cause undue hardships.” However, “in no case” were shipments “to extend beyond six months from 
the effective date” of termination.184 The abrupt conclusion of Lend-Lease had, according to Attlee, put 
Britain “in a very serious financial position”, not least because the economic burden of war continued 
throughout the demobilisation period.185 Although the State Department warned that aid was needed to 
support Britain’s “occupational duties” Truman chose to reject the “moral responsibility” of foreign aid and 
vetoed all subsequent Lend-Lease requests.186 
 
The war also had great social costs which are more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to calculate. The 
rationing of food continued, queues for even the most basic food stuffs were ubiquitous and homelessness 
common. Some 40,000 people occupied disused service camps and many of the houses that were inhabited 
were in poor condition. In “a large, dilapidated room without light, water and (yesterday at least) without 
fuel for a fire” a rehousing officer reported, were a “bus conductor, two woman, and three schoolchildren, 
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desperate for somewhere to live.”187 The dismal monotony of war had created a general sense of malaise and 
even in victory many remained dispirited. The Labour Party’s electoral triumph was certainly a reaction to 
growing poverty and can be viewed as something of a clarion call for wholesale change across all levels of 
society. The Party’s manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, had called for the creation of a cradle-to-grave 
welfare state and a new social democratic consensus to ensure that those who suffered in war would reap the 
benefits of peace. Upon being elected, Prime Minister Clement Attlee committed the new government to 
nationalising key British industries, making steps to eradicate poverty through the redistribution of wealth 
and ensuring that fairness became a central tenet of British society and governance alike.188
However, despite Labour’s high-minded idealism, conditions were such that improving Britain’s economic 
fortunes needed to take primacy over building a ‘New Jerusalem.’ The abrupt termination of Lend-Lease 
meant that, even with further borrowing and exhausting gold and dollar reserves, at least £1.250 million, or 
$5 billion, would need to be raised within three years if Britain was to carry out essential spending 
programmes.189 Keynes’ “total strategy” for Britain’s economic recovery focused on the “intense 
concentration on the expansion of exports” coupled with “drastic and immediate economies in our overseas 
expenditures” and “substantial aid from the United States.”190 This unified approach was hampered by the 
USA’s decision to offer Britain a loan worth $3.75 billion with a two percent interest rate and not the $5 
billion interest free loan Keynes had hoped for.191 The loan also carried stringent terms and conditions, not 
least the free convertibility of sterling by July 1947. As will be illustrated, convertibility sent shock waves 
through the fragile British economy and forced the Attlee government to both draw on increasingly scarce 
dollar reserves and reduce immediate capital expenditure.192 With American aid limited, one of Keynes’ three 
core elements for recovery was clearly weakened, leading to redoubled efforts to increase British exports 
while simultaneously holding down domestic consumer demand.
A Shot in the Arm: Reviving the Empire
As the depth of Britain’s economic malaise became clear, London’s remaining overseas assets became seen 
as a vital source of income, prompting the development of an increasingly pragmatic approach to imperial 
management. In ministerial meetings it was made clear that “the Colonial Empire could make a major 
contribution towards the solution of our present economic difficulties” as well as helping safeguard Britain’s 
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longterm sustainability.193 Thus, while the British displayed a readiness to come to terms with nationalism in 
India, Ceylon and Burma, their policy in Malaya showed what John Darwin refers to as, “no hint of any 
desire to cut and run.”194 Malaya not only produced a third of the world’s tin, but also a substantial amount of 
rubber: materials which could help to bolster Britain’s depleted dollar supplies and help to rejuvenate 
depleted domestic industries. A similar pattern of pragmatic reorientation can also be seen in colonial Africa, 
where it was hoped that economic development could help to alleviate Britain’s economic burden. Bevin, 
recognising that recovery would not be achieved through manufacturing alone, mused that “if only we 
pushed on and developed Africa, we could have [the] United States dependent on us, and eating out of our 
hand, in four or five years. Two great mountains of manganese ore in Sierra Leone, etc. [The] US is very 
barren of essential minerals, and in Africa we have them all.”195 Africa apart, Iran, and the Middle East more 
generally, was identified as a vital source of commodities and, thanks to the presence of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, a stronghold of the informal empire. The country was not only home to Britain’s greatest 
source of oil wealth, but also the Abadan oil refinery, Britain’s largest single overseas asset. Like Malayan 
rubber, the oil produced in Iran had the potential to be a major dollar earner, and was identified by Bevin as 
vital to Britain’s future.196 In a pithy assessment of the Labour government’s pragmatic approach to foreign 
policy, Cain and Hopkins suggest that “the empire was to be given a shot in the arm rather than in the 
head.”197 
Allied to the development of economic resources to support Britain’s recovery was the belief that 
development could raise the standard of living of the empire’s subjects. The Second World War had clearly 
undermined the old international order. First, it had illustrated that Britain could be defeated, by both 
European and non-European forces. This helped to stoke emerging nationalism across Africa, the Middles 
East and the Caribbean. Second, the United States’ entry into the war had been hinged, in part, on the 
Rooseveltian belief that the war could usher in a new age of international prosperity and freedom.198 As the 
terms of the 1941 Atlantic Charter, the first declaration of the Allies’ goals for the post-war world, 
demonstrate, freedom to self-determination was central in this estimation.199 Britain needed to offer an olive 
branch to its overseas outposts and prove that the empire was a benevolent, rather than rapacious entity. 
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According to Frederick Cooper “Britain saw development as the key means by which it could reestablish 
imperial legitimacy” while also raising much-needed revenue.200 
D. A. Low describes the revitalisation of the British Empire after World War Two as evidence of a “second 
colonial occupation.”201 Low, in conjunction with J. M. Lonsdale, argues that British policy was “grounded 
in traditional sentiments” and “reinforced” by emerging Cold War pressures.202 However, they also argue that 
development, or “the careful contrivance of ‘partnership’” helped to create a new synthesis, which came to 
define the Attlee government’s policy towards the empire.203 Historically typified as exploitative, the second 
colonial occupation saw efforts to accelerate growth and development across the empire. According to 
Cooper, Labour sought to move “toward a more positive colonial policy - fostering economic and social 
progress and devolving political responsibility.”204 Cooper argues that policy makers in London hoped to 
exploit colonial resources while simultaneously guiding development and planning for self-governance in the 
long-term. The convergence between the twin goals of Britain’s economic sustainability and colonial 
development led Chancellor Sir Stafford Cripps to declare that: “the further development of African 
resources is of the same crucial importance to the mobilisation and strengthening of Western Europe as the 
restoration of European productive powers is to the future progress and prosperity of Africa.”205  
This policy was developed in the hope of minimising the threat of domestic nationalism, guarding against 
communism and establishing governments friendly to London; thereby maintaining strong links between the 
metropole and peripheral regions, and reinforcing Britain’s position as a leading world power. Indeed, Bevin 
felt that “we have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and by giving a 
spiritual lead now, we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not 
subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union.”206 Although undoubtedly weakened by 
the Second World War, the Attlee government viewed Britain as not just an international power, but a nation 
with a unique role in global affairs and a bridge between the developed and undeveloped world.207 
Furthermore, as Cooper has suggested, development as envisaged by London would lead to an “overlapping” 
of domestic and international corporate boundaries, establishing a framework from which it would be 
difficult for individual states to break.208 This would then help to safeguard Britain’s overseas influence and 
maintain an informal empire based largely on trade and currency controls.
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Although Low and Cooper’s research is largely confined to British policy in Africa, parallels can be made 
with strategy elsewhere. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have, for example, suggested that the empire can 
be defined by its “capacity for regenerating on alternative sources of strength”, not least in the years after the 
Second World War.209 While withdrawal from India and Palestine was total, Louis and Robinson suggest that 
informal control elsewhere was strengthened, most notably in the Middle East, and Egypt and Iran in 
particular.210 Hyam argues that Bevin hoped to reduce the twin appeals of radical Islam and communism 
through collaboration and trade: a process which would engender with a ready supply of valuable 
commodities such as oil and gas.211 Paul Kingston, meanwhile, identifies the establishment of the 
Development Division of the British Middle East Office (BMEO) as central to revitalising Britain’s 
relationship with Iraq, Egypt and Jordan in particular.212 Kingston records that while this policy was 
designed to raise revenue it was also seen as the most cost effective means of ensuring these nations 
remained within Britain’s sphere of influence and rejected Soviet encroachment. Quoting Bevin, he explains 
this as a “peasants, not pashas” policy with development acting as an “ingenious means” of reducing the 
threats of “nascent revolutionary forces.”213 Although not formally part of the British Empire, both Kingston 
and Hyam note that Iran was identified as a nation with which Britain needed to rejuvenate relations. Indeed, 
Kingston suggests that at the end of the Second World War the threat to Britain’s interests there “had never 
been greater.”214
Understanding Iran’s Importance
The Second World War had seen the regeneration of Iranian extraction and refinement facilities as the 
country’s vast oil reserves became a vital commodity in the defeat of Nazi Germany.215 Although total oil 
production in Iran had fallen from 9.6 million tons in 1939 to 6.6 million tons in 1941, it had more than 
doubled by the end of the war, reaching 13.3 million in 1944 and 16.8 million tons by 1945.216 In turn the 
company’s tax yield to the Treasury had increased from £3.32 million in 1939 to £15.53 million in 1945.217 
This was no trifling amount, but rather represented one of the British Empire’s most profitable and consistent 
assets. In a strident comparison, the Ministry of Fuel and Power suggested that replacing the Abadan refinery 
would cost £120 million - “not much less than the estimated cost of retooling and modernising the coal 
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industry in this country.”218 There was also the potential for further growth, as demonstrated by the AIOC’s 
burgeoning capital expenditure, which rose from a low of £0.2 million in 1941 to over £6.8 million in 1945. 
Although investment was focused largely on developing new refinery facilities, in 1945 alone over £1.2 
million was dedicated to developing new oil fields, clearly indicating the wealth of untapped resources 
available in Iran and the Persian Gulf more generally.219 Exploration was given an added degree of 
expediency following the 1946/47 winter fuel shortage, which illustrated Britain’s energy fragility and the 
limitations of basing an industrial economy on domestically produced coal. As Bevin himself had noted “if 
the British Empire fell....it would mean that the standard of life of our constituents would fall 
considerably.”220 Few resources demonstrated this more clearly than Iranian oil.
Iran was also seen as a strategic asset and the Chiefs of Staff were keen to stress the country’s value as a 
defensive outpost. Although the United Kingdom was identified as “the fundamental basis of 
Commonwealth defence”, the Middle East provided “defence in depth for East and Southern Africa, and may 
also secure the through route of communication via the Mediterranean, Suez Canal and Red Sea” and as such 
it was suggested “that it is essential to maintain our position in the Middle East in peace and defend it in 
war.”221 In recognition of its value, Iran was identified as part of the “northern tier”, the shield against Soviet 
expansion into the Mediterranean.222 Although Anglo-Soviet relations at the end of the Second World War 
were ostensibly friendly, competition between the two states in this area was historically fierce.223 More 
importantly, the new Labour government was acutely concerned about Soviet expansionism and saw Iran as 
a bulwark against this.224
It must be recognised that although militarily important and vital to Britain’s economic recovery there were 
no plans to formalise London’s control over Iran. The 1944 Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement had, 
theoretically, guaranteed British informal power there by dividing the Middle East into distinct spheres-of-
influence and it was assumed that the AIOC would continue to act as London’s principle agent there.225 This 
strategy was risky and rested heavily on the company undertaking policies concurrent with government 
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strategy. Despite owning a controlling stake in the AIOC, the British government allowed the company to 
operate as a private firm and there were mechanisms to restrain or direct its behaviour.  
British policy towards Iran lends weight to John Darwin’s suggestion that after the Second World War “the 
necessity of modifying the imperial system was recognised” as a means of preserving British wealth 
overseas.226 Against the background of looming economic disaster the Labour government saw their foreign 
assets as essential to the country’s stability and believed that to reap their rewards reform and development 
needed to take place. As this chapter, and thesis more generally, will suggest, British policy was envisaged in 
broad, overarching terms and struggled to come to grips with the complexities of the situation. Moreover, 
policy was based largely on assumptions as to the empire’s capacity for reform and fluidity. In Iran, for 
example, little heed was paid to the potential for division between the AIOC and British government, or their 
divergent goals: a situation made worse by the inadequacy of successive ambassadors to Tehran. Finally, 
British policy was highly reflective of the personalities, opinions and bias’ of its creators, not least Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin.
Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary
An Education in Labour
Described by David Marquand as one of the “twin peaks” of the Attlee cabinet (Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Sir Stafford Cripps being the other) Ernest Bevin’s rise to political prominence seems, on reflection, as 
unlikely as any.227 Born in 1877, the poverty-stricken son of a Somerset woman who died when he was just 
eight years old, Bevin began working as a labourer at eleven, having received little formal education. In 1910 
he became secretary of the Bristol branch of the Dockers Union and, four years later, was elected national 
organiser. Sixteen years later, Bevin was instrumental in founding the Transport and General Workers Union 
(TGWU), of which he was subsequently elected chairman. Under his stewardship the TGWU would go on to 
become Britain’s largest trade union, establishing him as the country’s foremost labour leader.
While Clement Attlee bore the clipped, quiet and understated hallmarks of an upper middle-class former-
public school boy, Bevin was ebullient, massively self-confident and leonine in debates. Attlee’s socialism 
was born of sober Protestantism and charitable service in London’s impoverished East End, but Bevin’s was 
informed by the experience of organised labour and fiery Baptist sermons.228 A physically huge man, Bevin 
was a formidable figure, yet one who relied as much on high cunning as sheer ferocity to dispense with rivals 
and consolidate his own position within the labour movement. His skills were such that Churchill drafted 
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him into the National Government as Minister for Labour, even though Bevin was not an MP.229 The five 
years he served in this post demonstrated that despite his limited schooling Bevin had a both a rich intellect 
and impressive organisational skills. According to historian Geoffrey Field, Bevin helped to establish a “new 
context for labour relations in Britain, imposing constraints on both labour and business and creating new 
opportunities for the growth of trade unionism.”230  Thus, while the total number of strikes during the Second 
World War exceeded those of the First, the total number of days lost were reduced, thanks largely to the 
adoption of action such as “work-to-rule, overtime bans, absenteeism and brief walk outs lasting only a few 
hours.”231 Moreover, to Bevin, a staunch believer in the right to strike, the ability of workers to engage in 
industrial action was a demonstration of the positivity of his reforms.232 Central to his success was a creative 
approach to problem solving, so much so that Attlee would later suggest that he had “never met a man in 
politics with as much imagination as he had, with the exception of Winston [Churchill].”233 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary
On July 27, 1945, to the surprise of many observers, Attlee’s unveiled Bevin as Foreign Secretary and not 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, as had widely been assumed. In part this decision was tactical. Had Attlee 
posted Bevin to the Treasury he would have had to work closely with Lord President of the Council, Herbert 
Morrison, whom he openly loathed.234 Although Bevin’s political career had focused on domestic labour and 
economic policy, his role in the international labour movement afforded him the opportunity to gain a handle 
on overseas affairs. As well as taking an active role in the International Transport Workers Federation, he 
was prominent in the International Labour Office. Finally, during the 1930s he had served on the Colonial 
Development Advisory Committee, a body which sought to achieve more equitable relations between Britain 
and its foreign dominions. 
These experiences saw him develop a unique perspective on international affairs. As Permanent Under-
Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick would later suggest, somewhat critically, “he could 
only look at events through the spectacles of his own experience...most of our transactions were equated to 
some experience in his trade union or Ministry of Labour days.”235 His background also helped him to 
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develop socialist sensibilities that were rooted in pragmatism, rather than ideology, and a recognition that 
hard-nosed bargaining was the best means of achieving tangible success, whether for his union members, his 
constituents, or, latterly, his countrymen. This outlook, along with his coarse mannerisms, put him at odds 
with the intellectual and, largely, middle-class wing of the Labour Party, embodied by the Fabian Society and 
the New Statesman.236 Although himself a prodigious reader and individual of great intelligence, Bevin 
seemed to mistrust self-proclaimed intellectuals and experts, choosing to rely instead on his own intuition 
and instinct. Indeed, New Statesman editor Kingsley Martin even suggested that “the fact that Bevin himself 
was an intellectual, though he would not admit it, only increased his contempt for those who carried the 
label.”237  
Although Labour’s 1945 election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, had called for a “socialist analysis of 
the world situation” Bevin himself took total control over the direction of Britain’s foreign policy.238A clear 
demonstration of this was the manner in which he opposed Attlee’s suggestion that, on strategic grounds, 
Britain withdraw from the Middle East and Mediterranean, which the Prime Minister argued was “only an 
outpost position.”239 Bevin, along with the Chiefs of Staff and Colonial Office, rejected this suggestion out of 
hand. The Foreign Secretary not only felt that Britain’s financial recovery hinged on the empire’s resources, 
but also that any rollback would see Britain’s power vis-à-vis the United States and Soviet Union reduced.240 
Recognising Bevin’s strength of feeling the prime minister acquiesced, allowing his Foreign Secretary to 
dictate the direction of British policy. In part this was reflective of Attlee’s leadership style. Recognising the 
varied talents of his cabinet, he became committed to delegating responsibility to individual ministers. 
Indeed, Under Secretary of State Alexander Cadogan would later comment: “Bevin effaces Attlee, and at 
‘Big Three’ meetings he does all the talking while Attlee nods his head convulsively and smokes his pipe.”241 
Given Attlee’s tendency to delegate it is unsurprising that British foreign policy came to mirror Bevin’s 
outlook and attitude.242 
In his first speech to the House of Commons as Foreign Secretary, Bevin suggested that “if you get men 
talking together about the same occupation, the same trade, the same machines, nationalism ceases, and 
occupation and life interest takes it place.”243 His faith in negotiation when combined with his strong 
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patriotic streak and staunch unwillingness to view Britain as anything other than a great power undoubtedly 
ran contrary to the economic and military frailties discussed above. According to Corelli Barnett, Bevin was, 
despite his impoverished background, part of a generation in which the “imperial myth” of British 
international power was so entrenched that it formed a “psychological crutch”, necessary to understanding 
international affairs.244 In Iran, this so-called “crutch” would manifest itself in efforts to implement topdown 
development there to strengthen the ties between metropole and periphery without full consideration of the 
needs and desires of the Iranian people themselves.
However, Bevin’s philosophy can also be interpreted more positively, and as helping him to develop a belief 
in the possibilities of the empire to become a mutually supportive framework, both for Britain and the 
colonies. Bevin hoped that new partnerships would not only provide the resources necessary to improve 
Britain’s economic position, but also help to improve conditions abroad: thereby winning Britain favour and 
guaranteeing international prestige.245 Referring to Britain as “the last bastion of social democracy” he 
looked to carve a niche as an alternative power to American capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism: a liberal 
democracy and a model for others to follow.246 According to Chancellor Hugh Dalton Bevin offered “mulish 
resistance” to any proposals which could be construed as relinquishing power overseas and instead hoped to 
achieve domestic prosperity in tandem with overseas development.247
In Iran, and the Middle East more generally, this approach was particularly clear. The aim of his policy was 
“not to dominate its people or dictate how they shall live, but to help preserve them against any other 
domination...to make them feel that their interests coincide without ours, and thus to secure the fullest 
possible measures of cooperation from them in matters of policy and in arrangements for defence.”248 As will 
be demonstrated, Bevin hoped to pursue a policy of utilising Iran’s material wealth to decrease debt levels at 
home and encourage local economic development to help solidify support for Britain there. Although the 
Foreign Secretary’s strategy can be interpreted as being steeped in sentiment, a Machiavellian streak clearly 
ran through it.249 He recognised that Iranian oil was not only “one of our most important strategic interests” 
but also that it “would be vital to us in time of war” and provide a valuable source of income as an export 
commodity.250 However, over time, the more idealistic elements of Bevin’s policy would, as necessity 
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dictated, become secondary to economic considerations. This suggests a distinct malleability in the Foreign 
Secretary’s approach, and an acceptance that Britain’s “world-wide mission” was secondary to the country’s 
balance sheet.251
Bevin, the United States and the Labour Left
Although some elements of Bevin’s outlook are easily identifiable others are clouded to the point of paradox, 
not least his views on British relations with the United States. Undoubtedly suspicious of the free market 
capitalism which so defined the USA, Bevin couldn’t help but admire both the country’s material wealth and 
contribution to the Second World War. Similarly, he, like many in Britain, believed American power to be 
malleable and that Britain could act as a conduit to Washington adopting a more active role in international 
affairs.252 That this belief was widely shared in London, suggests that the British did not fully comprehend 
the United States’ international objectives at the end of the Second World War.253 Bevin was, for example, 
keen to secure American cooperation in the defense of the Middle East, but felt sure that Britain could retain 
its economic primacy there. Recognising that the USA was both militarily and technologically preponderant, 
the Foreign Secretary hoped that collaborative projects between the two states would increase the value of 
Britain’s assets there and guarantee their protection if war were to come.254 As will be revealed, however, the 
Foreign Secretary’s estimates were not entirely successful and the United States actively pursued a policy in 
Iran which was not only separate to Britain’s, but often ran counter to it. 
Though clearly a dominant figure within the Labour government, Bevin’s tenure was not without opposition. 
Although generally willing to let his Foreign Secretary guide Britain’s overseas policy, Attlee was himself 
sceptical as to the viability of a “Commonwealth strategy” and instead proposed an internationalist solution 
to the protection of overseas resources, suggesting that “the British Empire can only be defended by its 
membership of the United Nations Organisation.”255 In Attlee’s estimation, “if the new organisation is a 
reality, it does not matter who holds Somalia or Cyrenaica or controls the Suez Canal. If it is not a reality we 
had better be thinking of the defence of England, for unless we can protect the home country no strategic 
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position elsewhere will avail.”256 In this instance Bevin, with the support of the Chiefs of Staff, won the 
argument, and rejected Attlee’s approach to international security. The manner in which he rejected the Prime 
Minister’s concerns illustrates a certain single mindedness in Bevin’s approach to policy, a tendency that 
would be repeated in Iran. 
Bevin’s desire to revitalise the empire also drew criticism from the Labour Party’s leftist fringe. In protecting 
Britain’s monopoly over Iranian oil, Bevin was accused by figures such as Harold Laski of seeking to “split 
the party” by undertaking a “policy of hostility” towards the Soviet Union.257 Laski was also concerned that 
Bevin had aligned himself too closely with the United States during postwar discussions regarding both the 
future of Europe and German territorial integrity, preventing a socialist partnership between Britain and the 
USSR from emerging.258 Bevin also came under criticism from sections of the Trade Union Congress with 
some two and a half million of its members voting in favour of a motion suggesting that British foreign 
policy was anti-Soviet and deferential to the United States during the 1946 Brighton Congress. Although the 
motion was defeated by one million votes, the result illustrated the substantial opposition to British foreign 
policy from some sections of the labour movement.259 Rather than engage with such criticism, Bevin’s 
response was to guard himself against further attacks and remain confident in his highly personal approach to 
international affairs. He took further steps to align himself with the Chiefs of Staff and to establish a small, 
trusted circle of Foreign Office advisors.260 Such measures saw Bevin to tighten his hold over the creation 
and execution of British foreign policy and isolate himself from criticism. In doing so he undoubtedly 
limited discussions on foreign affairs, hindering the production of new, creative ideas. 
Less Than Heroic: The Limits of Bevin’s Tenure
In Iran specifically, the Foreign Secretary’s unwillingness to look beyond his own experience prevented him 
from gaining a full understanding of the social and political groups operating there. As P. S. Gupta has 
illustrated, Labour’s leadership, and Bevin in particular, were prisoners of Victorian “racial-cultural 
typology” and the inability to view colonial peoples as equals, or as capable of building nations without 
British guidance.261 The depth of this prejudiced view was such that it hindered both the creation and 
implementation of appropriate British policy in Iran and exacerbated tensions there. Furthermore, Bevin 
overestimated his ability to reign in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s worst excesses and get them to follow 
a path set in Westminster. With the company intent on maintaining its independence British policy became 
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disjointed, offering Iranian nationalism the opportunity to prosper. Finally, Bevin mismanaged relations with 
the United States in the Middle East and was gradually caught between preserving British primacy and 
maintaining close relations with Washington. This was particularly clear in his response to Iranian 
nationalism and inability to understand American mistrust of Britain’s intentions overseas. 
Given these failures, it seems difficult to justify the ‘heroic’ status bestowed upon Bevin by Terry Anderson, 
Robert Hathaway and Alan Bullock. While his successes in Europe, particularly in helping to establish 
Marshall Aid, are clear, his tenure at the Foreign Office was not entirely successful, especially in regard to 
policy in Iran.262 Similar conclusions have been drawn by Peter Weiler, who argues that Bevin fundamentally 
misunderstood the impulses behind nationalist movements in the developing world, adding to a sense of 
delusion around Britain’s international power and thus delaying necessary discussions as to the long-term 
feasibility of the empire itself.263 This was clearly the case in Bevin’s perceptions of Iranian trade unionism 
and his expectation that the labour movement there would only prosper if modeled along British lines.264 
This in turn led to the application of inappropriate policy, which helped to fuel nationalist discord and anti-
British sentiment. 
Part II: Responding to National Crises in Iran 
During 1945 and 1946, the Labour government was faced with two distinct, but interrelated, crises in Iran. 
The first was the creation of a semiautonomous regime in the northern province of Azerbaijan and the second 
a series of violent strikes across the country’s southern oilfields, which eventually lead to a declaration of 
martial law. Linking these events was the growing influence of the Soviet Union and the burgeoning viability 
of both communism and nationalism as domestic political forces. Although generally studied in isolation, 
either as part of domestic Iranian or early Cold War history, these events provide valuable examples to better 
understand British postwar policy. These case studies also provide an introductory narrative to future Iranian 
nationalism and are in a sense a conduit to the mass nationalist movements which emerged in 1947 and 
which would eventually lead to the AIOC’s nationalisation. Finally, they may be used as comparative models 
in discussions of the empire’s response to independence and labour movements.
Azerbaijan and the Soviet Threat
In Iran and the Cold War (1992) Louise L’Estrange Fawcett argues that the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis can be 
interpreted in four ways. First, that the crisis was the result of Soviet interventionism and relied upon foreign 
and not domestic activism. Second, that it demonstrated regional unrest and the inherent cultural and ethnic 
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differences between Azerbaijan and the rest of Iran. Third, Fawcett suggests that Iranian writers of a left-
wing bent have been keen to stress the crisis’ role as part of a broader movement for domestic change and 
societal reform. Finally, the traditional Soviet interpretation holds that the Azerbaijan crisis was part of a 
wider pattern of international liberation struggles across the developing world and a response by the Iranian 
proletariat to imperialism and capitalist oppression.265 Fawcett’s study, published in 1992, was initially 
written as a dissertation in 1988 at the height of the Cold War’s collapse. Given the international political 
climate of the time, it is unsurprising that the study is framed almost entirely in a Cold War context and 
ignores Britain’s role as anything other than an observer of Soviet and American actions. A rereading of the 
Azerbaijan crisis will demonstrate its importance in context of decolonisation and suggest its was seen in 
London as illustrating the necessity of tightening Britain’s hold over Iran and establishing safeguards to 
protect their economic and strategic assets. In keeping with ongoing political trends in London, development 
was central to this strategy.
The roots of the Azerbaijan Crisis lie in the Anglo-Soviet joint-occupation of Iran during the Second World 
War.266 As the war came to a close the Kremlin took the decision to arm Azeri separatist groups in their zone 
of occupation backing the creation semiautonomous client state there in the hope of gaining a new source of 
oil.267 Although the British Military Consul at Mashad, Sir Claremont Skrine, saw the Soviet effort solely as 
a response to “vigorous American intervention” in Iran, a more nuanced analysis came from the United 
States’ charge d’affaires in Moscow, George C. Kennan who suggested that “potential foreign penetration in 
that area [Azerbaijan] coupled with the concern for prestige” motivated Soviet policy.268 In a careful bid to 
avoid charges of stimulating unrest, the Soviet Union offered financial and organisational support to the 
newly formed Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) under the leadership of Ja’far Pishihvari, an Azeri 
nationalist who strove to secure regional autonomy for Azerbaijan and the federalisation of the Iranian state. 
Fakhreddin Azimi suggests that Pishihvari capitalised on “lurking feelings of discontent and deprivation” 
amongst the Azerbaijani people and appealed to their preexistent communal sentiments and highly 
regionalised outlook.269 In a sense the DPA established itself on a platform dedicated as much to national 
self-determination as Marxist ideology.  On 12 December the DPA successfully established a separatist 
government, based in the Azeri capital Tabriz, and a National Assembly was convened with the Russian 
Consul-General serving as a witness. The Iranian Army were powerless to prevent Pishivari being declared 
premier as Soviet forces blocked roads into the region and offered support to hastily assembled DPA militias. 
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Humiliated, the few Iranian troops remaining in Azerbaijan were withdrawn to Tehran to avoid enflaming the 
situation and risking war with the Soviet Union.270  
Recognising that a military solution was impossible, Prime Minister Dr. Ibrahim Hakimi attempted to resolve 
the Azerbaijan problem through a twofold, soft power formula. First, he looked to engage with Soviet leaders 
and establish a stronger Iranian bargaining position in any future negotiations. Second, he legislated to 
restrict public displays of support for either the Soviet Union or the Azeri separatist movement to prevent 
Marxism and separatism from spreading.271 In clear overtures to Moscow, Hakimi requested that Qavam al-
Saltana, a deputy in Iran’s parliament, the Majlis with close links to the Soviet Union, serve as a special 
advisor in his government and appointed several pro-Soviet legislators to his cabinet.272 Simultaneously, the 
Prime Minister forced through new legislation to ban public demonstrations and, in a bid to appeal to 
moderate Iranians, publicly declared that he would not negotiate with the “anarchists” who led the DPA.273 
Given that Iran was economically and militarily weak and diplomatically isolated, Hakimi had to rely on 
establishing a new platform for conversation with the USSR and hope that domestic conditions improved.
While the Prime Minister’s strategy seems reasonable in retrospect, it was less successful than he had hoped. 
His efforts to use Qavam as a mediator with the USSR were rebuffed immediately and were followed by a 
humiliating message from Moscow which stated that “they would prefer to greet in Moscow a Premier 
Qavam, rather than a Premier Hakimi.”274 Additionally, the Soviets objected to Hakimi’s ban on public 
demonstrations, and demanded that it be lifted immediately.275  These problems were compounded further by 
Moscow’s decision to halt the export of agricultural goods from Azerbaijan and solidify their military 
presence in the region.276 These actions were a direct abrogation of the 1941 Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty, 
which not only specified that foreign nations would avoid encroaching in Iranian political affairs, but also 
that foreign troops would be withdrawn within six months of the war ending.277 By ignoring this agreement 
the Soviet Union not only tested Hakimi’s strength, but forced him to look to London for diplomatic support.
The Iranian government’s efforts to mediate with the USSR were weakened when Ambassador Reader 
Bullard compared them to appeasement.278 Similarly, although opposed to Soviet aggression in principle, the 
Attlee government was unwilling to take action that could potentially lead to them being drawn into direct 
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conflict with Moscow. Militarily Britain’s presence in Iran was, according to Bullard, “strategically useless” 
which, considering just 5,000 soldiers (one-sixth of the Soviet forces present in Azerbaijan) were stationed 
there in December 1945, does not seem to be an unreasonable assessment.279 This view was shared across the 
British military. Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General F.E.W. Simpson, for example, 
suggested that “we do not possess in peace sufficient troops or facilities in the areas concerned to guarantee 
the security of the oil fields in Persia and Iraq in the event of large-scale attack.”280 Desperate to avoid 
conflict with Moscow and lacking faith in Hakimi’s policy the British Government wavered.
While the Foreign Office looked uncertain in the face of Soviet aggrandizement, Bullard saw it as an 
opportunity to advance Britain’s position in Iran. He argued that “over-centralisation was the real cause of 
present disintegration” and suggested that the best means of guaranteeing stability was through a settlement 
to divide the country into two semiautonomous provincial administrations.281 While the Soviet Union would 
have authority over Azerbaijan and other northern territories, Britain would control those in the south. The 
Ambassador believed that this system would provide a bulwark against future Soviet aggression and offer a 
greater guarantee of protection for British interests in the south.282 He also hoped that such an agreement 
would strengthen British influence at both a local level and in the Majlis, allowing London to bypass the 
increasingly vulnerable Hakimi and entrench their informal hold. In detailing the Iranian army’s withdrawal, 
Bullard suggested that “there is little chance that the present prime minister will be able to retain his position 
for very long, but if he and his cabinet give their blessings to our proposals and public opinion abroad lends 
its support we may hope to get in his place a prime minister who will also welcome the proposals and will 
cooperate loyally with it.”283 
The Ambassador’s proposals were given approval by the British consuls at Ahwaz, Shiraz and Isfahan, 
suggesting that rather than opposing Soviet action, they hoped to recreate it and assemble a pro-British bloc 
based around oil rich southern provinces.284 The logic behind Bullard’s support for division was simple, 
without it “they [the Soviet Union] could introduce labour conditions which would drain the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company’s labour market in a very short time. Moreover the mere presence of an enormous Soviet State-
controlled company operating in Persia would provide them with a first-class political lever for use in 
inducing the Persian authorities to harass the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company - if indeed it did not become the de 
facto government of northern Persia and consequently to a large extent of the whole country.”285 Bullard felt 
confident that the Soviet Union’s long term goal was to weaken Britain’s hold over Iranian oil and eventually 
displace them as the predominant foreign power there. If this situation were to occur Britain would not only 
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lose a vital strategic outpost and valuable source of oil, but suffer a catastrophic psychological defeat, 
demonstrating their fall from great power status. Partition, however, would enable Britain to formalise 
control over their assets in southern Iran and deepen their influence there: guaranteeing greater resistance to 
Soviet intrigue and protecting the bulk of the AIOC’s oil supplies.
On Bullard’s advice, Bevin used the December 1945 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to call 
for the appointment of an Anglo-Soviet-American commission to investigate the Azerbaijan problem and 
potentially to pave the way for the country’s division.286 According to Alan Bullock, the Foreign Secretary’s 
support for partition was bolstered by his recognition of Britain’s limited military power and the cost-
effective nature of maintaining a regime favourable to British interests through this process.287 Bevin’s 
refusal to withdraw British funding for Greek monarchist forces as part of an effort to guard against Soviet 
advances in the Mediterranean provides another demonstration of his plans to use proxy governments against  
Moscow.288 The parallels between British policy in Greece and Iran suggest a unified plan to defend British 
interests through indirect means and avoid military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Creedence to this 
view is given by records of Bevin’s meeting with Secretary of States James F. Byrnes in December 1945, in 
which the Foreign Secretary directly refers to Soviet efforts to undermine Britain in the Mediterranean.289 
Subsequently, he proposed that a process of retrenchment take place, without which “commerce and trade, 
economy and democracy will be finished.”290 
The idea of dividing Iran into semiautonomous provinces to be split between Britain and the Soviet Union 
drew fierce opposition from both the Iranian government and the United States. American Ambassador to 
Tehran, Wallace Murray, for example, suggested that Bullard’s approach bore the hallmarks of the Anglo-
Russian Agreement of 1907 and would lead to the country being subsumed into polarised spheres of 
influence.291 Meanwhile, State Department planners reported their belief that Britain was acting out of 
desperation and that, given their weak economic and military position, they would be willing to accept “any 
reasonable proposal which should prevent Iran becoming a Soviet satellite.”292 Perhaps the most forthright 
opposition to partition came from American Ambassador to Moscow, Averell W. Harriman who suggested 
that the British “could ill afford an independent foreign policy....England is so weak she must follow our 
leadership. She will do anything that we insist upon.”293 Harriman’s statement was an indication of how the 
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United States perceived postwar Britain. Although still a valuable ally, they were by no means an equal 
power and a new expectation had arisen that their actions would follow, and not conflict with, decisions 
made in Washington. In late 1945/early 1946 this impulse was still to mature, but it would soon become a 
defining characteristic of the Anglo-American relationship in Iran. In Britain, there was no recognition of 
this relative relegation in international stature and, despite ongoing financial difficulties, the Attlee 
government remained committed to forging a foreign policy independent of that set by Washington. 
Harriman’s comments illustrate the divergence in the British and American outlook towards the crisis in 
Azerbaijan. While the United States saw the situation as the result of Soviet treaty abrogation, the British felt  
it represented a deeper threat to their interests and the stability of the region more generally. Determined to 
maintain their preponderance in Iran and provide a demonstration of their international standing, the British 
government proved willing to adopt actions that were deemed inappropriate and perhaps even at odds with 
the geopolitical goals of the United States.
Bullard’s proposals helped to exacerbate the already heightened sense of panic in Iran, leading Hakimi to call 
for the Azerbaijan issue to be put before the United Nations Security Council as a demonstration of foreign 
aggression.294 Despite Britain’s established interests in Iran, Hakimi requested that the USA serve as an 
“unbiased, friendly assistant” in drafting a petition to the UN.295 Although this request was rejected by 
Washington, following warnings it could affect impartiality, it reflects an early marginalisation of Britain’s 
position in Iran and highlights Hakimi’s willingness to look beyond the traditional Anglo-Soviet duopoly for 
support. Although the United States was not actively seeking to displace Britain, they were viewed as a 
nation in the ascendancy by the Iranian government and their creeping soft-influence should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, this request can be seen as the first example of a pattern that would be replicated in 
years to come. While Bevin hoped to incorporate Iran into Britain’s economic and defensive system, there 
were no guarantees that the Iranians would themselves follow a path favourable to London. In truth, there 
was a sharp disconnection between British expectations and Iranian actions.
Despite Wm. Roger Louis’ argument that “the British on the whole were skeptical of American staying 
power” and Bevin’s determination to forge a foreign policy free from Washington’s influence, the British 
could not isolate themselves from international public opinion.296 Thus, while the British Ambassador to 
Washington, Lord Halifax, suggested that the Truman administration saw “the difficulties in the Middle East 
in terms of a clash between rival imperialisms for oil and power in which the United States has no immediate 
interest” he also argued that a divisive policy in Iran would “cast serious doubt” on Britain’s willingness to 
“abide by their undertakings as member of [the] United Nations Organisation” and would, therefore, be a 
blow to the authority of the UN itself.297 Halifax’s concerns were given further resonance when, after 
discussions with Secretary of State Byrnes, he suggested that not only did the United States “not at all like 
the idea of discouraging [a] Persian approach to [the] United Nations Organisation” but also that “the 
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Americans will not move from this position.”298 Byrnes reiterated this view four days later and made clear 
that “it did not appear very advisable for a great power to assume responsibility, as His Majesty’s 
Government had done in this instance, of dissuading a small country from invoking the machinery of the 
United Nations Organisation whenever it thought fit.”299 
In framing the Azerbaijan Crisis as potentially harmful to their interests, Halifax raises an interesting 
question as to the strength of Britain’s international position. While the British had in previous decades been 
able to adopt a unilateral policy in Iran, this was no longer the case with pluralism between nations the new 
norm in international politics. Byrnes’ comments underline this and suggest that Britain was no longer a truly 
great power, but rather one of many nations who should exercise diplomacy through the United Nations.
Despite Bullard’s determination to see Iran divided and British control in the south formalised, Bevin was 
under pressure from his domestic support base to find a constructive solution, free from the imperial hue of 
partition. Josephine Smith, a British trade unionist with experience advising labour leaders in Iran and a 
friend of future Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones, argued that the British administration in Iran, and 
Bullard in particular, was “quite unconsciously, anti-working class, be it the British, Persian or Russian, or 
any other working class...They just can’t help it that the Labour government’s policy is against the grain - to 
them socialism is something wicked and alien and the lower classes just something which has to be kept in 
its place, even if it is a sort of Gestapo which is to do so.”300 Smith’s letter is indicative of the strength of 
feeling of Britain’s left-wing towards potential support for dictatorial figures and their suspicions that Bevin 
could adopt an imperialist policy, even if it was seen as at odds with the socialist internationalism of some 
factions of the Labour Party. These views were crystallised by commentator Raymond Blackburn, who 
argued that “it is often said by extreme left critics that the British Labor [sic] government is pursuing a 
Socialist policy at home and a Tory policy abroad” and that the Foreign Secretary faced accusations of 
“being pathologically hostile to communism in any form.”301 This criticism of Bevin reflects his pragmatic 
nature, and a malleable approach based on immediate circumstance and necessity, rather than entrenched 
theoretical ideology.
While Halifax and the British left warned against the dangers of partition, Bullard remained certain that it 
offered the best means of safeguarding British interests from the USSR. In a January 2 message the 
Ambassador warned that the Azerbaijan issue going before the UN was “likely to kill our Moscow proposals 
for the appointment of a tripartite commission for the establishment of Provincial Councils for Persia” and 
called on the Foreign Secretary to take any action necessary to dissuade Hakimi from tabling a complaint.302 
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Bullard also took the unusual step of directly appealing to the Shah to prevent this from happening, 
suggesting that he wanted him to take a more active role in Iranian political life.303 The Ambassador believed 
Hakimi’s grip on power was slipping and he saw the Shah’s potential in becoming something of a dictatorial 
figure.304 This would not only fill Iran’s emerging power vacuum, but also provide a malleable strongman 
and vessel for British guidance and financial support, helping to guarantee their favourable position. 
Although unpopular in some quarters, the Ambassador’s hard-nosed stance gained the approval of Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State Robert Howe, who suggested that “Persian independence is already a thing of the 
past” and that the best means of protecting British assets there was to “adopt Russian tactics and encourage 
an autonomy movement in Southwest Persia.”305 Howe recognised that this was a “dangerous policy” that 
could draw adverse reactions from “British public opinion and in the United States”, but believed that it 
would provide long term sustainability and aid both Iran’s development and the exploitation of Iranian oil.306
The notion that Iran needed British guidance was a constant theme during and after the Second World War, 
as was the belief that the Iranian people themselves were weak-willed and lacking in moral fortitude. As the 
British military attaché reported “Persia, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not renowned for 
that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances. He was 
dismayed that recent approaches made to the Soviet Union did not immediately elicit favourable replies. So 
Persian courage is beginning to ooze away.”307 Given his proposed policies it is unsurprising that Bullard 
himself espoused this opinion. In particular, he announced his belief that the Iranian people were “too selfish 
and slothful” to resist communist subversion, “untruthful, backbiters, undisciplined, incapable of unity, and 
without a plan.”308 This highly negative analysis of Iranian attitudes and capabilities undoubtedly clouded 
Bullard’s judgements and hinder his ability to provide analysis of the situation in Iran that was untainted by 
racial and cultural stereotypes.
The Ambassador’s outlook was perhaps representative of his education and employment history. Although 
the son of an East London labourer, Bullard had attended the independent Bancroft School on a £16 Essex 
County scholarship before undertaking further study at Queens’ College, Cambridge and joining the Levant 
Consular Service in 1906 at just twenty-one years old.309 Bullard, now aged sixty-one, had spent his entire 
career in the diplomatic service, taking up positions in India, the Middle and Near East, and the Soviet 
Union. The former postings helped to create a sense of imperial triumphalism while the latter enhanced his 
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suspicions of communism generally and Stalinism specifically. In short, Bullard, surrounded by a crony 
network built up since his schooldays and inexperienced in non-diplomatic matters, failed to recognise either 
the emerging intellectual and social maelstrom that threatened Britain’s position in Iran. Although he was 
both well read and well travelled, the Ambassador’s relationship with the Iranian people themselves bears the 
hallmarks of orientalism and an inability to view even figures from within the Tehran government as equals. 
As Britain’s foremost diplomatic representative in Iran, Bullard helped to set the tone of relations between 
the two states. As Alexander Schölch has illustrated, in pre-modern and modernising states the ‘men on the 
spot,’ whether diplomatic or military, had the ability to inextricably alter relations between states and to 
pursue policies with limited metropolitan influence.310 Thomas Otte has pursued this line further and 
suggested a reservoir of insularity in the far-flung reaches of the British Empire. While Bullard was officially 
directed by London, he had a large degree of anonymity which manifested itself in policy tainted by a clear 
distain for the oriental Iranian people.311 This subsequently coloured Anglo-Iranian relations and hindered 
the establishment of a positive working partnership between the two states. 
Bevin increasingly found himself in a compromised position. Despite his initial support for a decentralised 
Iran made up of semiautonomous provinces, by mid-January 1946 he had grown concerned that this policy 
could damage Britain’s image abroad and, following Halifax’s advice, hinder relations with the United 
States. Thus, while he lamented Qavam for having “wrecked any chance of Russian acceptance of the 
proposal for a tripartite commission” and expressed concern that the Iranians may have “deprived 
[themselves] of the possibility of raising the question later.” He also agreed to support Iran at the United 
Nations.312 This decision was undoubtedly based on calculating pragmatism. In Parliament Bevin was called 
upon to explain his previous endorsement of Bullard’s proposals. Invoking the traditional language of 
empire, the Foreign Secretary candidly explained that “when a small country happens to possess a vital raw 
material it is for allies to arrange their business so as not to make the small country the victim of controversy 
between the big allies.” Revealingly, Bevin added “I think this is a sound policy; I tried to do it and 
failed.”313 With his policy shelved and his ideas something of an anachronism, Bullard’s position was 
untenable and he retired from the Tehran Embassy aged sixty-one.
While the British were divided, a spirit of unity and desire to protect their nation’s integrity had emerged 
amongst the Iranian people. This was embodied by the rise of Qavam al-Saltana as an alternative power to 
Prime Minister Hakimi in the Majlis. Described by Bullard as having “openly taken a violently one-sided 
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line against inter-allied treatment of the Persian question” Qavam appealed to both communist and 
nationalist elements in Iran thanks to his stance against foreign interventionism, and long political 
experience.314 A committed patriot, Qavam had served as Prime Minister three times (in 1921, 1922 and 
1942 respectively), but, due to the chaotic nature of Iranian politics, had spent a total of just thirteen months 
in office. Qavam also had personal interests in Azerbaijan. He was the region’s largest landowners and, as 
such, was seen by the Majlis as unlikely to be susceptible to Soviet intrigue or bribery.315 
By a quirk of Iranian parliamentary procedure and a period of lobbying, Qavam had by mid-January created 
a “minority” bloc that could rally fifty-two votes to Hakimi’s fifty-one.316 With his support base dwindling 
and facing allegations of treason, Hakimi was, on January 21, 1946, forced to tender his resignation. His time 
in office lasted just seventy-six days and ended a mere forty-eight hours after Iran’s petition had been tabled 
at the UN. Subsequently Qavam was invited to form a new government as Prime Minister. Despite his 
relative popularity in Iran and history of crisis management, he was regarded by the British Embassy in 
Tehran as untrustworthy, “filling the key posts with Tudeh nominees” and seeking to collaborate with the 
Soviet Union.317 The British military attaché was also sceptical of his abilities and intellect, stating that “like 
most Persians he is obsessed with the idea of his own cleverness and believes that he can handle the 
Russians. This is a belief which few outside the ranks of his own countrymen would share.”318 
British concerns were exacerbated by Qavam’s surprising decision to quietly withdraw Iran’s case from the 
United Nations and engage in direct, bilateral negotiations in Moscow as to the future of Azerbaijan. 
Qavam’s mission to Moscow lasted three weeks, but achieved few identifiable successes. Indignant that the 
Soviet Union had failed to gain an Iranian oil concession in 1944, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov 
demanded that Tehran recognise Azerbaijan’s autonomy and grant a concession before troops were 
withdrawn. Despite Soviet pressure, Qavam refused to be cowed and offered no guarantees on either matter 
before he returned to Tehran on March 10.319 Privately the Prime Minister viewed his visit to Moscow as a 
success. By resisting Soviet pressure he felt that he had earned their respect and could now bargain from a 
stronger position. Similarly, by delaying an agreement, he had allowed time for Anglo-American suspicion 
towards Soviet intentions to fester, increasing their support for Iranian action at the United Nations. In 
previous decades Iran had generally found itself divided between the imperial powers, but it was now able to 
play them against one another on terms it dictated. For example, throughout discussions with the Soviet 
Union, Qavam hinted at a greater American role in his country and promised that any “southern oil still 
unallocated will go to the Americans.” Murray, surprised by Qavam’s candour, suggested that the Iranians 
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had “the impression that Britain has given up and is no longer interested in Iran.”320 Although the Prime 
Minister knew that this was not the case, he understood the value of oil to Britain, and hoped that he could 
extract influence by massaging latent fears that their position in Iran was vulnerable to foreign intrigue.321
Before relaunching discussions with the Soviets, a second Iranian appeal was made to the UN with joint 
Anglo-American support. Faced with mounting international opposition the Soviet Union agreed to 
withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan within six weeks. In return Qavam agreed to establish a jointly held 
Irano-Soviet oil company, subject to Majlis approval and renegotiate the terms of all foreign oil concessions. 
The USSR would maintain a 51% stake in the company, which would be confined to exploiting Iran’s 
northern oil reserves. While this agreement seemed to offer the USSR a permanent base in Iran, Qavam’s 
insistence that the Majlis had to agree to its terms meant that it was unlikely to become law. While the Prime 
Minister publicly referred to the concession as “long overdue” and a “natural development” he was under no 
obligation to campaign for its ratification or call on his supporters to do likewise.322 The inclusion of a clause 
to renegotiate the terms of all foreign concessions was also a canny move. Having established a more 
positive relationship with the Soviet Union, Qavam felt confident in his ability to win a more favourable oil 
settlement with the British who feared foreign intervention from both London and Moscow. Finally, although 
the Prime Minister agreed to Azerbaijan’s autonomy in principle, he did not rule out its future reintegration 
or guarantee that Tehran would respect legislation drafted by the regional council in Tabriz.323 
The brokering skills, diplomatic savvy and high-cunning displayed by Qavam indicate that British 
orientalism had blinded them to the realities of Iranian political society. Moreover, Qavam demonstrated an 
ability to operate on the international stage without British interference, challenging the misguided belief that 
Iran could not function without London’s guidance. However, while the British Government had proven 
malleable to international opinion, their underlying world view appears unchanged. Ambassador Bullard was 
bullish in his belief that the Iranians were incapable of independently maintaining order and though Bevin 
was more flexible, he was only a reluctant supporter of Iran at the United Nations. Indeed, the Foreign 
Secretary’s performance throughout the crisis was far from exemplary and riddled with uncertainty. He 
seems to have lacked an overarching vision in Iran and failed to define Britain’s role there.  
Even as Soviet troops withdrew from Azerbaijan, a sense of tension lingered and the specter of new unrest 
loomed heavy on the horizon. While Qavam’s actions were heralded as a “dubious” success, key questions 
remained over Iran’s immediate future, not least whether the Prime Minister would be able to consolidate his 
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domestic power base and avoid the infighting and corruption that had plagued his predecessors.324 
Complicating this issue was the emergence of the Tudeh Party, a Marxist organisation, who, thanks to Soviet 
funding, an advanced propaganda campaign throughout the Azerbaijan crisis and the neurotic state of Iranian 
politics had become what the new British ambassador Sir John Le Rougetel termed, “the only coherent 
political force in the country.”325 
The Second Crisis: The Tudeh Party
While the Azerbaijan Crisis was limited by geography, the creeping rise of domestic political extremism was 
more difficult to contain and provided the second major threat to British interests in Iran. The Tudeh was 
undoubtedly the most popular and organised body to emerge after the Second World War. Although 
sometimes unfairly categorised as simply an extension of Soviet entryist tactics, the Tudeh were largely a 
homegrown force, blending Marxist doctrine with staunch nationalism.326 In Britain, support for the Tudeh 
was viewed first, as a response to poor wages and working conditions and second, as a radical extension of 
Iran’s fledgling trade union movement. This categorisation misunderstood the fundamental impulses driving 
the Tudeh’s support and made it difficult for Britain to implement an appropriate response to their threat. It 
will be argued that despite evidence to the contrary, British diplomats, and Bevin in particular, saw the Tudeh 
as a reflection of their own political bias and not as a national movement in its own right. In part this attitude 
reflected engrained orientalism and an inability to consider the Iranians as capable of modern political 
thought.
The Roots and Ideology of the Tudeh Party
The Communist Party of Iran was formed in 1920, the first of its kind in the Middle East. Despite limited 
growth, the party was outlawed in 1931 as part of Reza Shah’s efforts to tighten his hold on power in Iran. Its 
supporters lay dormant until the 1941 Anglo-Soviet occupation saw the Shah exiled and replaced by his son 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Subsequently, the Communist Party was reformed under the new moniker Hezb-e 
Tudeh-e Iran (‘The Party of the Iranian Masses’) and committed itself to societal reform, stressing “the 
importance of safeguarding democracy as well as all social and individual freedoms - the freedom of 
language, speech, press, through and social activity.”327 Although the Tudeh would later become 
synonymous with the Soviet Union, in 1941 the party could be described as liberal, rather than radical and 
operated from a populist platform, including demands for legislation to protect the “labouring classes” and 
extending the electoral franchise.328
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However, by 1945 the Tudeh was increasingly incorporating the radical ideology of Iran’s urban 
intelligentsia who strove to become the vanguard of the country’s industrial working class and rural 
peasantry.329 Their new outlook was clear from Sorbonne educated Majlis deputy Iraj Iskandari’s address to 
the 1944 Party Congress in which he suggested that the Tudeh’s aim was to “unite the masses - the workers, 
the peasants, the traders, the craftsmen and the progressive intellectuals” and utilise their power in the 
“common struggle against imperialism, against absentee landlords, against exploiting capitalists, and against 
industrial robber barons.”330 Iranian historian Arvand Abrahamian suggests that the Tudeh identified the twin 
threats of capitalism and imperialism in an attempt to attract industrial workers who, largely for religious 
reasons, might otherwise disengage from communist associations. In 1942 the Tudeh’s elected Central 
Committee and its commissions contained thirty members, thirty of whom were middle class with just one 
working class representative. While industrial workers were courted by the Party there is little evidence to 
suggest that they had any influence over the Tudeh’s “upper echelons” or their direction.331 
The pattern of influence within the Tudeh is redolent of communist theorist and revolutionary Vladimir 
Lenin’s “emphasis on the consciousness of the intelligentsia rather than that of the masses.”332 Lenin 
believed “in the capacity of the masses to draw the right conclusions when prompted by experience” and, 
given that they were strongly influenced by Soviet ideology, it is unsurprising that Tudeh leaders adopted 
this model for mobilisation. According to sociologist Ernest Mandel using a “vanguard” organisational 
structure would also offer revolutionary forces “the highest level of consciousness possible, and the highest 
level of self-organization and self-activity.”333 
The Central Committee can be seen as the visible tip of the Tudeh iceberg with a large body of associated 
members, drawn from the labour movement, below the surface. The war years saw the revival in Iranian 
trade unionism following the lifting of a ban on workers organising into representative bodies. On May Day 
1944, the Tudeh’s Council of United Workers merged with local workers’ bodies in Azerbaijan, Tehran and 
Kermanshah to form the Central Council of the Federated Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers. By 
late 1944 this body, thanks to a vigorous series of recruitment drives, allegedly had over 200,000 members, 
giving the Tudeh leadership a direct link to the working class support it craved.334
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To make their appeal as broad as possible, the Tudeh took the decision to target individuals from across 
Iran’s religious spectrum, becoming the first party to do so. Their programme promised citizenship to non-
Muslims and secular reforms to protect all faiths, from the Shia majority to Sunni Muslims, Jews and 
Christians. The party also made direct overtures to religious minorities by promising legislation to protect 
holy days. Thus, in October 1946, Ambassador John Le Rougetel reported, with an air of surprise and 
exhaustion, that the Tudeh were seeking to “revive the ancient Zoroastrian feast of Mehrgen” despite 
attaching no religious significance to the festival.335 
As well as embracing minority religions, the Tudeh leadership’s commitment to ethnic diversity was clear. 
Of the fifteen members of the Provisional Central Council, elected in October 1942, eight were Persian, four 
were Azeri, two were Qajars and one was Armenian. However, it should be noted that two minorities were 
undoubtedly overrepresented in the Tudeh leadership structure. Azeri and other Turkic groups made up less 
than twenty-seven percent of the Iranian population, yet formed up to forty-three percent of the Party’s 
leadership. Similarly, Christians, who numbered less than one percent of the total population, formed 
between three and eight percent of the leadership, again reflecting the urban makeup of the group’s upper 
echelons.336 Although contemporary political commentator George Lenczowki argued that the 
overrepresentation of ethnic and religious minorities indicated the Tudeh’s position as a party of minority 
protest, his analysis fails to comprehend the largely Persian ethnic makeup of its affiliated trade unions or the 
emphasis the Tudeh placed on national liberation.337 Indeed, it also appears that British representatives in 
Iran failed to acknowledge this and instead treated the Tudeh as a pro-Soviet party of protest and a vehicle 
for workplace grievances. It is notable, for example, that the British Embassy’s labour attaché Kenneth J. 
Hird believed that the Tudeh gained popularity because it “gave coherence to workers’ grievances” and was 
supported by the “extreme left wing.”338
The Tudeh’s popularity grew exponentially throughout 1945 and 1946. During this period the Tudeh’s 
newspaper circulation had reached an all-time high of 120,000 and their support was solidified by the 
decision to embrace mass media as a means of spreading its message. Rasbah - the Party’s newspaper and de 
facto mouthpiece - was, by 1945 able to sell upwards of 100,000 copies per issue. While most newspapers 
operated within a single district or region, Rasbah was distributed nationwide, helping to entrench its image 
as a party of the nation as a whole. Rasbah was so popular that it employed over fifty anti-capitalist and anti-
British journalists.339  The British Consul, Kerman reported that the Tudeh’s reach was so great that “at least 
seventy percent of the population who represent the working class have been affected.”340 
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In Khuzistan, home to the AIOC’s Abadan Refinery, May Day 1946 saw some eighty-thousand workers 
march under the Tudeh standard.341 The Tudeh were, in the words of Labour MP Jack Jones, not only “intent 
on serious business”, but “an industrial force to be reckoned with.”342 The Tudeh’s power even extended to 
government officials. The British military attaché reported that “in the Caspian province all Persian officials 
from the Governor downward are under Tudeh supervision....In fact, the Tudeh can take over whenever it 
wished to do so.”343 In January, new Prime Minister Qavam recognised the Tudeh’s strength by inviting three 
of its leading members of join his Cabinet, releasing Party loyalists from prison and permitting mass rallies, 
previously banned by Hakimi.344 According to Le Rougetel, Qavam’s policy was self-defeating and offered 
the Tudeh undue power: “if he were to take [a] strong line against them, they would almost certainly retaliate 
by forcing him from office and replacing him with an out and out communist.”345 Fearful that confronting 
the Tudeh could lead to violence, and perhaps even revolution, the British government refrained from direct 
engagement and instead opted to monitor the situation from a distance.
In a sense the Tudeh’s rise can be seen as mirroring the wider zeal for Marxism across the developing world 
and the belief that it offered an ideological framework which was not only free from colonial dogma, but 
concurrent with nationalist awareness and independence. Although the Tudeh was able to galvanise support 
from across racial and class lines some in Iran, particularly religious conservative factions, were fiercely 
opposed to it. A particularly incendiary report from the conservative, and allegedly pro-British, Ra’ad-i 
Emruz newspaper suggested that the Tudeh’s doctrine was “satanical”, sought to “violate sacred rights”, such 
as private property, and that the party was itself “an enemy of Islam.”346 Despite such criticism the Tudeh 
continued to prosper. Unlike its competitors it was not only highly organised, but widely perceived as being 
uncorrupt: a rarity in a state where “nothing could be done, but something could always be arranged.”347
Britain Responds
Faced with limited organised opposition, the Tudeh’s influence reached its peak in the summer of 1946. In a 
message to the Foreign Office dated July 13, Ambassador Le Rougetel reported that a strike had begun in the 
Agha Jari oilfield, little over one hundred miles east of Abadan. Although it was one of many strikes that 
summer, it was the most violent with pickets organised not only to intimidate Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
staff, but also to seize all means of transport and foreign property. The strikers’ zeal was clear and as they 
looted company buildings Le Rougetel was forced to admit that the “Tudeh ringleader was in complete 
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control.”348 The scale of the disturbances was vast, spreading for almost one hundred miles to Ahwaz. Here 
AIOC staff were again targets of assaults by members of the Provincial Workers Union, the trade union wing 
of the Tudeh.349 Previously the Tudeh had orchestrated strike action to close individual facilities for short 
periods of time, usually one day or less, however in this instance unrest spread rapidly and was sustained for 
over three days.350 With the threat of a general strike in Khuzistan looming, the Governor General declared a 
state of martial law and the Iranian Department of War despatched a battalion of soldiers and twenty-four 
trucks to quell the violence: resulting in a reported seventeen fatalities and upward of one hundred and fifty 
injuries.351 Having met with the Iranian Prime Minister, Le Rougetel reported that the Khuzistan strike was 
seen by the Iranian government as having “no industrial justification whatsoever” and was instead viewed as 
“a deliberate challenge to legally constituted authority.”352 Despite British fears of Soviet fifth-column tactics 
in Iran, the strikes were not seen as instigated by Moscow, but as a manifestation of discontent towards 
unfair working conditions, low pay and poor housing.
 
This view was shaped by two factors. First, this was the official position taken by the AIOC. Discussions 
between company officials and Iranian trade unionists had led to the conclusion that the strikers’ principal 
demand was “that the company should forthwith increase the wages of all workers by one-sixth to provide 
payment for the seventh [rest] day.” The AIOC also concluded that married workers earnings were 
insufficient to maintain a family, heightening their frustration and industrial militancy.353 The company’s 
focus on the issues of wages and welfare in isolation was clear in their correspondence with the British 
government. In a draft statement prepared for Prime Minister Clement Attlee by AIOC chairman Sir William 
Fraser and the Ministry of Fuel and Power, for example, special emphasis was given to the “completion of 
welfare and housing schemes” and raising living standards as a means of quelling unrest.354 Similarly, Fraser 
would, in an October report entitled ‘Social and Municipal Development Carried Out by the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company Ltd. in Abadan and the South Persian Oilfields’, go on to detail the material advances made by 
the AIOC since the end of the Second World War and argue that the company was something approaching 
the status of a model employer in the region, thereby invalidating the claims made by striking employees.355
Second, and perhaps most important in shaping Britain’s position towards labour issues in Iran, were the 
findings of a parliamentary delegation despatched to Iran by Bevin to “inspect labour conditions in the 
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AIOC’s area.”356 The subsequent reports, drafted by MP’s Jack Jones, Frederick Lee and William N. 
Cuthbert following their June visit, provide something of an impartial analysis of the company’s labour 
practices and the political mood in the country more generally. They were also, given their wide circulation 
within the Foreign Office, clearly valued by Bevin as a vital source of information.
The delegation’s findings are revealing. In his report Jack Jones, Labour MP for Bolton and a veteran of the 
British trade union movement, focused on the “low order” housing of many AIOC employees, referring to 
their “cave-like existences in the hillsides.”357 Jones’ concerns towards housing provision were shared by the 
Conservative MP for Rye, Cuthbert, who argued that the provision of amenities “lagged behind” the AIOC’s 
pursuit of profit. That Cuthbert adopted this stance illustrates a cross-party recognition of the workers’ plight. 
Perceptively, Cuthbert also referenced the depth of feeling felt towards foreign intervention in Iran. For 
example, he stated that an “anti-British and anti-company attitude [was] shown by the great majority of the 
Persian employees” and suggested that the militant slogan ‘Persian Oil for the Persians’ demonstrated that 
Britain was facing more than an industrial problem, indeed, he argued that “there is something much more 
important behind it all.”358 Despite Cuthbert’s warning, the delegation’s final recommendations paid no heed 
to wider issues of oil ownership or the role of foreign companies and nations in Iran, but instead maintained 
focus on the need to “win over the Tudeh trade union officials to British ideas and to constitutional methods” 
and strengthening the central government’s authority over provincial areas.359
 
Given Bevin’s previously discussed background as one of Britain’s leading trade unionists, it is unsurprising 
that he sympathised with the notion that the strikes were a direct result of workplace grievances or that he 
was taken with the idea of incorporating the trade union movement into civil society as a means to prevent 
future unrest. Indeed, he had expressed an interest in such a policy little over a month before the Agha Jari 
strike began, suggesting that while civil unrest was “inevitably” the result of historical “anti-trade unionism” 
workplace activism could be constructively channeled into “local councils” to improve democratic 
representation.360 The Foreign Secretary envisaged a role for elements of the Tudeh within such a scheme, 
proposing, in a widely circulated Cabinet Paper that “it may prove possible to wean the Tudeh Party, or at 
least some parts of its adherents, from extremist or communist courses.”361 Although, in the short-term Bevin 
recommended that the AIOC undertake an advertising campaign “to draw public attention, both here and in 
Persia, to what you have done and are doing for your Persian employees” his long-term vision was more 
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expansive and identified trade unionism as a vital tenet of Iranian civil society.362 It is notable that Bevin’s 
analysis did not acknowledge any nationalist or patriotic impulses within the Tudeh. In his mind its 
complaints related to workplace injustices and could be solved through collaboration with the labour 
movement.
The idea of enlarging the role of trade unions in Iranian society can be seen as a continuation of the domestic 
policies undertaken by Bevin while serving as Minister of Labour during the Second World War. Through the 
expansion of trade union membership and centralisation of labour, Bevin was able to undertake a process 
that historian Geoffrey Field suggests “amounted to civilian conscription.”363 The effect was striking in that 
it helped to formalise workplace discontent and establish a “wider consciousness of class... superimposed 
upon older loyalties.”364 If a similar process were undertaken in Iran, it was hoped that the working class 
would begin to take an active role in politics and help to ease the long-standing tribal and religious 
differences which had impinged on the country’s development.
Bevin identified the AIOC as the greatest obstacle to a viable Iranian trade union movement, reflecting his 
own apprehension towards the relationship between management and labour.365 Although the British 
Government had representatives on the AIOC board of directors “none of them has ever taken any interest in 
labour at all” and while the Tudeh, on the advice of Moscow, had adopted underhand tactics in Iran they had 
“been psychologically much wiser” in engendering a sense of ownership amongst workers.366 During a 
session of Parliamentary Questions, Bevin publicly hinted at the AIOC’s failures. Upon being asked whether 
he was “aware that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have the reputation of being the best employers in 
Persia” the Foreign Secretary cryptically replied that although he was “not prepared to say what is the best” 
he believed “in all companies in Persia there is room for improvement.”367
Bevin’s belief that AIOC could do more to improve matters, particularly regarding labour relations, was 
reinforced by a report sent to him by the MP for Stoke, Ellis Smith, who, having discussed the matter with an 
anonymous friend (a former AIOC employee at Abadan, using the pseudonym ‘Joe’), suggested that AIOC 
leaders “had no experience at all of dealing with organised labour. The management is absolutely at sea in its 
efforts to deal with the problems now arising.”368 Bevin’s faith in this report is demonstrated by its 
circulation throughout the Foreign Office and Tehran Embassy. That such attention was given to a report that 
provided little concrete evidence suggests that he was willing to consider more deeply any evidence that 
bolstered his own outlook, rather than approaching it from an objective position.
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The Foreign Secretary’s analysis was not, however, universally supported and came under particular scrutiny 
from Le Rougetel. Although unwilling to totally discount the importance of trade unionism to the Tudeh 
Party, Le Rougetel felt that the Tudeh exploited rather than reflected workers’ grievances and was “an 
integral part of the communist [Soviet] machine.”369 He also questioned whether Britain could win support 
from the trade union movement, suggesting “the prospect of detaching them [being] even more remote than 
that of concluding an ideological truce with the Soviet Union” and even that “it would almost certainly be 
impossible to do so.”370 The Ambassador felt that the Tudeh were part of a “deliberately planned political 
offensive, inspired and directed from abroad, and is being driven home by ruthless pressure upon all the 
weak spots, economic, social and political, of this backwards country.”371 However, although adamant that 
this was the case, Le Rougetel was unable to obtain “any evidence which I consider conclusive regarding 
relations between the Russians and the hard core of the Tudeh Party” that could be used to discredit the 
organisation.372 In part this was the result of the fluid nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Marxist groups in the developing world. Although often characterised as instigating and directing 
revolutionary action, the Soviet Union’s key role was as an inspiration to native forces, rather than as a 
guide.
Instead, the Ambassador proposed that Britain “foster the natural antipathy to communism of religious 
bodies, and encouraging [sic] the formation of a new progressive party on democratic lines if possible.”373 Le 
Rougetel’s suggestion highlights not only his belief that a modern civic society was achievable in Iran, but 
also a conviction that Tudeh-style Marxism was incompatible with Iran’s largely Islamic society. According 
to Abrahamian, for example, clerics across Iran identified Marxists as “kafir and blasphemers...by definition 
amoral, corrupt, sinful and wicked.”374 However, the Ambassador remained far from confident that this 
would succeed. Indeed, he went as far as recommending that alternative sources of oil be developed and that 
a strategy for Britain’s gradual withdrawal from Iran should be developed.375 Le Rougetel’s judgement was 
not made lightly. He not only recognised that “British prestige in the Middle East would be prejudiced” by 
this policy, but also that it could lead to the “extension of Soviet influence to the Persian Gulf.”376 That the 
Ambassador adopted this cautious stance indicates a nuanced understanding of the ongoing political situation 
in Iran. While his predecessor had been bullish in his dismissal of domestic unrest, Le Rougetel was steadfast 
in his opposition to complacency.
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Objection to Bevin’s outlook was also found within the Foreign Office itself. Like Le Rougetel, Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State, Sir Orme Sargent, was unconvinced that even fringe elements of the Tudeh could 
be co-opted into a British endorsed trade union system and instead argued in favour of policies to bolster the 
government’s strength in conjunction with rigorous anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda.377 Sargent’s 
assessment offers further evidence that Bevin’s analysis of the Tudeh was unduly influenced by his own bias 
and misunderstood the inherently anti-capitalist, and indeed anti-British, nature of the organisation. He also 
suggested that should the Tudeh gain further political traction it would be “desirable to investigate the 
possibility of encouraging any demands from the people of southwest Persia for provincial autonomy” and 
the creation of a client state, friendly to British interests. Allied to this was a proposal to “flood” Iran with 
Commonwealth labour, reducing the Tudeh’s influence over oil production and refinement and providing a 
ready source of workers without representation.378 
Although Sargent’s suggestions won some tentative support from within the AIOC, it proved at odds with the 
ongoing metropolitan vogue for economic development and political reform in the empire. While Sargent 
justified his recommendations by suggesting that Iran was drifting towards “a return to 1907...quite 
regardless of our policy” Bevin remained adamant that he would not preside over the dissolution of Iran as a 
single, sovereign entity.”379 Similarly, the Under-Secretary’s Commonwealth labour scheme was dismissed 
out of hand. Although labourers from formal British dominions, particularly India, had long been a fixture of 
AIOC operations in Iran there were no guarantees that large enough numbers could be raised with the skills 
required to maintain oil production and refinement levels. Furthermore, fears existed that foreign labourers 
were themselves susceptible to communist infiltration with the Communist Party of India identified as 
seeking to create “discord” and build links with the Tudeh.380 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bevin 
refused to endorse Sargent’s bleak analysis of the Tudeh Party and instead reiterated his belief that “the way 
to tackle this problem is vigorous application by the company of their social programme and greater 
consultation with their work people, and the building up within the undertaking itself of human relationships 
with the actual men, not on a feudal basis but with the appreciation that all over the world the sense of 
equality is rapidly developing.”381 This statement again demonstrates Bevin’s strength of feeling and 
determination to put a highly personal stamp on Anglo-Iranian relations. It may also be seen as evidence to 
support TUC General Secretary Walter Citrine’s impression that Bevin “personalised almost everything” and 
styled himself as the voice of the working class, regardless of the situation.382
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The World Federation of Trade Unions Report on Iranian Trade Unionism
Le Rougetel’s suggestion that trade unionism in Iran served as a vehicle for the Tudeh’s activities was given 
added legitimacy following the publication of the World Federation of Trade Unions’ (WFTU) report on 
conditions there. In November 1946, the TUC informed the Foreign Office that they had received contact 
from Tudeh founder and leader Reza Roustel, requesting an independent assessment of the AIOC’s treatment 
of trade unionists. In particular, Roustel stressed that the company had “turned out over 5,000 workers 
without cause” and “acted in a way detrimental to the interests of trade union organisations in Iran.”383 
Although the Foreign Office felt that “these telegrams are clearly part of the Tudeh campaign to discredit the 
Persian Government” and rejected Roustel’s claim that 5,000 workers had their contracts terminated, support 
was given to an independent assessment of Iranian labour conditions, to be carried out by a WFTU 
delegation.384
The Federation’s initial report was a damning indictment of British mismanagement and railed against the 
state sponsored unions that workers were “forced” to join. The Oil Workers’ Union based at Abadan came in 
for particular criticism, and it was suggested that the AIOC was actively seeking to control and suppress the 
free organisation of workers there.385 The report also reinforced criticism of British power over the Iranian 
government and suggested that, despite his rhetoric, Qavam faced the same pressure from London as his 
predecessors.386 However, although the WFTU claimed to be an independent arbitrator, this does not seem to 
entirely be the case. British delegate and TUC organiser Edgar P. Harries refused to sign the report and 
suggested that “there is no doubt in my mind that the Tudeh Party and Federation of Trade Unions of Iran 
were one and the same body.”387 Harries was particularly critical of the data gathering process and suggested 
that the “delegation [had] interviewed only Tudeh supporters.”388 Additionally, and perhaps most 
importantly, Harries identified collusion between the other delegates and efforts on their part to politicise the 
investigation. Not only did Roustel hold private meetings with the Soviet delegate Borisov, but these took 
place in the Soviet Embassy and no minutes were made available. Finally, El Aris, the Lebanese chair of the 
delegation, publicly railed against the Iranian government and openly offered his support to the Tudeh.389
Upon his return to Britain, Harries met with Hector McNeil, a trusted advisor of Bevin’s, who reported that 
Harries had the “utmost difficulty’ in persuading other delegate member to “have any regard at all for trade 
union matters and the worker’s welfare” and that “the Soviet and Lebanese delegates had definite 
instructions from Moscow to improve the position of the Tudeh and to consolidate and enhance the power of 
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Reza Roustel, the secretary and driving force of the Tudeh.”390 Harries’ description of the Iranians as 
“excitable eastern people” suggests that like Bullard and others he perceived them through an orientalist 
lens.391 In turn, their naivety made Iran “the perfect Marxist text book case for a revolution” and an area 
where the Soviet Union could “engineer” an advantage.392 
Like Sargent, Harries was convinced that the Iranian trade unionism was largely a front for the Tudeh and a 
threat to British interests in the Persian Gulf. This in turn provides further support to suggest that Bevin’s 
analysis of the Iranian trade union movement was incorrect and based solely on his own experience and bias. 
Despite reports to the contrary from the Iranian Embassy, various consuls and intercepted material from 
within the Tudeh itself, he remained adamant that pay and conditions, and not ideology, were the most vital 
matters at hand and that with British guidance the anger expressed by Iranian trade unionists could be 
directed in a positive manner.
Trade Unionism as an Expression of Nationalism
Although the Foreign Office and British Embassy in Tehran saw workers’ rights and Soviet intrigue as the 
primary, and secondary, forces behind the Tudeh Party and associated groups, a third factor was present, but 
repeatedly ignored: nationalism. Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as “the dignity and self-respect arising 
from the elimination of ‘second - or nth class citizenship’ and the joys of liberated peoples enjoy from not 
being ‘bossed and knocked about by others with whom they cannot or are not allowed to identify’ and being 
bossed and knocked about by ‘their own’ people instead.”393 Nationalism in Gellner’s view is not solely 
based on shared ethnicity, language or culture and the Tudeh’s approach clearly demonstrated this. 
Tudeh propaganda and inter-party discourse demonstrated a firm commitment to nationalist goals and the 
development of Iran free from foreign influence. For example, an undated Tudeh Party declaration sent to the 
Foreign Office in December 1946 used strikingly patriotic language, referring to readers not only as 
“comrades”, but also as “countrymen.” This document paints a stark portrait of Iranian leaders as 
collaborating with foreign enemies who were conspiring to divide the country. In comparison, the “workers 
of the Tudeh Party [were] devoid of everything, but patriotism”, “the best guarantee of national unity” and 
“the most patriotic individuals.” Although tinged with the language of class consciousness, i.e. references to 
the “landowners” and “foreign capitalists”, the declaration also had broad appeal and ended with a patriotic 
call to arms: “long live the liberty, integrity and independence of Persia!”394 
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It is notable that the language used by the Tudeh makes no reference to religious, class or even tribal 
differences within the organisation or the country more generally, but instead establishes a degree of 
homogeneity between them with the British cast in the role of the other. Political theorist Katherine Verdery 
argues that “nationalism is a quintessentially homogenizing, differentiating or classifying discourse: one that 
aims its appeal at people presumed to have certain things in common as against people thought not to have 
any mutual connections.”395 Thus, while the Tudeh comprised Muslims and Christians, Azeris and Tehranis, 
a unifying bond was created through differentiation against Britain as a markedly foreign adversary. What 
Ernest Gellner refers to as nationalism’s “the objective need for homogeneity” is also fulfilled by the Tudeh’s 
discourse.396 Gellner argues that nationalism was a “yearning for incorporation” as disparate groups came 
together to demand “full cultural citizenship.”397 The Tudeh’s rhetoric clearly illustrate a goal of “national 
unity” and sense that the rights of Iranian citizens could only be obtained through independence.398 Despite 
the sophistication of expression outlined above, the British response was generally to ignore its underlying 
nationalist tone. 
The Tudeh’s success in developing mass support from a small, intellectual and cosmopolitan vanguard 
follows the model Czech social scientist Karl Deutsch referred to as “social mobilization.”399 For Deutsch 
the integration of new groups, such as religious minorities or workers who had previously lacked outlets for 
political expression, into extensive networks of communications, including the media, expands their horizons 
and enables them to better understand the influence they can wield as part of a mass movement.400 Social 
mobilization is not a uniform process, but rather one in which “major clusters of old social, economic and 
psychological commitments are eroded or broken down”, their membership fluctuating as some are drawn in 
while others are ignored.401 Thus in Iran while trade unionists from the industrial sector were drawn into the 
Tudeh’s ranks, amongst the rural and religious peasantry this, largely, did not take place. Those working in 
industrial centers benefitted from better organisation and communication networks which simply could not 
exist in the backwaters of, for example, northeastern Iran.402
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The Tudeh declaration outlined above was widely circulated and, according to Le Rougetel, supported by 
media appearances from Tudeh leaders.403 However, it was not an isolated statement, but rather a part of a 
wider ideological continuum and a reflection of Tudeh ideology more generally.404 Telegrams between Tudeh 
operatives intercepted by British Embassy and consular staff reveal that anti-imperialism, often expressed 
through anti-British and anti-AIOC sentiments, was central to Tudeh discourse. In a telegram to the United 
Council of Representatives, Tudeh Youth Organisation members Ghulam Ali Muradi and Mahmud Karduani 
suggested that “only by the dismissal of Misbah Fatimi (Governor General of Khuzistan), the open agent of 
the AIOC, and the dissolution of the AIOC’s political machinery, can the public and the workers have faith in 
the government.” Similarly in a telegram circulated amongst the Tudeh leadership Mirdi Hasim Najafi and 
Husain Tarbait stressed that Iranian workers were “puppets in the hands of the imperialists” before 
condemning the Company for its role in exacerbating tribal unrest for their own economic ends and 
demanding that “the Jeacocks, the Granvilles, Underwoods and Temples” be “banished” from Iran.405 
Nationalist sentiments were also indirectly communicated to the British government. For example, in a letter 
to the Trade Union Congress, Roustel argued that organised workers were suffering “under pressure of 
imperialist and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agents” and that the British government was taking steps to 
hinder the progress of organised labour there.406 
Iranian news reports of the July strike clearly indicate a domestic belief that the Tudeh was at least in part 
driven by nationalism. Unsurprisingly Tudeh operated newspapers including Shazbar and Rahbar accused 
the AIOC of “organised terrorism” and suggested that the strike was the natural reaction of corporate and 
imperial aggression. However, these sentiments, though perhaps expressed somewhat less vehemently, were 
also clear in reports from the non-Tudeh press, whatever its political hue. For example, left-wing newspaper 
Dad suggested that the strike was the natural reaction to the AIOC’s political meddling and “declared that the 
company influenced government officials to oppress the workers’ movement.” Similarly, Darya, a 
newspaper referred to by the British Embassy as of the “moderate left” referred to the strike as a reaction to 
British efforts to partition Iran and a demonstration of workers’ patriotism. Centrist newspaper Qiyam-e-Iran 
was no less scathing in its condemnation of British policy and suggested that London was “continuing her 
war against Hitler for the domination of the world.” Finally, even Mihan, generally seen as a conservative 
and even pro-British newspaper, suggested that striking workers’ demands were legitimate and that steps 
needed to be taken to maintain Iranian independence and territorial integrity. Tellingly, in a report prepared 
by the British Embassy, Tehran just a single paper, Foruhar, blamed Tudeh intrigue for the strike.407 Despite 
this wealth of evidence, little credence was given to the idea that the Tudeh’s popularity was the result of its 
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nationalism. Instead British leaders persisted with their fixed view that minor questions of workplace 
grievances, rather than industrial ownership, were the source of labour militancy.
In his study of labour and decolonisation, Decolonization and African Society, Frederick Cooper suggests 
that at a time when the metropole “needed the imperial economy more than ever” colonial authorities found 
“that they were facing not just a long-run problem of directed social change, but an immediate question of 
control.”408 In Iran similar problems were apparent, although the impulses driving them were largely 
misinterpreted and misunderstood for two reasons. First, perceived cultural backwardness exacerbated 
misunderstanding. In British Africa, as in Iran, little consideration was given to the idea that striking workers 
were protesting against anything other than their immediate pay and working conditions, despite evidence to 
the contrary. While trade unions were a form of social organisation that British leaders could recognise and 
understand, little effort was made to comprehend the impulses which drove their formation in Iran. Cooper 
describes British thinking as “brittle....caught in the same contradiction between a universalistic conception 
of human progress and a fear that African society was ill-equipped to partake in it.”409 A similar parallel can 
be drawn in Iran where even figures with left-wing and somewhat internationalist sympathies, such as 
Harries, identified its people as “excitable” and in need of British guidance.410 
Although the idea of creating an Iranian civil society was embraced in London, where it was widely believed 
that the “docile and submissive” Iranians would be unable to achieve stability without British support, it was 
not warmly embraced amongst the Iranian people.411 Given that domestic unrest was itself partly a response 
to foreign interventionism, it helped to reinforce Iranian suspicion of British intentions and exacerbate 
legitimate fears that Iran could be relegated to a colonial outpost. It seems that Ernest Bevin either 
fundamentally misunderstood, or even willfully ignored this information. Bevin, a staunch believer in the 
universal necessity of national trade union movements, found himself confined by his own bias and 
experience and unable to comprehend that strike action could be related to anything other than the conditions 
of working men. While the Iranian trade union movement was an outlet for nationalist sentiments this went 
unrecognised in London and as a result resources were misdirected and inappropriate policies implemented.
The misdirection of British policy also raised questions as to the viability of Anglo-Iranian relations. 
London’s importance was increasingly being called into question by nationalist unrest, and yet no thorough 
analysis of this phenomenon was undertaken by the Foreign Office or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. That 
the two main agents of British policy showed such limited interest in engagement underlines the potential for 
further discord. It seems that Britain’s position in Iran was taken for granted with their informal power an 
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assumed norm. At the end of 1947 Britain remained the foremost foreign power in Iran, but with the benefit 
of hindsight it is clear that this position was not guaranteed and that a new, more thoughtful policy was 
required.
Conclusion
At the end of the Second World War Britain was faced with what Keynes referred to as “a financial 
Dunkirk.”412 The Attlee government looked to its empire, formally controlled or otherwise, in the hope that it 
would provide the materials necessary to revive Britain’s fortunes and maintain their country’s great power 
status. 
In Iran, the Azerbaijan crisis and the rise of the Tudeh posed clear threats to this process and to British 
prosperity in the country more generally. However, division existed as to how to respond to them, not least 
between Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Ambassador Reader Bullard. While the former’s approach can 
be seen as idealistic, if not naive, and lacking in understanding of local issues, the latter was cynical and 
unwilling to move beyond an outmoded, orientalist vision of Iranian society. Moreover, both outlooks 
suffered from an inability and, perhaps even, unwillingness to understand the complaints of the Iranian 
people: mirroring wider patters within the British imperial system. While Iranian nationalism was a complex, 
modern ideology with support from a sizable base, the Foreign Office refused to perceive it in these terms 
and instead identified trade unionism as symptomatic of poor conditions, rather than a call for sovereignty.
The division between metropolitan policy makers and those operating at the peripheries of the empire meant 
that by late-1946 British policy was disorganised and in need of revision. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
revitalisation came in the form not only of development projects, but of the suppression of the more militant 
aspects of trade unionism and a concerted attempt to introduce new, state mandated labour organisations 
modeled along European lines. While this dealt with the immediate threat posed by the Tudeh it did little to 
fundamentally alter the radical germ of nationalism which was developing in Iran.
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Chapter III, Metropolitan and Peripheral Discord: The Attlee Government, Iranian Development and 
the Supplemental Concession Agreement 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Attlee government increasingly saw itself as responsible for 
shaping Iranian civic society and improving the country’s standard of living. Although both the Foreign 
Office and Ministry of Fuel and Power stressed that the AIOC would not make up any shortfalls in Iranian 
development funds, plans to improve conditions and worker’s representation in the company’s facilities 
continued.413 
However, as this chapter will demonstrate, these plans were made without consulting the Iranian people and 
failed to understand or address the emerging nationalist force. A second major problem was that the Foreign 
Office’s development goals were not shared by the AIOC, leading to rifts between them and stymying the 
successful implementation of policy. Additionally, Britain’s economic position was in an increasingly 
perilous state, leading to pressure from the Treasury to abandon development plans and focus on increasing 
the profitability of Iranian oil. Furthermore, these issues were played out against a backdrop of negotiations 
between the AIOC and the Iranian government on the terms of a new ‘Supplemental Agreement’ to change 
the terms of 1933 Anglo-Iranian Oil Concession.  
The cumulative effect was a steady rise in popular unrest in Iran and a groundswell of nationalist sentiment. 
This chapter will chart Britain’s efforts to contain this and in doing so highlight how their policies failed, 
allowing nationalism to blossom. It will also illustrate the difficulties of managing the informal empire and 
suggest that British policy, though well intentioned, lacked the long term goals, proper management and 
sustained collaboration needed to make it a success.
Crisis and Development in Iran
To reduce the long term threat of communism and safeguard the AIOC’s monopoly over Iranian oil, Anglo-
Iranian relations were reorientated in two ways. First, measures were taken to formalise corporate and 
government control over the Iranian trade union movement, codifying and shaping it to prevent Tudeh 
exploitation. Second, schemes to improve conditions in AIOC facilities and material benefits were 
introduced as a sop to discontented employees and a demonstration of corporate benevolence. This section 
will analyse and discuss these policies and suggest that they largely failed in their objectives. Instead of 
increasing political participation, control over the trade union movement hindered it, and while plans for 
housing and social development were grand, they were largely ill-conceived and lacked a clear path to 
implementation. Complementing these failures was the continuation of Britain’s domineering and 
condescending attitude towards the Iranian government and people, as well as a failure to recognise the 
potential of domestic led development.
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Trade Unionism
By the summer of 1946, thanks to a rigorous propaganda campaign, the Tudeh’s numbers had swelled to 
approximately 100,000, half of whom Abrahamian identifies as “active.”414 Buoyed by greater support, 
strikes became commonplace, including a picket involving sixty-five thousand workers at Agha Jari in 
Khuzistan province: the central hub of oil production and home of the Abadan refinery.415 The strikes were 
far from peaceful affairs with looting, arson and violence commonplace. As previously noted, the Agha Jari 
strike, driven by what the AIOC’s Political Advisor Sir John Underwood termed “hot headed Tudeh leaders”, 
lasted for three days and saw 165 people injured and 50 killed as pickets clashed with Iranian 
gendarmerie.416 The anti-foreign rhetoric so often employed by Tudeh propaganda had manifested itself in a 
haze of violence which risked destablising the very basis of British power in Iran. Commenting on the root 
of this disorder, Ladjervardi places blame firmly on Underwood, whose “provocative actions” led to conflict 
between the strikers and the military.417 While it should be noted that there are no British sources to 
corroborate these accusations of collusion between the company and Iranian security forces, the idea that the 
AIOC were able to exercise such influence adds to a wider narrative regarding the perceived depth of their 
strength in Iran. 
The first official step towards suppressing the Tudeh was a naval show of strength and the dispatch of HMS 
Wild Goose and Norfolk to Iranian waters. This act was taken unilaterally by the British government and 
described by Foreign Minister Hossein Navab as “unfriendly.”418 Subsequently Force 401, roughly 15,000 
Indian soldiers, was dispatched to Basra, Iraq, alongside a warning that should a threat “to her interests in 
Iran” emerge they would be authorised to cross the border without giving notice to the Iranian 
government.419 The single-minded nature of what historian Paul W. T. Kingston calls “classic gunboat 
diplomacy” illustrates the value of Britain’s informal power in Iran and their lack of faith in the Iranian 
government to maintain order alone.420 That these forces were dispatched at a time of demobilisation and 
increasingly tight fiscal constraints reinforces this notion.
Iranian action to quell the ongoing violence took the form of a declaration of martial law and arrest warrants 
being issued for the Tudeh’s leaders and sympathisers.421 Although Qavam stopped short of banning the 
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Tudeh completely, his decision to have its leaders arrested effectively ended its viability as a political force. 
With no leadership structure in place internal division became rife and local groupings began to tear apart as 
their remaining members vied for power. As Abrahamian points out, of the reconvened seven member 
Central Committee four were forced to flee the country while two faced accusations of internal sabotage for 
their alleged links with the Democratic Party.422
The trade union movement that the Tudeh relied upon so greatly also fell into disarray, again characterised 
by infighting.423 With the Iranian police and army given new powers of “expulsion” over “agitators”, trade 
union leaders were forced into hiding.424 The stratified nature of trade unionism in Iran was such that without  
clear and identifiable figureheads to rally around their ability to organise was almost nonexistent. The 
Tudeh’s collapse was so sudden that within a matter of weeks Le Rougetel felt confident enough to declare: 
“in the province of Khuzistan most of the party’s agitators have for the time being been banished or shut up 
and martial law has imposed severe restrictions on part activities of all kinds.”425 Although the violence that 
had typified the Tudeh’s rise had been quelled, questions lingered as to how to deal with the sentiments 
which had underwritten its development. Central to British thinking on this was matter was whether it was 
possible to harness the positive aspects of trade unionism while simultaneously rooting out the last vestiges 
of nationalism? 
As Iranian scholar Habib Ladjervadi has suggested, few within the British Government or the AIOC relished 
the thought of direct negotiations with communist controlled or inspired groups, even if they recognised the 
value of greater communication between workers and management.426 The report presented to Bevin by Jack 
Jones MP following his visit to Iran in June1946, for example, stressed the necessity of improving relations 
between the AIOC’s leadership and staff, and providing viable outlets for the expression of dissatisfaction 
towards working and living conditions. The most obvious outlet to do so would be through reformed trade 
unions, action that greatly appealed to Bevin.427 It may be argued that the Foreign Secretary’s desire to 
channel the anger and energy that had accompanied the Tudeh into constructive “local councils” was 
founded on his personal bias and limited worldview, certainly there appears to have been little internal 
discussions on this matter within the Foreign Office.428 Rather, the goal of changing the dynamics of Iranian 
trade unions and the introduction of more palatable and democratic unions modeled along European lines 
was accepted simply as a natural course of action. In doing so independent regional unions, such as the 
Provincial United Council of the Trade Union of Workers and Toilers of Khuzestan (KUC) based largely at 
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Abadan, would be dispensed with in favour of industry specific, nationwide unions with strong links to the 
central government and supported by a network of “factory councils.”429 This would, theoretically, promote 
pride amongst workers in their industry and help to ease communications between workers and managers.
This preference for single unions parallels the pattern of union creation in Africa identified by Paul Kelemen. 
Kelemen argues that the Labour Party, on the advice of the Trade Union Congress, favoured the creation of 
industry specific trade unions as a means of encouraging better relations between employees and 
management.430 The similarities between these policies can be interpreted as illustrating the lack of 
importance placed on local circumstances within the Foreign Office and an overarching belief that trade 
unionism could only successfully operate when built along European lines. The adoption of this policy 
indicates the threat posed by Tudeh and its associated trade union movement, but also the hope that new 
unions could produce a sense of solidarity amongst Iran’s workers  It is notable, however, that the sense of 
nationhood fostered by the Tudeh was largely ignored, suggesting that the Iranians were seen as incapable of 
grasping these concepts without guidance and certainly unable to express them through political parties, 
trade unions or other caucuses. 
Kelemen’s analysis ties into, former Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley’s 
suggestion that trade unionism was not simply a matter of workplace representation, but a vital aspect of 
colonial “education” and movement towards a modern, civil society.431 Although a sizable proportion of 
Iran’s population had undergone a transformative process of social mobilisation this had gone unrecognised 
and British policy remained based on theories that were no longer applicable to the actual situation in Iran. 
The parallels between Stanley’s outlook and that of the Labour government suggest that critical thinking on 
matters related to trade unionism and nationalism had progressed very little following the latter’s election in 
1945 and indicate the depths to which they permeated British society. 
With the Tudeh backed union leaders imprisoned and a vision for trade union reform in place, Le Rougetel 
suggested that “no time should be lost in setting up regular machinery for consultation between the 
management of the AIOC and their staff and labour” and that steps should be taken to set up factory councils 
and encourage “senior and junior Persian staff to form their own trade unions.”432 Following the British 
Embassy’s advice, the AIOC appointed an industrial relations advisor, A. C. V. Lindon, and entered into talks 
with trusted employees to establish what they referred to as a “legitimate” organisation.433 The trade union 
envisaged by the AIOC would be “a channel for industrial relations between management and labour” and a 
means of restoring “a sense of personal liberty amongst labour.” However, although ostensibly a forum for 
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workers, the union would also act as a “firm authority” and a bulwark against the spread of Tudeh 
propaganda.434 While small, regional unions were difficult to monitor and infiltrate, the new national entities 
would be structured to ensure transparency and enable the British government and AIOC to influence 
proceedings where necessary. AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser, for example, noted that through “properly 
accredited leadership” the British would be able to prevent militancy amongst the workforce.435
The domineering attitude taken by the British Government and the AIOC towards Iranian trade unionists is 
indicative of their attitudes towards the Iranians more generally. As W. N. Cuthbert stated during his visit to 
Iran, “the Persians” were not “morally sound enough” to establish the institutes of a democratic state.436 The 
image of the Iranians as without agency seems to be entrenched in discussions surrounding trade union 
reform, the underlying assumption being that without Britain’s guiding hands the labour movement would be 
hijacked and exploited by a minority of extremists. Reporting on the AIOC’s efforts to support trade unions, 
spokesman E. H. O. Elkington demonstrates this, suggesting that “all efforts to induce labour to organise 
itself...have met with little or no response” and that the workers were “confused” by the notion of trade 
unionism itself.437 Elkington also stated that “time and firm authority” was needed to “restore a sense of 
personal liberty amongst labour” with the AIOC, and not an Iranian organisation, best placed to oversee 
this.438
During discussions between AIOC employees and leaders, Mostafa Fateh, a distribution manager, proposed 
the creation of the Oil Workers’ Union (OWU), “a new union opposed to the Tudeh”, the legislative body of 
which was established in January 1947.439 Although OWU was set up only “after obtaining official 
permission” from the company, efforts were made to publicly distance the union from the AIOC leadership, 
thereby increasing the workers’ sense of ownership over it and encouraging membership from staff members 
who might be suspicious of the firm’s intentions.440 Despite these efforts the OWU’s leadership did little to 
hide their pro-company sentiments and actively encouraged the depoliticisation of Iranian trade unionism. In 
one case, OWU members were told that “this new union of ours has nothing to do with politics. It is simply 
for the welfare of the workers. Do not abuse the government and the company which are always working for 
your welfare...the government has the right to imprison anyone abusing peaceful citizens of government 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
87
434 Note: collaboration between the British Embassy, Tehran and the AIOC in this manner was a rare occurrence. Despite being the 
key to Britain’s strength in Iran, the AIOC was often unrestrained and generally pursued an independent policy. It is noticeable that 
records of communication between Le Rougetel and the AIOC’s leaders are few in numbers with the bulk of their interaction 
seemingly coming through ad hoc meetings, usually organised in times of some crisis. It is noteworthy that there is no evidence of 
Foreign Office officials working to correct this. E. H. O. Elkington, AIOC, London, to E. A. Berthoud, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 
29 October 1946, FO 371/52726.
435 Sir William Fraser, ‘Social and Municipal Development Carried Out by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, in Abadan and 
the South Persian Oilfields,’ 11 October 1946, FO 371/52726 NA. 
436 ‘Reports of Parliamentary Delegation to Persia’, 3 July 1946, FO 371/52718  NA.
437 E.H.O. Elkington, AIOC, London, to E. A. Berthoud, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 29 October 1946, FO 371/52726 NA.
438 Ibid.
439 Report up to Noon, 25 July 1947, FO 248/1475 NA.
440 Report up to Noon, 26 January 1947, FO 248/1475 NA.
officials.”441 The Iranian government not only allowed the OWU to bypass new trade union registration 
processes, but offered approval of their activities. In February 1947, for example, the Ministry of Labour and 
Information issued orders that “any application for registration by the Trade Union of Oil Workers should be 
accepted immediately.”442 Such efforts did not go unnoticed by employees and OWU struggled to attract 
support. The British consul at Khorramshahr reported that “workers are still very suspicious of the motives 
underlying the formation of this union” and “though a fair number of workmen have already enrolled, the 
general enthusiasm expected by the union leaders has not so far been forthcoming.”443 
British efforts to establish industry-specific national unions lend themselves to Cowan’s suggestion that new 
forms of “association” would “help to preserve the British connection” and perhaps even establish stronger 
links between organisations in the metropole and those at the peripheries of the empire.444 However, the 
success of this policy is questionable and clearly suffered from a lack of local leadership. Frederick Cooper 
has argued that “colonial labor policy was to a large extent pulled along from the periphery, as local officials 
had to come to grips with the challenges posed by workers.”445 In Africa, Colonial Office officials not only 
designed a framework for trade unions, but also acted to maintain it with little intervention from Whitehall. 
In Iran, however, such individuals did not exist. While Ambassador John Le Rougetel offered advice to the 
company, he was generally unwilling to intervene in what he perceived as civic and corporate matters. 
Similarly, although the AIOC’s leadership advocated the creation of new trade unions, they feared that 
corporate intervention could alienate workers and diminish their sense of ownership over these institutions.
The disparity between management styles in Africa and Iran indicates the level of diversity across the empire 
and the differences between those areas managed by the Colonial Office and those where the Foreign Office 
took precedence. Although Ernest Bevin’s image looms large over Britain’s policy in its most general form, 
the power of “local officials” referred to by Cooper in shaping labour policy in Africa, indicates that the 
power of the “official mind” of empire can be overstated.446 In both Iran and Africa, Darwin’s proposal that 
“British domination...would be replaced by tactful self-effacement” appears to carry some credence.447 
However, the disparity in the policies employed to achieve this indicates, that action at a local level was 
dictated by the competing visions of individuals. The differences in approaches to organised labour described 
above is indicative of historian R. C. Crook’s suggestion that postwar policy towards the empire was 
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characterised by the “interaction between a bewilderingly rapid set of policy changes at the London level, 
with a varied set of responses to crisis at the level of individual colonies.”448 
By entrusting the execution of policy to officials on the ground and offering little by way of a monitoring 
process it may be suggested that the Foreign Office demonstrated a lack of planning and foresight. This was 
undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that the AIOC was run as a private company over which Foreign Office 
and British Embassy officials had little to no jurisdiction. Between these disparate parties there were no 
formal discussions as to how the creation of new trade unions would lead to stability or what measures and 
safeguards would be taken to guarantee the success of this approach. Rather, labour policy suffered from 
haphazard organisation and a lack of clear, identifiable leadership. 
The first cracks in Britain’s Iranian labour policy appeared within weeks of the Oil Workers Union’s 
formation. The British Consul at Khouzistan suggested that despite AIOC support the union had “no 
headquarters or registration office” and that “workers [were] fearful [of] joining another union.”449 Although 
the Tudeh’s leadership structure had crumbled, the sentiments that had driven its growth were “still strong” 
and workers were “very suspicious of the motives underlying the formation of this union.”450 Despite a mass 
recruitment drive OWU membership remained small, peaking at little over 2,000 members.451 Widely seen 
as illegitimate, oil workers turned their backs on OWU and requested that they be allowed to start their own 
union without interference from the company.452
Within the Iranian government there was some sympathy towards this suggestion. Quoting Ahmad Aramesh, 
then vice minister at the Ministry of Commerce, Ladjervardi suggests that “the government could not destroy 
the Tudeh union by force” and that a more nuanced approach was required.453 Drawing upon Iranian archival 
sources, he proposes that a sizable number of legislators were supportive of government-sponsored “genuine 
unions.”454 Free of foreign influence, it was hoped that these would be better able to represent the views of 
Iran’s voiceless working classes. Crucially they would also be free from Tudeh influence.455 The British were 
sympathetic: with corporate-sanctioned unions floundering, the “genuine unions” proposed by the Iranian 
government seemed to be a reasonable alternative.456 
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“Genuine unions” were established by the Ministry of Labour and Information, itself formed at Britain’s 
request following Tudeh-instigated unrest. In September 1946, for example, the Ministry’s Tehran branch 
established the Central Syndicate of Iranian Craftsmen, Farmers and Workers (ESKI), a “grassroots” 
organisation that claimed to be “a genuine union led by and for the workers.”457 This claim is questionable, 
not least because of the ministry’s own admission that the workers they represented were “ignorant of their 
rights...and in need of direction.”458 To raise support, the Iranian government financed ESKI’s official 
newspaper Kargaran-i Iran (Workers of Iran) and provided support for its nationwide expansion.459 Workers 
in government owned and subsidised factories were, according to American labour attaché William J. 
Handley, also warned that they would be dismissed if they failed to join the union.460 Ladjervardi suggests 
that coercion and bribery were used to give the impression of popular support for ESKI, but masked 
widespread indifference.461 Although there is some evidence to suggest that ESKI rallies were well attended, 
they lacked the zealous fervour roused by the Tudeh and failed to challenge the growing sense of apathy 
amongst working class Iranians.462 ESKI’s credibility sank further following the appointment of Khosrow 
Hedayat, a former director-general of the State Railway Organisation and aristocrat with direct links to the 
Shah’s court. Urbane and fond of “perfumed handkerchiefs and flashy cravats”, Hedayat’s appointment 
demonstrated a further stage in the depoliticisation of Iranian trade unionism and a demonstration of the lack 
of authenticity amongst ESKI’s leaders.463 
Although Bevin had enthusiastically argued for the creation of “local councils” to ensure “greater 
consultation” between workers and AIOC management, this policy had limited successes.464 Indeed, the 
AIOC not only welcomed the Ministry of Labour’s efforts as a means of drawing Iranians away from Tudeh-
controlled trade unions, but also as a way of weakening the labour movement more generally.465 Clearly, this 
attitude was in marked contrast to Bevin’s promise that “the company is doing all in its power to enable 
organised labour to establish its own free representation under properly accredited leadership.”466 However, 
the Ministry of Labour’s actions did win support from John Le Rougetel, who encouraged ESKI’s expansion 
and the creation of the Iranian Trade Union Congress (ITUC) as a “natural and spontaneous movement 
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towards federation.”467 He found an ally in Vice Minister of Labour, Habib Naficy, who in May 1947 began 
the process of merging ESKI with the Central Union of Workers and Peasants of Iran (EMKA). Unlike 
ESKI, EMKA was, according to the United States Embassy in Tehran, “the labour union which comes 
closest to being independent of party and politics”, an increasingly unique position in Iranian society. Under 
Naficy’s guidance a deal was brokered to establish a joint labour congress which would include members of 
ESKI, EMKA and smaller organisations.468 While the British had initially looked to establish industry 
specific union this idea appears to have fallen by the wayside. Despite a flurry of activity from the Foreign 
Office in the wake of the Agha Jari strikes, their interest was waning.
Although it may be argued that Naficy’s agreement was born out of genuine concern for Iranian trade 
unionism this was not a universally held view. Hedayat, in particular, maintained that ESKI was primarily an 
organisation of resistance to Tudeh infiltration and that labour-specific issues should be a secondary focus. 
Hedayat’s approach suggests that resistance to communism was becoming a sufficient justification for 
measures that impinged upon workers’ rights to representation and the centralisation of Iranian trade 
unionism.469 It is unsurprising that in December 1947 EMKA’s club and office facilities were seized by ESKI 
thugs, allegedly with tacit approval from the Ministry of Labour. With the Tudeh a shell of the organisation 
which had shaken Iran the previous year, domestic resistance was limited and the seizure justified on the 
grounds that “EMKA was using the clubhouse for political rallies.”470 
The British Embassy’s reaction was similarly tepid with Labour Attaché Kenneth J. Hird brushing off claims 
of a crackdown on independent trade unionism by suggesting that “there is little real understanding here of 
what unionism or democratic government mean or how they work.”471  The orientalist perception of Iranian 
workers as unable to organise themselves mirrors the impulses of colonial officials in Africa, discussed in 
detail by Frederick Cooper. There existed an “explicit and generalized assumption of African backwardness” 
and as such the route to modernisation “did not begin with the dynamics of the African present but with 
British imagination.”472 As in Iran, officials attempted to impose British values and institutions on a foreign 
society and frame the labour question in terms of political and civic necessity. According to Cooper, the 
British hoped to move beyond the “traditionalism associated with indirect rule” to “create political and 
administrative organisms at the local level”, which could serve as agents of change.473 
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By the end of 1947 the Tudeh’s influence on Iranian trade unionism had been limited to the point of 
nonexistence. However, efforts to reform the labour movement had failed. It lacked the legitimacy of mass 
membership and was unrepresentative of the Iranian working class. As the British Consul at Khorramshahr 
V. W. D. Willoughby warned, “they [the Iranian workers] are beginning to feel [that it is] better for them to 
remain aloof from all organisations” and disengage from political activity in the workplace.474 Perhaps more 
troubling was the attitude of local representatives, both of the AIOC and the British Government, who 
remained trenchant in their opinion that the Iranian people were incapable of expressing political sentiment 
without guidance and required foreign authorisation to organise in the workplace. In this sense the 
development of Iranian trade unionism after the July uprising indicate a disparity between the reformed 
labour movement envisaged by Bevin and that produced by AIOC and British representatives in Iran itself. 
The limited opposition to this process offered by Foreign Office officials suggests a lack of planning on their 
part and illustrates that Bevin’s enthusiasm and vigour did not naturally translate into policy. As a result 
Iran’s trade unions became unfit for purpose, inconsistent with the views of their supposed constituents and 
useless as a means of improving communication between AIOC leaders and staff. 
Wages and Development
Complementing their efforts to reform Iranian trade unionism, the British Government also looked to 
improve the material wellbeing of the AIOC’s workforce. Le Rougetel, for example, insisted that “every 
effort should be made to improve living standards for all categories of workers, particularly for labour, and 
the highest priority should be given to materials and equipment required for this purpose.”475 Improving 
social and working conditions in Iran was part of a wider narrative of British development efforts in the 
colonies. In 1940 the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed, providing capital for the 
development across the empire for the benefit of colonial peoples and the British Treasury alike.476 In 1945 
the second Colonial Development and Welfare Act made available a further £120 million in funding over ten 
years with an annual limit of £17.5 million.477 These sums enabled the creation of long term development 
schemes, indicating the importance of raising living standards. As Kathryn Tidrick has suggested, the acts 
illustrate the “erosion of the once sacrosanct idea that the colonies must be, if nothing else, self-
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supporting.”478 However, these sums were not entirely charitable. As Bancroft of the Treasury made clear: “a 
worker’s productive power is enhanced in direct ratio to an improvement in his social conditions.”479 Thus it 
was hoped that by improving the conditions of colonial peoples they would not only be able to make a 
greater economic contribution, but would also become more open to collaboration with Britain.480 
Historian David R. Devereux notes that although Britain had withdrawn from Palestine in May 1948, this 
“was by no means the end of the British presence in the Middle East” and that strategic and economic 
interests there were central to a policy of retrenchment.481 Allied to this was regional development to raise 
living standards and solidify British strength. In Iraq, for example, improving social and political conditions 
was seen as “vital for any successful development of Iraq’s resources.”482 In Egypt similar policies were 
pursued with the British tying investment in the country to the production of plans for structural and social 
improvement projects.483 Heinlein suggests that this firm attitude was the result of an orientalist mindset and 
belief that it was the only means of dealing with “a hysterical people.”484 It appears then that improving the 
lot of the Middle Eastern people was identified as a means of retaining influence and of strengthening 
Britain’s position. However, the people of the Middle East, although not formal subjects of the Crown, were 
not be trusted to achieve this themselves, making necessary the guiding hand of British intervention.485
This was certainly the case in Iran where, in November 1946, a statement of intent had been made in the 
form of a joint report by the Foreign Office and Ministry of Fuel and Power that called for the AIOC to 
become “the best employers in Persia” through “the fixing of new minimum wage levels” and improvements 
to company housing stock.486 This document, circulated widely throughout both departments and the Prime 
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Minister’s office, demonstrates a belief that unrest could be assuaged largely through material improvements 
and reflected the growing problem of spiraling inflation and a lack of housing for AIOC employees.
Between 1939 and 1945 Iranian AIOC employees had seen their weekly wages more than double, however 
between 1939 and 1947 the official cost of living in Iran had increased more than fivefold, leading to protests 
against spiraling prices.487 Le Rougetel noted that inflation had led to a scarcity of rials in free circulation 
and to increase liquidity, through sales of sterling, “every effort should be made by His Majesty’s 
Government to increase the provision of British goods and services for the Persian market.”488 Allied to 
living costs, housing was identified as an area for improvement. It is notable that in 1946 the company had 
just 14,300 staff lodgings available for over 65,000 staff, over ten percent of whom were foreign.489 This 
shortage was exacerbated because almost seventy-five percent of housing stock was earmarked for married 
staff and their families, a fact which failed to understand the fluid nature of the AIOC workforce.490 Many 
employees worked on a seasonal basis and would return to their homes to undertake agricultural work once, 
or even twice, a year. This in turn led to fluctuating staff levels and oversubscribed demand for “bachelor 
quarters.”491 Finally, at Abadan, just twelve percent of staff had been employed by the company for more 
than three years, indicating a rapid turnover of employees, making the allocation of accommodation a 
challenging administrative process.492
In the months that followed the Tudeh uprising there appears to have been some improvement in the material 
wellbeing of AIOC employees. On 28 January 1947, for example, an unnamed company representative told 
Treasury officials that “recent increase in wages has for the present settled all the trouble and calmed all the 
agitation.” The increases in question were unquestionably large: “a fitter who used to get 28 rials a day now 
gets 44: a telephone operator who got 20 rials a day now gets just twice that sum: and the senior Persian 
interpreter at Ahwaz now draws the stupendous sum of £1,800 per annum.”493 Wages for unskilled workers, 
previously the target of Tudeh propaganda, also increased substantially, rising by thirteen percent to 40 rials 
a day as part of a new minimum wage agreement between the AIOC and Iranian government, encouraged by 
the Foreign Office.494
Although the AIOC was able to increase the salaries of Iranian employees their housing policy was less 
successful. In April 1947, Willoughby noted that the AIOC planned to begin an ambitious housing project at 
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Abadan, increasing the Bahmanshir quarter, one of four company owned estates, by 5,000 homes alone. 
However, on announcing the project, the company failed to provide either a timetable for completion, or 
detailed inventories of the materials required.495 By October the AIOC had made little to no progress in 
improving housing, even amongst high ranking members of staff, and inventories of necessary materials had 
still not been drawn up.496 This situation was exacerbated by a “singular lack of cohesion amongst the senior 
authorities of the company” regarding planning and development and a general “lack of cooperation” 
between the AIOC’s various departments or British officials in Iran.497 Efforts to relieve pressure on the 
company by consular and embassy staff were also rebuffed, with the AIOC warning against government 
meddling. Such was their obstinacy that in July 1947, Willoughby damningly reported that “the company are 
a law unto themselves”, adding that they “do not seem fully to appreciate the fact that His Majesty’s 
Government own over 50% of the shares in their concern. It would be an excellent thing if this important fact 
could be impressed on them periodically through their London office.”498 
While the Foreign Office and AIOC headquarters at Finsbury Circus were a matter of miles apart, their 
relationship was noticeably distant. Records demonstrate that communication between the two generally 
took place with the Ministry of Fuel and Power acting as an intermediary and direct discussions were kept to 
a minimum. The company had a history of pursuing a unilateral policy in Iran, free from Whitehall’s 
constraints, and was keen to continue this. In contrast, Bevin publicly suggested that the AIOC had “room for 
improvement” and demanded a change in the relationship between the government and the company.499 
However, despite the Foreign Secretary’s desire to reform the AIOC he had no clear blueprint of how to do 
so. Indeed, for all Bevin’s rhetoric there is no substantive evidence that he ever set his plans in motion or 
undertook consultations within the Foreign Office on how to bring the AIOC into line. 
Bevin was far from alone in his views towards the company. Although Under-Secretary of State, Neville M. 
Butler, questioned whether Willoughby’s attitude towards the company should see him recalled to London, 
Le Rougetel’s defence of “a most conscientious Anglo-Indian official” suggests that he recognised that the 
AIOC were becoming “too big for their boots.”500 A. C. Trott, Consulate-General at Ahwaz, was similarly 
critical of the growing disparity between AIOC and Foreign Office policy, suggesting: “it seems a pity that 
someone can’t impress on them the sound commonsense of the famous dictum of Lord Melbourne about 
some controversy: ‘it doesn’t matter so much what we say, but for God’s sake let’s all say the same 
thing.’”501 
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Resistance to government intervention in AIOC housing and development policy was clear throughout 1947, 
indicating an emerging disconnection between each parties’ aims and intentions. That this ran alongside 
disunity amongst AIOC leaders, who spoke “not with one tongue but with as many tongues as the tower of 
Babel”, suggests an inherent instability, to the point of dysfunctionality, within the company.502 Discord and 
disunity also manifested itself in the Foreign Office’s inability to work with the AIOC to establish a 
sustainable development plan. It is notable that while this was clearly a problem no steps were taken to 
correct it. There are, for example, no records of a government review process taking place, or of a systematic 
monitoring process. While the expansion of Bahmanshir was impressive, it was not part of a wider, unified 
solution to Iran’s socioeconomic ills. Thus, while the company “intended” to provide new medical and 
housing facilities to their workers, there was no indication of how or when, these would be established.503 
American Ambassador George C. Allen was damning of British complacency, suggesting that the 
government and the AIOC were “not deeply concerned whether Iranian political and economic interests are 
safeguarded in the matter or not.”504
In an attempt to mask their failing housing policy and improve their image in Iran more generally, the AIOC 
and British Embassy embarked on an aggressive public relations campaign. G. Keating, “an experienced and 
capable public relations official”, was appointed and set about producing a new range of daily and weekly 
newspapers to raise the AIOC’s image and inform workers and citizens alike of the company’s progressive 
development policies.505 Meanwhile, communications between Empire Information Services and the Tehran 
Embassy’s Information Department illustrate state-sponsored efforts to demonstrate the benefits of British 
guidance to the Iranian people and economy. For example in March 1947, George Rees requested pamphlets 
from the ‘Wars Not Yet Won’ and ‘Progressing Towards Self-Government in the British Colonies’ series for 
national distribution.506 These series reported on British successes in raising standards of living for colonial 
peoples while simultaneously providing reassurance that the empire’s long-term goal was native self-
governance. Increasingly, efforts were also made to influence the Iranian media, a policy which Colonel 
Whelan, the Embassy’s Press Counsellor, suggested “should be the basis of our publicity in Persia.”507 
Revealingly an Embassy circular from May 1947 announced that “we are placing an average of 75,000 
words of news and 12,000 words of feature [in the Tehran press] each month” and called for even greater 
efforts to influence the media through the distribution of pro-British and indeed, anti-Russian papers, films 
and radio broadcasts.508 It seems that as development floundered, a media campaign was viewed as the best 
means of papering over the cracks and improving Britain’s profile.
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John Darwin, Frank Heinlein and William Roger Louis are just three of the historians who have discussed 
the reorientation of the British Empire after the Second World War and suggested that the Attlee government 
wished to achieve greater integration through metropolitan-led development and infrastructure projects.509 In 
Iran the germ of this policy is clear. Plans were made to improve housing and welfare, and the need to 
improve material conditions was recognised. However, the depth of planning was superficial and relied on 
the assumption that the Iranian people would not only welcome top down development, but be prepared to 
wait for its implementation. As this plan faltered, propaganda was identified as a necessary tool to assuage 
Iranian concerns. Simultaneously, however, the Iranian government was growing more ambitious in its 
outlook and increasingly looked to challenge foreign perceptions of how to improve living standards. Their 
aims were generally ignored by the British, reinforcing the sense that they suffered from an entrenched 
orientalist mindset and were unable to collaborate with the Iranians as equals.
Domestic Led Development
The AIOC’s failure to establish a wider plan to improve conditions in Iran came at a time when the Shah was 
looking to extend his influence and establish himself as an independent advocate for modernisation. It is 
noteworthy that his March 1947 New Year’s Eve speech plainly stated: “fuller attention must be paid to 
improving the lot of the public, particularly that of the toilers, so that they can be comfortable in living, 
dwellings and subsistence. Also great efforts must be made to ensure public health and free education so as 
to eliminate illiteracy and epidemics which constitute the greatest cause of degradation, both materially and 
morally.”510 In a follow-up message on the feasibility of the Shah’s plans, Le Rougetel suggested that the 
Qavam administration estimated that “the minimum needed to ensure to this country her rightful place 
among the nations” would be almost 600,000 million rials, approximately £450 million, or “the equivalent of 
some fourteen years annual ordinary revenue on the present basis.”511 Included in these estimates was 17,305 
million rials for health service provision, 11,500 million rials for education and 5,130 million rials for 
housing.512 While these estimates may appear to be unrealistic to the point of extravagance they reflect a 
growing desire for a unified, nationwide and domestic-led approach to development. Unlike his 
predecessors, the young Shah had travelled widely and recognised his country’s many socioeconomic 
frailties. Similarly, he was aware that without entrenched dynastic roots he would need to ingratiate himself 
with the Iranian people and earn their affection through public spirited works.513 Although he was not in a 
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position to immediately achieve legislative change, the Shah believed that by publicly voicing his concerns 
he could wield his influence and develop his support base.514
However, despite the Shah’s clear message, the Foreign Office and Treasury refused to entertain the notion 
of direct funding for development projects initiated by the Iranian government itself.515 Bevin was also quick 
to insist that AIOC revenues and royalties should not be levied against future loan repayments and that “the 
effect of pledging the royalties as service for a loan would be to divert royalty receipts from normal revenue 
to capital purposes and by starving the former might create undesirable consequences.”516 Additionally, the 
Foreign Secretary instructed Le Rougetel to make clear that, “we should like to be consulted before any final 
[financial] arrangements are made, in order that we may be able to satisfy ourselves that the loan agreement 
contains nothing detrimental to the interests of His Majesty’s Government or of the AIOC.”517 While Bevin 
claimed that neither the British Government, nor the AIOC could “attempt to stipulate how the Persian 
Government should use their royalties” it is clear that this was not the case.518 By ring-fencing AIOC 
royalties the British cut off Iran’s principal source of revenue, hindering their ability to implement a 
development policy designed from within. British orientalism also manifested itself in criticism of the very 
idea of domestic led development. For example, the Commercial Counsellor at the Tehran Embassy, Roberts, 
stressed that the Iranian impropriety made the plans financially unfeasible. “The government”, he wrote, 
“leads a hand to mouth existence financially and it would probably be difficult, if not impossible, to increase 
its rial revenue to any appreciable extent.” Additionally, he suggested that, “the Persian is by long tradition a 
skilful [sic] tax dodger, and the government is usually obliged to depend for the greater part of its revenues 
on those which can be collected at the source.”519 Roberts’ outlook, like that of the AIOC and government 
officials in London, served to reinforce the notion that the Iranians were without agency and reliant on 
British guidance. 
Despite a lack of British support for domestic led development, the Iranian government opted to pursue it 
regardless, exploring the possibilities of securing expertise and funding from other, foreign, sources. In the 
most general terms the Shah called on the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, Husain Ala, to seek $250 
million in economic and military aid from the United States. Ala, a diplomatic veteran, recognised that such 
a sum was unlikely to be given and instead requested $100 million in the form of low-interest loans or 
ideally, grant aid. The request, although ultimately unsuccessful, gained the support of Ambassador to 
Tehran, George C. Allen, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, and 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
98
514 Ibid.
515 Davis, Contested Space, 296.
516 Bevin to Le Rougetel, 14 April 1947, FO 371/62001 NA.
517 Ibid.
518 Ibid.
519 Memorandum by Commercial Counsellor at Tehran (Roberts) on the Financial Aspect of Persia’s Development Programme, 24 
September 1947, FO 371/62003.
Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, suggesting that Iran’s geopolitical importance to Washington was 
increasing, albeit slowly.520
While the Truman Doctrine had demonstrated the United States’ willingness to aid strategically vulnerable 
nations in the Near/Middle East, Iran was not yet deemed to meet the necessary criteria.521 Aid to Iran could 
also have the undesired effect of inflaming tensions with the Soviet Union and undermining Britain’s 
position there. For these reasons, head of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, John D. 
Jernegan, wrote that while the Iranian oilfields were potentially as important as the Turkish Straits, Iran’s 
best course of action was to remain independent and avoid becoming too closely aligned with any single 
power.522
With support from the American Government unforthcoming, Iran appealed to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, announcing, on March 21, 1947, that funds were required to finance the 
Seven Year Plan: an ambitious scheme of nationwide reconstruction and development. To provide an initial 
survey for the IBRD, Morrison-Knudsen, an American construction firm, dispatched a consultancy group to 
Iran consisting of “seven or eight experts to study irrigation, dams, agriculture, transportation, power and 
fuel, industry, mining and communications.”523 Consultation fees totalled approximately $100,000, but it was 
hoped the firm’s reports would illustrate the Iranian government’s commitment to rigorous structural 
development and their ability to improve infrastructure independently.524 Throughout 1947 Qavam’s 
administration developed increasingly ambitious plans, these included: a nationwide road building 
programme, modernising urban housing and building a new water system in Tehran.525 The latter project 
enlisted support from British engineer and member of the London Metropolitan Water Board H. Ingleson, 
who proposed a grand scheme of mobile water chlorination units to help minimise the threat of cholera and 
other water borne diseases, and engineering firm Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners.526 
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Perhaps of greater consequence, the Seven Year Plan also engaged the support of American oil expert Max 
W. Thornburg and, on his advice, the Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI), the firm tasked by the United State 
Department of War to plan the industrial reconstruction of Germany and Japan following the Second World 
War.527 Thornburg recognised that corruption was rife in Iran and encouraged the Plan’s governing body, 
Plan Organisation, to be apolitical and run along modern management lines, similar to a large, private 
corporation.528 As vice-president of OCI Thornburg was to be stationed in Iran permanently, serving as the 
main point of contact with the Iranian government. To the Iranian people, and indeed many within the 
Iranian government itself, Thornburg was perceived not as a private citizen, but a representative of President 
Truman himself. He had previously served as an economic advisor in the State Department, and was on first-
name terms with important figures, both on Capitol Hill and in the oil industry: attributes which gave 
Iranians hope that the OCI’s actions would lead to much-coveted American financial support.529 Although 
Thornburg’s role between 1947 and 1949 was technically confined to offering advice on issues surrounding 
development, his presence can be interpreted as evidence of growing American interest in Iran. With the OCI 
employed as consultants the British were frozen out of an area of Iranian political and economic life that they 
assumed they could dominate. As Kingston suggests, “all out commercial competition with the Americans 
was not possible” and the British were forced to accept both the intervention of the United States’ private 
sector and their reduced ability to shape the Iranian government’s development plans.530 While Thornburg’s 
role will be discussed more prominently in chapter four, it is important to recognise his presence and the 
possibility that he could become, what Emily Rosenberg terms, a “chosen instrument” for the expansion of 
American informal influence overseas.531
Despite clear signs that the Iranian government hoped to forge its own course for development, British 
support remained unforthcoming and, as a result, Tehran looked to the United States as a potential source of 
funds and expertise. Although, at this stage the American response was tepid, the presence of the OCI 
suggests that Iran was firmly on the radar in the United States. In a sense this was a period of missed 
opportunities for Britain. Clearly Iran was in need of external partners and yet no olive branch of 
collaboration was offered by London, even though this could have greatly improved Anglo-Iranian relations. 
It seems clear that British policy rested on the misapprehension that the Iranians were in need of their 
guiding hand. However, while London’s unwillingness to support domestic led development was driven by 
orientalism, it was also the result of economic malaise, the growing realisation that the postwar recovery 
would be slower than expected and a need to generate revenue while simultaneously cutting costs.
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British Economic Frailties
As has been suggested, the British reaction to domestic-led Iranian development was one of resistance. Not 
only were officials certain that the Iranian government was “over confident” in its ability to undertake such 
an ambitious operation, but they feared that it could open the door to foreign competition for dominance 
there.532 The Board of Trade was particularly alarmed by the Morrison-Knudsen survey, which they saw as 
“clearly equipped to put projects in [the] hand” of American firms and “whose opinions cannot be considered 
unbiased.”533 Le Rougetel warned that the mission represented the American private sector’s “increased 
interest...in capturing trade in this country” and a desire to increase Iranian “dependency” on the United 
States.534 Similarly, despite the American Government’s refusal to grant aid to Iran, a concerns persisted that 
the Truman Doctrine could lead to the decline of British dominance in the Near East.535 This fear was 
exacerbated by military collaboration between the Iranian and American armed forces, and the Shah’s efforts 
to bolster his air force with the proposed purchase of American made B-17 bombers.536 However, despite the 
Ambassador’s concerns, the options available to the Attlee government to resist American advances, real or 
otherwise, were limited by increasingly harsh economic realities.
1947: An “Annus Horrendus”
In his autobiography, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton would refer to 1947 as an “annus 
horrendus” as the optimism that followed Labour’s election gave way to economic malaise.537 Labour’s 
problems began when unprecedented cold weather and snow accentuated preexisting fuel shortages. In June 
1946, President of the National Union of Mineworkers, Will Lawther, had warned of a “coming catastrophe” 
as manpower shortages hindered production, yet it was not until November that a Cabinet Committee was 
established to provide a solution.538 From January 20, Britain endured bitterly cold conditions with coal 
stocks falling to below four million tons, the minimum level for national survival, as demand rose to 607,000 
tons a week, 93,000 tons more than anticipated. Adverse weather affected transport routes, and on 7 
February, Minister of Fuel and Power, Emanuel Shinwell, told the House of Commons that, as a result of 
shortages, many power stations were to be temporarily closed due to shortages.539 Conditions did not 
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improve until late March and Britain’s economic performance suffered greatly, as the country proved unable 
to produce enough energy, let alone goods for export.
Even as the temporary shock of the fuel crisis ebbed, a more general economic malaise was revealed. 
Manpower, materials and startup capital were scarce and Britain’s balance of payments performance was in 
steady decline. In 1947, over 42 percent of imports came from the United States, however just 14 percent of 
exports were sold there: exhausting British dollar reserves.540 Further exacerbating the dollar shortage was 
the growing cost of occupation in Germany which, alongside the fuel crisis, meant that by March Britain was 
drawing double its normal amount of dollars per month. By April over $450 million were being withdrawn 
per month, more than four times as more than a year earlier.541 
Britain’s economic woes were compounded by the forthcoming introduction of full convertibility to sterling 
current accounts, due to take place on 15 July, 1947. Full convertibility was, alongside “non-discrimination 
in trade”, identified by the United States government as a vital tenet of international multilateralism and the 
integration of nations into a unified world economy, and as such was included as one of the terms of the 
1946 loan to Britain.542 Although leading economists like J. M. Keynes recognised that convertibility was 
inevitable in an increasingly connected world, forcing the free convertibility of sterling to dollars onto 
Britain’s fragile economy so quickly was an error of great proportions. Britain was suffering a dollar 
shortage, having seen the value of its reserves slashed from £864 million in 1938 to around £453 million in 
1945, as well as high levels of debt and a declining balance of trade, even with other sterling area 
economies.543 
On July 19, 1947, The Economist reported that convertibility had come and gone with “no untoward events”, 
suggesting that Britain’s gold and dollar reserves had demonstrated robustness in the face of external 
pressures. However, this was quickly proven to be an unduly optimistic assessment.544 In the first week of 
convertibility Britain’s dollar levels declined by $106 million, rising to $183 million for the week ending 16 
August with an average weekly loss of $115 million. By comparison, weekly losses during the second 
quarter of 1947 had been $77 million, an amount that was in itself dangerously high.545 The dollar drain also 
resulted in a fire sale of British stocks, including government securities which fell in value by $400 million. 
With sterling’s value plummeting, convertibility was suspended on August 20.546
‘Export or Die’
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The convertibility crisis was fundamental in exposing the limitations of Britain’s postwar recovery and in 
shaking the confidence of policymakers in London. Chancellor Dalton called for further cuts to British 
expenditure, including £120 million in imports.547 However, despite this bold step, Dalton’s credibility had 
vanished and on 13 November he was replaced by Sir Stafford Cripps, previously Minister for Economic 
Affairs. Cripps, described by Life magazine as “an ascetic, with a taste for socialism, sermons and sea-kale 
salad”, redoubled Britain’s drive for austerity.548 According to historian P. D. Henderson, exports needed to 
be increased to 150 percent of their prewar level if Britain was to eliminate its current account deficit, 
leading Cripps towards a policy dubbed “export or die.”549 
The AIOC was identified by Cripps as valuable asset, not only due to its potential as a dollar earner, but also 
as a rich source of taxes. In 1946 the company had paid £15.59 million to the Exchequer, rising to £16.82 
million in 1947 and £18.03 million in 1948.550 Additionally, dividend limitations had been imposed on the 
AIOC. This not only raised the tax pool from which the British Government could draw, but limited royalties 
paid to Iran. Under the terms of the 1933 concession the Iranian government could claim a fixed royalty per 
ton of oil sold at market prices and twenty percent of the dividend paid to ordinary shareholders.551 As a 
result, the Iranian government received a dividend payment of just £1.07 million in 1948, despite AIOC 
profits of over £20 million.552 Financial austerity also limited the funds available for the company’s 
development projects or structural development, straining relations between the Foreign Office and the 
Treasury, the AIOC leadership and the Iranian government.553
Cripps was not alone in linking British, and indeed Western European, economic fortunes with the 
exploitation of colonial resources and could call upon the support of Prime Minister Attlee himself. Historian 
John Callaghan suggests that Labour were “in search of Eldorado” and steadfast in their belief that foreign 
riches could be exploited to create a new welfare settlement in Britain.554 Although Callaghan’s research 
focuses largely on relations between Britain and Africa parallels can be drawn with policy in Iran, suggesting 
increasing commonality and a general sense of desperation to raise capital from foreign sources wherever 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
103
547 Cabinet Memorandum, 16 October 1947, CAB 129/21 NA. The dilemma faced by the Attlee government is referred to by 
historian and political scientist Martin Francis as a choice between “economics or ethics.” Increasingly concerned by burgeoning 
economic difficulties, Francis proposes that Labour came to rely on “demand management” and in turn dispensed with many of the 
Keynesian spending plans, both domestically and overseas, which had defined their early years in office. Francis, Ideas and Policies 
Under Labour, 34-35.
548 Life Magazine, 8 March 1948.
549 Hinds, ‘Sterling and Decolonization’ 104.
550 Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 325. 
551 Ibid., 387.
552 ‘Foreign Office Views on the Increased Profits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Request for Loan of £10 
Million Against Royalties’ Minute by Sir Orme Sargent, 27 Aug 1948, FO 371/68731 NA.
553 Nicholas White suggests that the Foreign Office’s role came to one of “fending off the exploitative tendencies of the Treasury-
Bank-City nexus” as it struggled to come to terms with this situation and construct policy around it. White, ‘The Business and 
Politics of Decolonization,’ 558.
554 Callaghan, ‘In Search of Eldorado,’ 115.
possible.  Hyam has also investigated British economic policy in Africa, proposing that the British looked to 
the empire “to get its hands on raw materials with which to buy food and other requirements” and that Cripps 
sought to “force the path” of colonial economic development to help alleviate the dollar gap.555 Secretary of 
State for the Colonies Arthur Creech Jones continued to believe that this could be a mutually beneficial 
strategy, suggesting that “the people of the colonies....can help us and themselves” by producing and 
exporting ever-greater quantities of valuable commodities.556 Creech Jones’ approach indicates that despite 
British economic frailties Whitehall officials remained global in their outlook and committed to an imperial 
future.557
 
However, the Treasury’s zeal for immediate returns on overseas assets and the bleak economic outlook 
hindered lines of credit and led the AIOC to turn to other sources of finance, including from the United 
States. In October 1947, Sir Gordon Munro, the Treasury’s advisor in Washington, warned that American 
investors had been tacitly approached with the view to raising a $100 million loan for the company, on the 
basis “that the group lending the money would want to be able to buy itself into the AIOC on a modest basis 
and that as a necessary preliminary to the loan all the details of AIOC’s finances would have to be 
published.”558 Munro’s reports were subsequently confirmed by Sir William Eady, former head of Britain’s 
financial mission to Washington. Eady suggested that in a conversation with Sir William Fraser, the AIOC 
chairman had let it be known that the company had been investigating the possibility of raising capital in the 
United States for over six months.559 Subsequent records show that the AIOC had even gone as far as 
approaching J. P. Morgan and other firms “on the street” to broker a ten-year financial agreement with an 
American creditor, a process described by a J. P. Morgan representative as “hawking.”560 Recognising that 
pressure from central government was increasing, the AIOC was seeking to break free and become an 
independent company, able to operate beyond the bounds Whitehall had imposed on it. 
The reaction within the Foreign Office’s Economic Relations Department was, unsurprisingly, immediately 
dismissive. In a message to Sir Orme Sargent, C. T. Grandy found four disadvantages to the AIOC raising 
funds on Wall Street. First, “the Persian Government would have a full account of the dollars earned by the 
sale of AIOC oil....this will increase the pressure on us to provide even more gold and dollars for Persia.” 
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Second, “any American participation in AIOC would be interpreted throughout the Middle East as another 
sign of the British decline.” Third, “at home His Majesty’s Government would be accused of selling out once 
more to the Americans.” Finally, “the Admiralty have a very strong interest in fuel oil from the AIOC and 
should be consulted.”561 Gandy’s second and third points are particularly interesting in that they provide a 
further acknowledgment of British vulnerability, and the possibility that the United States could usurp their 
position in the Middle East. Gandy’s message also suggests a belief that relations with Washington required 
moderation and that Britain needed to maintain a level of independence. 
In his response, Sargent drew closer attention to the wider political and security implications of the proposed 
policy and warned that neither the Treasury, nor the AIOC could “do this sort of thing without full 
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Chiefs of Staff and Sir Stafford Cripps.”562 The AIOC’s value as 
a premium dollar earner was also well recognised. Indeed, Eady suggested that within three years it would 
“exceed the value of Malaya rubber” with further potential for growth as the United States sought to import 
and stockpile oil.563 With Britain’s dollar drain a persistent problem in the postwar year, the AIOC was a rare 
commodity: a consistent dollar earner with full British ownership. 
Throughout these deliberations there was minimal direct contact between the AIOC’s board of directors and 
the Foreign Office or British Embassy, Tehran. There are, for example, no records of Bevin personally 
contacting the AIOC’s board of directors or of Le Rougetel holding meetings to discuss the implications of 
American investment in the AIOC on policy at a local level. In many respects this disconnection is surprising 
and raise the question of why, given the AIOC’s importance, were no substantive efforts made to establish 
and develop contact? Although the Foreign Office had platitudinously suggested the AIOC should improve 
its performance, there had been little follow up action to achieve this. While Bevin had taken an interest in 
Iranian labour matters, it appears that he had little stomach to take on the AIOC, a powerful organisation 
used to operating as an independent entity. Disunity in outlook prevented collaboration and relations were 
allowed to drift, even as the British government became ever more determined to generate tax income 
through the AIOC. Though a fine negotiator and an extraordinary intermediary between Britain, Russia and 
the United States, it appears that the Foreign Secretary lacked tactical vision and failed to build bridges with 
the AIOC’s leadership. The company’s decision to approach American firms without prior consultation 
indicates a clear manifestation of the mistrust it felt towards the government and determination to pursue an 
independent policy.
According to Nicholas J. White this kind of disunity between public and private bodies was a common 
feature at the fringes of empire. He proposes that “given the social and ideological divisions between 
officials and commercial specialists, it should not seem strange that the thinking of imperial business was 
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generally at odds with many of the tenets of postwar imperial policy.”564 In addition to a basic and 
fundamental difference in outlook, White contends that “no imperial business could have failed to observe 
the conspicuous worldwide failure of British governments to protect British commercial interests from the 
predatory instincts of determined postwar economic nationalists.”565 This suggests that the Attlee 
government’s lack of planning may have reduced private sector faith in its abilities, contributing to a decline 
of trust and making rapprochement more difficult. It is notable that White identifies this pattern in the 
relationship between mining companies in Africa’s Gold Coast and rubber producers in Malaya; industries 
which, like the AIOC, had been identified as ready income streams.566
The Supplemental Agreement and Iranian Nationalism
Coinciding with the AIOC’s efforts to raise funds from outside Great Britain was an emerging movement 
inside Iran calling for a renegotiation of the terms of the 1933 Anglo-Iranian Oil Concession and a more 
equitable division of the company’s profits. The Qavam-Sadtchikov Agreement, negotiated in the wake of 
the Azerbaijan crisis was rejected by 102 votes in the Majlis in October 1947, which, while preventing the 
Soviet’s gaining a foothold in Iran, made necessary a renegotiation of the terms of the 1933 concession and 
the establishment of a new ‘Supplemental Agreement’ between the two states.567 
While the British had shown little indication of a desire to change the status quo, there was a wide base of 
support for a revised oil agreement across Iran. Low level dissatisfaction towards the AIOC had been 
growing since the Tudeh collapsed. Not only had development efforts stopped in their tracks, but the total oil 
revenue they received was less than half of that taken by the British government in tax revenues. For 
example, in 1945 the Iranians had received £5.62 million, rising to £7.13 million the following year. In the 
same period, the British Exchequer took £15.63 and £15.59 million respectively.568  The dividend limitation 
policies imposed in the wake of the convertibility crisis added to this sense of unfairness and meant that in 
1948 the Iranian government would receive a dividend payment of just £1.07 million in 1948, despite AIOC 
profits of over £20 million.569 A less tangible, but no less important factor was the sense that the AIOC was 
an all pervasive presence, able to influence all areas of Iranian political and economic life.570 While the 
violence which accompanied the Tudeh’s rise was not apparent, a more subtle form of nationalism was 
emerging in bazaars, universities and mosques. The new nationalism demanded that the Supplemental 
Agreement establish a more equitable oil settlement and offer the Iranian government and people a greater 
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means of participating how their country’s oil industry was managed. Negotiations were to take place against 
a background of poisonous rhetoric and AIOC obstinance, eventually resulting in a Supplemental Agreement 
neither party truly believed in.
“Open Revolt”
Although the Tudeh’s immediate threat had largely been extinguished by trade union reform, residual anger 
and unrest continued to simmer under the surface. The Iranian people were largely disenfranchised by the 
political system and endemic corruption left them unable to voice their concerns through the ballot box. The 
British were far from an innocent party in this. AIOC political advisor Sir John Underwood suggested that 
during balloting for the Fifteenth Majlis, held in June 1947, electoral clerks prepared papers in the name of 
Dr. Abdol Hossein Rajeh, a former AIOC executive and that “anyone arriving with a voting paper made out 
for any other candidate usually had this substituted unless the electoral committee were prepared to allow a 
certain number of voting papers to be placed in the [ballot] box in another candidate’s name so as to make 
things appear normal.”571 A degree of stability was maintained thanks to Qavam’s ability to extinguish 
threats from within the Majlis and consolidate his position by publicly playing opposing forces against one 
another. However, this was a high-risk strategy and one which bought him into direct opposition with the 
Royal Court. Increasingly, the Shah hoped to be more than a constitutional monarch and to take a more 
active role in Iranian political life.572 As early as February 1947, Le Rougetel warned that “relations between 
the Shah and Qavam have lately undergone a change for the worse” indicating an emerging power struggle 
between the Majlis and Royal Court.573 Additionally, Qavam’s Democrat Party was a fractious alliance rife 
with “blatant corruption”, internal competition and mistrust, not least between wealthy landowners, 
industrialists and workers.574 Given the contradictory interests of these groups it is little surprise that the 
Party’s caucus was followed by mass defections in the Majlis. The much vaunted Seven Year Plan, despite 
support from the American private sector, was also faltering with “numerous complaints about corruption 
and administrative inefficiencies.”575
Le Rougetel warned that up to forty Majlis deputies were in “open revolt”, an untenable situation that led to 
the government’s collapse on August 27.576 Even as his government crumbled, Qavam vowed to fight on and 
hastily formed a new coalition with a majority of just thirty-six representatives. The result was “complete 
deadlock.”577 Although Qavam remained Prime Minister for over three months, his fragile coalition lacked 
unity and was unable to pass even the most basic of policies, not least legislation to ratify the Seven Year 
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Plan, despite the capital that had already been sunk into this project.578 With his popular support wavering 
Qavam’s position became untenable and on 11 December a vote of no confidence saw him removed from 
office.579  His fall was, according to Ladjervardi, “the end of a phase in the development of Persian politics” 
and the dawn of a new period of turmoil and domestic unrest.580
The collapse of Qavam’s government precipitated the search for a suitable successor and in a secret Majlis 
session Dr. Ibrahim Hakimi returned to the Prime Ministerial office in December 1947. Hakimi’s cabinet was 
fractious at best and can be seen as an attempt to encourage the support of the Royal Court. For example, 
Hakimi had asked Abdul Hossein Hazhir, a favourite of the Shah, and Murtiza Yazdanpanah, the Shah’s 
Adjutant General, to join as ministers. However, this prompted opposition from reformists, who objected to 
the heavy handed tactics used to bring down the Tudeh in the summer of 1946. In a bid to win over these 
elements Hakimi concluded martial law and simultaneously sought to lift restrictions on vital food stuffs, 
such as tea and sugar. Although the significance of these basic legislative changes is often overlooked they 
helped lead to a reawakening of Iranian nationalism and to foster a climate of political activism more 
generally.581 
The Gass Mission and British Division
After successive delays and two further changes of government, AIOC representative Neville Gass arrived in 
Tehran at the end of August 1948, spending almost a month establishing formal procedures before 
discussions on the Supplemental Agreement’s terms opened on 28 September, 1948.582 The Iranian 
delegation’s demands were initially unclear, but did include £10 million in credit, to be paid back by future 
royalties, to ease ongoing fiscal constraints and provide start up capital for the Seven Year Plan.583 Early 
talks were stifled by what the AIOC referred to as a lack of “properly organised procedure”, the Iranian 
delegation’s inability to enlist impartial expert advice and few, if any “formulated definite demands.”584 
Critically, Gass was concerned that future discussions could be “jeopardised by political considerations” and 
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felt that “any future conversations [on the Supplemental Agreement] must depend upon there being good 
prospects of their being carried through to satisfactory conclusion.”585 
His concerns were in some respects understandable given that Abdol Hossein Hazhir’s government fell after 
little more than four months in office, despite a Majlis vote of confidence. Iranian scholar Homa Katouzian 
argues that the replacement of Hazhir, a patriotic civil servant with links to Qavam, by the avidly 
anticommunist, Swiss-educated bureaucrat Mohammad Sa’ed exemplifies the control “the domestic and 
foreign powers that be” had over Iranian politics and their desire for a figure with “much wider appeal within 
the political and religious establishment” to lead negotiations.586 The main implication of this was that Sa’ed 
struggled to attract support not only from the Iranian public, but also within the Majlis itself. The continued 
threat of political uncertainty was undoubtedly seen as damaging to the AIOC’s interests. For example, in 
talks with Michael Wright, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State supervising Middle Eastern affairs, Gass 
reaffirmed that the Iranian government’s sustainability was “the crux of the whole question” and warned that 
unless the Supplemental Agreement could be successfully passed through the Majlis, discussions were 
largely pointless.587 However, Gass’ comments can also be interpreted as a subtle indication of the orientalist 
mindset being adopted by the AIOC. First, rather than entering into the discussions with the intention of 
reaching a compromise, Gass tacitly suggested that unless the Iranian government followed the company’s 
line no agreement could be reached. Second, Gass’ notion of stability was a veiled attack on Iran’s 
democratic process. These sentiments were latent throughout discussions, but would become increasingly 
pronounced as nationalism developed.
To break the negotiating deadlock tripartite discussions were held between Treasury, Foreign Office and 
AIOC officials, during which “it was agreed that the company would be well advised to show willingness to 
give some short-term accommodation, but not as much as £10 million [to the Iranian government].”588 
However, this was not a charitable act, but would necessitate the removal of discriminatory regulation that 
allowed the Iranian government to offer British firms a less favourable sterling-rial exchange rate.589 Bevin 
agreed with an extension of aid to Iran, but felt that it was “a case for a gift, rather than for a loan.” In part, 
this was because he viewed the limited revenue generated by the Iranian government as a “legitimate 
grievance” given the company’s “large profits” and the negative impact of Britain’s dividend limitation 
policy.590 While the Foreign Secretary had been able to craft foreign policy with little interference from other 
government departments between 1945 and 1947, economic dislocation ensured that this was no longer the 
case and his call for a “gift” to Iran was swiftly rejected by Cripps. The Chancellor warned that “an outright 
lump sum gift is dangerous” before going on to suggest that any loan should not exceed £5 million and that 
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the company would be encouraged to reject demands for a royalty increase of more than 33.5 percent.591 
Although Bevin shared Cripps’ faith in the AIOC as a consistent revenue generator, he was unconfident in its 
ability to reach a fair settlement with the Iranians. However, with his focus fixed largely on the emerging 
Cold War in Europe, he was unable to dedicate adequate time or energy to the Supplemental Agreement’s 
negotiation.592
By late 1948 the threat of war in Europe loomed large.593 The continent was split between the communist 
East and capitalist West and a succession of events had raised tensions to breaking point. In February, for 
example, Soviet operatives helped to execute a coup in Czechoslovakia while June saw Stalin order a 
blockade of Berlin, resulting in the Allies launching an airlift (Operation Vittles) to supply the beleaguered 
city. Reflecting on events, then Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson suggested that the clash between the 
communist and capitalist nations was the greatest since “Athens and Sparta and Roma and Carthage.”594 
Acheson believed that while the Soviets did not yet want to engage in open warfare they would instead look 
to “probe wherever there is weakness” and, as a result, conflict was expected.595 To minimise the risk of 
social turmoil that may enable communist insurgency, the United States looked to offer economic support to 
its European allies, calling upon them to bid for European Recovery/Marshall Plan funding. Leading the 
response were the British, and Bevin in particular.596
As the architect of the Treaty of Brussels, the forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the foremost voice 
in support of an active American role in Europe, Bevin had helped to establish Britain, and himself, at the 
heart of Europe’s defence.597 However, as Randall B. Woods, Howard Jones and Alan Bullock have made 
clear, Bevin’s influence in Europe came at a cost, both to his health and his creativity in other areas.598 In 
Iran this was particularly obvious. While Bevin had been a leading supporter of reshaping Iranian trade 
unionism and forcing the AIOC to improve conditions for employees, his voice was largely missing from 
debates as to the role the company could play in Britain’s economic recovery and, indeed, the ramifications 
this would have for relations with Iran. With the Foreign Secretary occupied by events in Europe, the AIOC 
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was given something of a free hand in discussions with the Iranian government and could set the tone of 
debate with little input or interference from the Foreign Office.599 Indeed, Wright warned that “the 
company’s operations and policy are not in any way controlled by His Majesty’s Government” and noted that 
Foreign Office officials “did not know what concessions the AIOC were prepared to offer the Persians” and, 
as such, felt unable to advise on policy towards Iran more generally.600 By failing to prepare adequate 
channels of communication with the company in previous years the Foreign Office had become unable to 
influence proceedings or influence a vital policy area.
Talks between the company and Iranian government on the terms of Supplemental Agreement were renewed 
with the presentation of a twenty-five point memorandum compiled by Iranian Finance Minister Abbas Quli 
Gulshayan on January 4, 1949. Amongst the document’s key points were that the Iranian government’s share 
of the AIOC’s profits would not be liable to British taxation, dividends paid to Iran would be unburdened by 
British restrictions, the company’s books and accounts would be freely accessible to Majlis officials and Iran 
would benefit from a “share of the foreign exchange resulting from the sale of oil products in the world.601 
However, although the presentation of this document demonstrates a crystallisation of the Iranian demands, 
Gass remained adamant that the delegation did not constitute a “strong Negotiating Committee with [the] 
authority to reach a settlement” and demanded that a “spokesman empowered to speak on their behalf” be 
appointed.602 
The AIOC’s obsession with protocol and unwillingness to engage with an Iranian delegation they deemed to 
be lacking in authority reaffirms the obstructionist attitude and aloofness that alienated the company from the 
Iranian people. Similarly, in casting such aspersions on an official delegation, the AIOC again demonstrated 
clear orientalism. A message from Le Rougetel to the Foreign Office also indicates an element of chicanery 
in the AIOC’s policy. He suggests that the company was seeking to “spin out the negotiations under cover of 
a smoke screen of publicity” before forcing the Iranians into an unfavourable, last-minute settlement.603 The 
Ambassador saw this strategy as inherently unwise. “In the long run” he wrote, “every successive 
postponement can only work against us; we have recent evidence - which we have reported to the Foreign 
Office - of increasing dissatisfaction in the country.”604 Le Rougetel’s perspective was supported by 
Diplomatic Counsellor, M. J. Creswell, who informed Bernard A. B. Burrows of the Foreign Office that “the 
long term situation is gradually worsening for the company...and any appearance on their part of hanging 
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back at this stage would immediately be exploited against them and against us, by our enemies. It would also 
weaken the Sa’ed government and might even lead to its fall.”605
Although he believed that “the easiest way out would be to seek a postponement of negotiations” Bevin 
recognised that this would “arouse suspicion that we were anxious to postpone the day when the company 
must pay over to Persia sums in justice due to them.”606 Despite Le Rougetel’s warnings that such a policy 
could prove disastrous, he instead argued that “the next best course of action [was] to spin out negotiations 
until the dissolution of the Majlis” and called upon the AIOC to “display great activity and create as much 
noise as possible in the press and in public utterances, as a smoke screen for their efforts to delay the 
conclusion of negotiations.”607 Bevin hoped that his suggestion would offer the Foreign Office time to 
regroup and develop a strategy to improve Britain’s bargaining position. The disagreement between Foreign 
Secretary and Ambassador highlights the lack of an overarching vision in Iran and the ad hoc nature of 
British policy there. The emerging sense of dysfunctionality at the heart of British policy was exacerbated 
when Cripps used a session of Parliamentary Questions on 25 January, to defend the AIOC from government 
intervention, stating: “it is not the duty of the shareholders to interfere with the directors when they are 
carrying out their job.”608 
Tellingly, contemporary political commentator M. A. Fitzsimons wrote that Labour’s members remained 
driven by “utopian hopes” for foreign policy, but that these impulses, although “rooted in the very structure 
of the party”, were being ignored by the government, creating a chasm between ideology and action.609  
However, the options available to Attlee government were limited. During 1949 Britain’s economy remained 
sluggish: the dollar deficit reached $1,410 million on 3 September and sterling continued to fall in value. In 
this climate oil was seen very much as a safe, marketable and profitable commodity.610 This sentiment was 
undoubtedly reinforced by the AIOC’s own predictions that Iranian oil production in 1950 could be as high 
as 28.5 million tons, of which Abadan would be able to process over 87 percent.611 Faced with dire economic 
circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that the goals of restraining the company and establishing a fair 
settlement were sidelined in favour of economic realism and a determination to maximise returns.
An Equitable Settlement?
Against a backdrop of internal British discord, AIOC aloofness and Sa’ed’s inability to establish a viable 
power base, nationalist tensions in Iran were rising. To deflect criticism, the Prime Minister called for an 
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agreement “in accord with the poverty of the people”, a bold statement from a figure seen by the AIOC as a 
moderate.612 Even more vehement was Majlis deputy Abbas Iskandari who on 23 January, 1949 not only 
suggested that “oil, the lifeblood of Persia, was being stolen by the British”, but cast doubts on the legality of 
the 1933 concession, claiming there may have been an “oversight” or “mistake” in its formulation.613 
Iskandari’s remarks were followed by a cacophony of scathing criticism from the Iranian media and Majlis 
officials alike. This reached a crescendo when Majlis deputy Husain Makki read a letter from veteran 
constitutionalist and popular icon, Dr. Mohammad Mussadiq, to a packed Majlis session. Mussadiq spoke of 
the “high treason which has been committed against our dear land” and advised Iranian politicians to reject 
any agreement with the AIOC.614
Subsequently, on January 27, Majlis deputy and veteran nationalist Hassan Taqizadeh demanded a vote of 
confidence on Sa’ed’s relationship with the AIOC and the ongoing delays in concession renegotiation.615 In 
response Le Rougetel warned the Foreign Office that “during the past few days the situation has deteriorated 
noticeably and in the Majlis, in the press and even by demonstrations in the streets an impression is being 
fostered that discussions now impending with the AIOC should start upon the basis of the cancellation of 
their concession.”616 Popular uproar reached a dramatic climax on February 4 when the Shah was shot and 
wounded during a ceremony commemorating the opening of Tehran University by Fakhr-Arai, a writer for 
the fundamentalist paper Parcham-i Islam and member of a Tudeh-affiliated journalists union. Given Arai’s 
connections, the Royal Court used the assassination attempt as evidence of a Tudeh-Islamist conspiracy and 
moved to silence all opposition through a series of draconian measures. Martial law was again declared, 
opposition leaders exiled, or in Mussadiq’s case placed under house arrest, and a new Constitutional 
Assembly was convened to establish a Senate, half of whose members would be nominated by the Shah. The 
Royal Court was also granted the power to dissolve the Majlis at any time, provided new elections were held 
within three months. Finally, the Shah gave Sa’ed the power to ban all forms of propaganda and protest 
which “undermined public law-and-order.”617 Purposely couched in vague terms, this order made effective 
opposition to the state extremely difficult and prevented protests against the Supplemental Agreement from 
taking place.  Despite previous criticisms of Iranian corruption and a lack of popular representation, the 
British reaction to these policies was mute. This suggests that as the relative value of Iranian oil rose, British 
leaders became more willing to overlook the frailties of democracy there and more Machiavellian in their 
negotiating strategy.
Unconstrained by public opinion the Iranian government was able to return to discussions with the AIOC. As 
negotiations resumed, two key areas of disagreement became clear. First, the AIOC representatives 
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announced that the Iranian government’s desire to peg royalties to the international price of gold was 
“unsound and workable” due to the “large variations” in the royalty payment each year, which “would be a 
most disturbing factor in the economy of Iran.”618 In 1931 the Bank of England had fixed the price of gold at 
an artificial rate of £8.40 per ounce, roughly £3 less than the world market rate. As a result the Iranian 
government received a quarter to a third less than they would have if an international rate had been 
applied.619 This disparity was seen as evidence of British deviousness and a demonstration of the need for 
royalties to be pegged against international gold prices. Second, the Iranian government called for a fifty-
fifty split of total gross profits, including those “derived from other oil and operations in other countries.”620 
The fifty-fifty formula mirrored that used by both Standard Oil of New Jersey and, crucially, Royal Dutch 
Shell in Venezuela. That Shell, a British owned firm, used the formula appeared to many in Iran to set a 
precedent for the equitable division of profits.621 It should, however, be noted that this agreement referred 
solely to profits derived from the extraction, refinement and sale of Venezuelan oil and not Shell’s total 
operations, indicating a degree of misunderstanding amongst the Iranian negotiators.
Despite the disagreements between AIOC and Iranian Treasury representatives, some progress was made 
during private talks between Le Rougetel and the Shah. While the Shah felt that the company’s offer “was 
not sufficient”, he also recognised that the Iranian formula required adjustment and agreed to pursue the 
advice of technical advisors, including Max Thornburg.622 Although Thornburg refused to serve as a formal 
consultant for the Iranian government, due to State Department opposition, he agreed “to discuss with them 
at any time any general questions of oil economics.”623 Thornburg was critical of the “completely fallacious” 
demands from some within the Iranian Treasury, suggesting that British opposition to their formula by no 
means superfluous, or unjustified.624 
Thornburg’s recommendations helped to solidify splits within the Iranian delegation. Veteran 
constitutionalist Jamal Enami warned that there remained “dangers of a breakdown, which might have 
serious consequences” and “that pressure of public opinion in Persia might force them to nationalise the oil 
industry.”625 Although Enami’s claims that “public opinion...was a really important factor” were dismissed as 
“nonsense” by Michael Wright, they demonstrate the Iranian establishment’s fear of the emergence of 
nationalism and indicate that popular opposition to the Supplemental Agreement was a strong, potent force. 
Enami’s claims also cast doubt on the notion that the Shah could lead popular opinion, despite a groundswell 
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of goodwill towards him following the assassination attempt.626 Finally, that a leading member of the Iranian 
delegation would offer such a pronounced view, yet have it dismissed offhand as “nonsense” indicates that 
the British had not yet come to terms with Iranian nationalism. 
Iranian nationalism traversed class, religious and social distinctions, drawing supporters under a broad 
umbrella with control of oil as the central goal. In this sense, it was highly sophisticated, maintaining the 
“dialectical quality” of being “both inclusionary and exclusionary” as described by sociologist D. V. 
Kumar.627 Although the Iranian people officially lived in a sovereign, independent state, they perceived the 
British as acting as puppeteers: controlling power through impenetrable channels of influence. Such was the 
depth of this perception that Sa’ed claimed that most Iranians were “in a state of acute distress, while great 
wealth was flowing out of the country with little benefit to them.”628 
In a bid to break the deadlock over profit-sharing, AIOC chairman Sir William Fraser travelled to Tehran for 
two weeks of discussions with the Persian government in late April. However, these talks again proved 
fruitless, despite the Shah’s “expressed wish that an agreement should be concluded before the chairman 
left.”629 Although he had earlier agreed, in principle, to an equitable division of revenue generated in Iran, 
Fraser was adamant that a general fifty-fifty division of AIOC profits was impossible. The Iranians were 
similarly unbending, seeking clarity that the company would not utilise corporate loopholes to maintain their 
hold over the profits derived from Iranian oil and a guaranteed minimum royalty per annum.630 The Shah 
was increasingly frustrated by what he perceived as the obstinacy and inflexibility of an unpatriotic few and 
looked to exert ever greater pressure on the Majlis to agree terms with the AIOC before the end of the 
parliamentary term. Backed by a troop of Royal Guards he held private “meetings” with wavering deputies 
as a form of state-sponsored intimidation.631 As William Roger Louis points out, the Shah was “by no means 
the tyrant of later years”, but was developing a tendency to assert himself in matters beyond his 
jurisdiction.632 
This was a high risk strategy. Le Rougetel warned that the mistrust wrought by negotiations surrounding the 
Supplemental Agreement was hindering the normal business of government and that the economic situation 
was “deteriorating” as a result.633 Not only were “food prices being maintained at the higher level reached 
during the winter”, but acute shortages of even the most basic foodstuffs were being reported. Similarly, 
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industrial activities were “flagging” due to a lack of liquidity and materials. In the bazaar there were 
murmurs of a general strike as “growing agitation” led to nationwide protests against the state. Perhaps most 
important, however, was the general “lack of confidence in the government” amidst outcry over the 
protracted oil negotiations and ongoing reports of internal deficits and a shortage of capital for development 
projects.634 Worryingly for the British these problems were “widely attributed to the Shah” who was seen as 
meddling in affairs of which he had little understanding or experience. In strained tones, Le Rougetel stated 
that “I still hope that the Shah may be able to intervene in this matter with success. But if he fails a new 
situation will arise.”635 
Although he had found it difficult to influence negotiations, Bevin recognised the severity of the situation 
faced by the AIOC. “I feel that a major British interest is at stake” he wrote before suggesting “that failure to 
reach a settlement on the basis of this offer would have serious consequences both for ourselves and in 
Persia.”636 To relieve pressure on the Shah and provide an easily demonstrable improvement in the 
concession terms for the Iranian people, he called on the company to offer the Iranians a guaranteed 
minimum royalty of £4 million per annum.637  This would not only curry favour with the Iranian public, but 
also help to plug their ever growing funding gaps. Additionally, a deal was struck between the Foreign Office 
and AIOC to raise the royalty per ton from four to six shillings and remove dividend limitation legislation 
from the company’s general reserves. Both measures were retroactive to 1948 and as such a lump sum 
payment of little over £5 million was offered, to be transferred within thirty days of the legislation’s passage 
through the Majlis. Under these new terms, royalty and tax payments would rise from an estimate of £13.49 
million to £22.89 million for 1949.638 Finally, to assuage the complaints of corporate insularity made by 
nationalists in the Majlis, the company agreed to a steady process of ‘Iranianisation’ and guaranteed that 
Iranian employees would gradually take over all aspects of domestic extraction and refinement. 
The terms offered by the company were readily agreed to by the head of the Iranian delegation, Gulshayan, 
who declared himself “confident of ramification during the life of the present Majlis.”639 On July 21, Le 
Rougetel contacted the Foreign Office to inform them that “the Oil Agreement Bill was passed by the Majlis 
Commission last night and it is expected that the final vote will be taken on July 23rd or 24th.”640 Under its 
final terms the royalty per ton was raised from 4 to 6 shillings, a minimum royalty of £4 million per annum 
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was guaranteed and the company agreed to pay little over £5 million to the Iranian government within thirty 
days of the agreement coming into force, in lieu of unpaid royalties from 1947/48.641
Although agreed by Gulshayan and the other Iranian delegates, the Supplemental Agreement remained 
unratified in the Majlis, where it was presented in a public session beginning on 23 July. The debate was 
beset by nationalist opposition, with seasoned constitutionalists dragging out proceedings by using elaborate 
filibuster tactics. In an effort to regain order, Sa’ed called for a time limit on speeches, a request shouted 
down by enraged opposition deputies, encouraged by their supporters inside the chamber. For five days 
nationalists held the floor, railing not only against the Supplemental Agreement, but the British 
themselves.642 Throughout the negotiation phase the British government and the AIOC chose to ignore the 
emerging threat posed by Iranian nationalism, dismissing it as something of an irrelevance, an aberration that 
would soon pass. However, by the close of the Fifteenth Majlis on July 28, 1949 nationalist forces had 
demonstrated their strength and prevented the passage of a major contract between the state and the 
company. Iranian nationalism was sophisticated in its scope and encompassed a range of otherwise disparate 
groups while completely excluding any British influence as an alien and dangerous force. The British failed 
to accept this and by treating the Iranians as weak, naive and without agency added to the already deep 
divisions between them.
One of the few British voices to recognise the strength of feeling in Iran was Ambassador Le Rougetel. In a 
thoughtful message to London he warned against encouraging the Shah to dissolve the Majlis or take further 
action to force its members into agreeing to it. “If the agreement were to have any real value it must be freely 
accepted” he wrote, later suggesting that the media was increasingly “developing the theme that the failure 
of the Majlis to ratify is tantamount to rejection of the bill and that it is the duty of the government to reopen 
negotiations with the company at once with a view to obtaining further concessions.”643 Le Rougetel also 
warned that Britain’s power to influence Iranian politicians was in decline and that “nothing that I can say 
will have [a] decisive effect.”644 Finally, he suggested that “there is a real danger of the government being 
inveigled into an attempt to re-open negotiations which would be in flat contradiction with the stand they 
have taken in the Majlis. This would render their position impossible and would jeopardize the prospect of 
persuading the new Majlis to pass the agreement.”645  Damningly, the Foreign Secretary’s determination to 
“spin out negotiations” had cost Britain dearly and despite the effort of the Shah, the AIOC and the British 
government, nationalism was now shaping Iran’s political landscape.646 
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The National Front Emerges
Perilous economic conditions exacerbated tensions further. On September 18, 1949, sterling was devalued, 
prompting panicked talks between Gulshayan and the AIOC. The Finance Minister, seeking to safeguard 
pending payments, requested that royalties owed to Iran from before this date maintain their value, a request 
denied by the company and justified on the basis that past royalty payments were “not covered by gold 
guarantees.” As such, the previously agreed £4 million minimum payment rate would also be devalued, 
meaning a decline in payments in real terms.647 This serves as another clear example of the AIOC adopting a 
tough bargaining position, in spite of pressure from Whitehall. Given Bevin’s previous criticism of the 
company’s approach it is telling that opposition from within the Foreign Office was minimal, suggesting a 
perceived inability to restrain their excesses and a clear lack of direction and leadership. The department’s 
limited response can also be interpreted as part of a hardening of the British government’s attitude towards 
Iran and an extension of Cripps’ belief that improving Britain’s economic position needed to take priority 
over all other goals. Iran’s financial woes were exacerbated further when, during an October/November visit 
to the United States, the Shah proved unable to secure a guarantee of support should his country’s economy 
collapse.648 This promise would have provided a degree of security for Iran and without it the Iranian 
government appeared at the AIOC’s mercy, a situation which inspired popular condemnation.649 
With the Shah in Washington, Mussadiq, recently freed from house arrest, and other nationalist leaders 
seized the opportunity to protest against the unrepresentative nature of Iranian politics and British power by 
attempting to occupy the Imperial Palace. On October 13, a crowd of several thousand had gathered outside 
109 Palace Street. To ease divisions between the distinct political groups present Mussadiq took to a 
megaphone and declared “silence is our slogan!”650 Initial efforts to enter the Palace were rebuffed by 
Colonel Shafaqqat, commander of the Imperial Guards. However, after much negotiation twenty 
representatives were symbolically allowed into the Palace to stage a bast, or sit-in. The bastis represented a 
broad cross section of Iranian political society. Alongside the constitutionalist Mussadiq were Islamists, 
including Hossein Emami of the Warriors of Islam, and centrists, like Majlis deputy Hossein Makki. The 
diversity of their beliefs demonstrates that opposition to the AIOC was not confined to one single political 
entity, but rather spanned Iranian political society.651 While the Tudeh, the last major nationalist movement, 
had a clear Marxist bent, which precluded moderates and some Muslims from engagement, the emerging 
coalition was largely free from any explicit ideology, except greater Iranian sovereignty. William Roger 
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Louis suggests that “the oil question as on which Iranians from difference backgrounds could unite in protest 
against the old order” and express themselves as Iranians before all else.652
Once inside the Palace walls, the group intensified their protest by going on hunger strike, and releasing a 
statement railing against corruption and the misappropriation of “Iran’s dearest assets.”653 The hunger strike 
lasted for just three nights, but stoked the imagination of the Iranian people. Still unnamed, the group were 
given the title melliyum, or ‘of the people’ by the popular press, indicating a growing support base.654 On 23 
October, Husain Fatemi, an ally of Mussadiq and one of the twenty bastis, published an article calling for “a 
strong party or a powerful front” to seize control in Iran. Concurrently, the creation of the ‘National Front’ 
was announced, establishing the first unified, bipartisan nationalist opposition to not only the AIOC, but also 
British intervention in Iran more generally.655 This was followed a month later by the assassination of former 
Prime Minister, the relatively pro-British, Abdol Hussain Hazhir, demonstrating an emerging volatility.656
The formation of the National Front marked the beginning of a new, important stage in Iranian history. While 
the AIOC and British government had previously been able to limit opposition through legislative processes 
and direct intervention in social movements, the broad and popular nature of the Front’s support meant that 
this was no longer possible. The National Front’s message was a simple one of self-governance and control 
of Iran’s most precious resources. This message was vital in fulfilling Ernest Gellner’s condition that 
national legitimacy can only be achieved by instilling confidence that a new system of governance would be 
“less corrupt and grasping, or most just and merciful” than its predecessor.657
While the Tudeh had grown powerful thanks to its nationalist tendencies it had been crippled by a lack of 
resilient leadership and a portfolio of interests which was difficult to sell to the Iranian public. The National 
Front, however, transcended ideological politics by committing itself solely to Iranian nationalism and the 
removal of all traces of foreign influence. This singular vision helped to unify disparate groups under a 
single banner and offered a simple solution for Iranian ills. Although the Front was undoubtedly an uneasy 
alliance, the very fact that it was formed illustrates the depth of opposition to British policy and perceived 
state corruption. The emergence of this new, viable nationalist vehicle also indicates the failure of British 
policy in Iran. Just six months before Michael Wright had dismissed warnings of rising popular unrest as 
“nonsense”, indicating a continuation of British arrogance when dealing with “excitable” oriental people 
deemed incapable of understanding national unity.658 In the months that followed the Foreign Office 
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repeatedly failed to adequately respond to growing pressures or to successfully collaborate with the Iranian 
government to develop a new policy. It is notably that the British continued to remain fixated by the idea that 
they could provide “guidance” and “friendly advice to the Iranians, but to do so a “man of strong 
personality” may be required to force through the Supplemental Agreement and quash nascent 
nationalism.659 Although the British had purported the necessity of inclusive democracy in Iran, such noble 
goals were falling by the wayside and they now appeared unbending and unconciliatory in their dealings 
with Tehran.660
This was particularly clear in the attitude adopted by the AIOC. Having been given a free hand by the British 
government, the company proved impossible to manage and uncompromising in its dealings with the 
Iranians. That their approach began to shift following Bevin’s intervention suggests that the Foreign 
Secretary still carried some weight of influence, however, occupied by events elsewhere, he routinely failed 
to use it. Instead communication between the Foreign Office and AIOC relied upon indirect channels and 
intermediaries: rendering cooperation impossible. Communication between government departments fared 
little better. The division between the Treasury and Foreign Office on matters pertaining to development 
suggests a lack of a singular vision and whether policy should be based on profitability or ideology. In Iran, 
this debate would grow in importance with every National Front success and yet, damningly, remained 
largely unresolved.
Conclusion
In the three years between the Tudeh uprisings and the formation of the National Front, British policy in Iran 
underwent great shifts. The twin goals of harbouring a new trade union movement and instituting 
development projects had largely slipped by the wayside, deemed too costly and scuttled by ineffective 
leadership. Increasingly, the AIOC had become unrestrained and, as seen in their negotiations with the 
Iranian government, attempted to create an agreement that bore the hallmarks not of transnational 
cooperation, but informal domination. The domestic political and economic situation in Iran had undoubtedly 
exacerbated tensions. The Shah, unsure of his own position and politically inexperienced, successively 
undermined the authority of the Majlis, which was itself a chaotic organisation. That Iran had five Prime 
Ministers in little over three years speaks volumes about the country’s disorganised political system and the 
depth of internal division. Economic conditions there were little better with even the most basic foodstuffs 
subject to inflationary pressure.
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The emergence of the National Front, a nationalist movement drawn from across the political spectrum lends 
itself to Henri Grimal’s analysis of decolonisation and the end of empire.661 Grimal asserts that European 
empires collapsed as a result of native people unifying to seize power and determine their own future. 
Undoubtedly something of a romantic notion for Grimal, it is one that has been greatly refined by modern 
scholars, not least by John Darwin. Darwin asserts that Britain’s postwar colonial policy can be divided into 
two clear categories. From 1945 to 1948, the British looked to bolster their hold over the colonies and 
retrench their position there through economic and development schemes. In this sense “the signs of British 
domination...would be replaced by tactful self-effacement.”662 Subsequently, from 1948 onwards, economic 
imperatives meant that this approach was no longer feasible and development efforts were cut back, even 
while efforts to exploit foreign resources held strong. In turn, popular anger rose and British power waned. 
This process is referred to be which as the “subordination” of Labour’s internationalist principles, though 
entrenched in the party’s history, “to practical considerations” as economic circumstances forced them to 
become less ambitious in reforming the empire, formal or otherwise.663 
By 1949 the Supplemental Agreement had become a popular symbol of British meddling in Iranian affairs 
and of their informal hold over the country. Though it would be incorrect to suggest that Iran was on the 
verge of revolution, discontent was growing stronger and increasingly vociferous. This situation was not 
eased by the AIOC, which pursued a defiantly single-minded policy and repeatedly refused to enter into 
collaboration with the Iranian government. The Foreign Office failed to control the company and struggled 
to create its own vision for the future of Iran. Meanwhile, the Exchequer supporter it as a means of 
maintaining the AIOC’s capital flow. Britain’s development policy in Iran had failed. It had both 
misunderstood the nature of the challenges facing Iran and exaggerated the urgency of reform because of the 
important of the country’s oil supply, which by 1948 was readily identified as a sustainable and consistent 
source of both energy and income. As a result there had been little to no discussion as to the nature of 
development in Iran, its long term aims, or the desired outcomes there.
A similar pattern has been identified by Crook in Africa’s Gold Coast. Here, he argues, “the London-inspired 
policy of preparation for ‘self government’ did not seem to have prepared anyone for the idea that the 
government would be handed over to people despised only the previous year are unrepresentative and 
irresponsible agitators.”664 Additionally, Joseph M. Hodge has suggested that by focusing on “substandard 
living standards and inadequate government services” as the principle reasons for African discontent, the 
Attlee government viewed development as a series of “technical problems that were remediable by large 
scale government planning and state directed welfare schemes.”665 In Iran, as in Africa, these efforts negated 
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to consider the needs and desires of the local population, reinforcing a sense of disunity between the 
metropole and peripheries of the empire. 
Britain’s precarious economic position had exacerbated disunity and hindered collaboration with the Iranian 
government. Those development efforts that were in place were rolled back and with Bevin preoccupied with 
events in Europe there were little impetus to remodel or improve them. Part of the informal empire, Iran 
received Britain’s attention as a source of great mineral wealth, but with none of the benefits of Whitehall 
taking responsibility for the economic or social situation there. Economic difficulties also exposed rifts 
between the AIOC and Whitehall. With the government seeking to reap ever more benefits of the company’s 
activity, AIOC directors looked for new sources of funding and sought to establish a policy beyond London’s 
remit. Perhaps the most important source of British strength in Iran, this changing dynamic could greatly 
weaken Britain’s position there and have great ramifications in the immediate future.
A more subtle, but no less important, change in this period was the emergence of Max W. Thornburg. 
Although still a marginal figures in Iran, he was, as one of the few Americans operating there, emblematic of 
the possibilities for the United States’ private sector there. Recognising that British power was diminishing, 
and hoping to prevent Iran falling into or civil war, Thornburg sought to encourage American investment in 
the country. It would be a mistake to see Thornburg as a barometer of change given his limited direct power. 
However, his appearance in Iran was identified locally as an indication of growing interest from the 
American private sector and, possibly, as an indicator of future American investment in Iran. Again, the 
British government failed to adequately respond to this. While London eyed the United States with 
suspicion, they made few plans to maintain competitiveness and missed several opportunities to form new 
partnerships in Iran to strengthen their position.
With 1950 approaching, Britain was at a crossroads. Nationalist pressure and growing American interest in 
Iran added a new dimension to the necessity of maintaining control of a valuable dollar earner. However, 
changing government policy risked both alienating the AIOC and surrendering control of oil, one of the 
empire’s most valuable and sought after commodities. This challenge would shape British policy for the next 
two years and, unresolved, would lead to the collapse of their position in Iran as the AIOC was nationalised 
and the United States became arguably the predominant foreign power there.
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Chapter IV: The United States and the Collapse of British Power in Iran
As chapter three demonstrated, by the end of 1949 British power in Iran was receding: undone by 
mismanagement, fiscal constraints, growing domestic nationalism and pervasive orientalism. Although the 
nascent trade union movement had been silenced, little had been done to deal with the root causes of popular 
discontent, which continued to grow amidst financial dislocation and perceived AIOC intransigency. 
This chapter will argue that British power in Iran continued to dwindle, eventually collapsing due to two 
factors.  First, throughout 1950 and 1951 British policy was inflexible and relied too heavily on the AIOC. 
While British Colonial policy in Africa bore the hallmarks of a dynamic development strategy, in Iran policy 
was repetitive and riddled with internal conflicts. Second, in spite of warnings to the contrary from 
Washington, both the British government and AIOC board of directors failed to recognise the strength of the 
nationalist fervour gripping Iran or adequately respond to it. British decline took place against a backdrop of 
growing American interest. During 1950 and 1951 the Truman government attempted to act as a mediator 
between Tehran and London and to maintain stability as a safeguard against communism. With British power 
waning the United States begin to displace its ally, undermining London’s prestige and, eventually, dictating 
the terms of settlement following the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s nationalisation. 
To justify these claims this chapter will be divided into four subsections. The first will analyse the USA’s 
early Cold War policy, both in Iran and elsewhere. The second will assess British policy towards Iran under 
the Sa’ed and Mansur governments, alongside their respective failure to ratify the Supplemental Oil 
Agreement. The great hopes placed on General Ali Razmara’s tenure will then be studied in subsection three, 
together with an analysis of the deterioration of Anglo-Iranian relations and the United States’ response to 
this. Finally, the prelude to the AIOC’s nationalisation will be analysed to demonstrate Britain’s relative 
decline in power, vis-a-vis the United States.
American Foreign Policy and the Globalisation of the Cold War
An Emerging Policy of Firmness
On January 7, 1949, President Truman announced General George C. Marshall’s resignation as Secretary of 
State, choosing Dean Acheson as his replacement. Reflecting on his nomination Acheson would later record: 
“wherever one turned, what little was left of social, economic, and political stability seemed about to be 
submerged. The other world superpower appeared determined to push this process forward in the apparent 
belief that chaos was the stage preparatory to communism.”666 Acheson was not alone in this pessimistic 
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summation.667 Rather, it reflected a wider trend in American diplomacy and an extension of the belief that 
communism would be spread not through active conflict, but the exploitation of economically and socially 
fractured states.668 According to Cold War historian Melvyn Leffler, American leaders believed that in the 
long term this would damage the United States because their “own political economy of freedom would be 
jeopardised if a totalitarian foe became too powerful.”669
In 1945 the United States was the world’s foremost economic and military power and many leading 
politicians believed that positive wartime relations with the Soviet Union should be continued in peace. In 
conversation with then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Roosevelt had boasted of his 
ability to forge strong relations with Moscow, suggesting “I think I can personally handle Stalin better than 
either your Foreign Office or my State Department.”670 Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, the Republican 
spokesman on foreign affairs, agreed, stating: “I think our two antipathetical systems can dwell in the world 
together, but only on a basis which establishes the fact that we mean what we say when we say it.”671 
Secretary of the Treasury Fred M. Vinson drew similar conclusions, telling Congress that “whether we wish 
it or not - we are at this very moment starting to lay a foundation either for another war or for true peace...in 
short we must have an intense and continuous interest.”672 The diversity and bipartisan nature of these views 
suggest a sense of optimism and little antagonism towards the Soviet Union.
However, suspicion of the Soviet Union’s long-term intentions was widespread amongst career diplomats. 
First, the Soviet occupation of much of central and eastern Europe after World War Two had raised fears of 
territorial aggrandisement. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the USSR was the central hub of 
communism, an ideology that American strategists feared could be embraced by the economically destitute 
in Europe and beyond. While Moscow did not yet possess long distance aircraft or access to atomic weapons, 
it did pose something of a spiritual threat to democracy and capitalism. Exacerbating these concerns further 
was the rapid growth of communist party membership in Allied zones of occupation in the months following 
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the end of World War Two.673 Similarly, Soviet intransigence during postwar peace and redevelopment 
discussions helped to create a sense that cooperation was temporary and doomed to fail in the long run. This 
was reinforced most clearly by an electoral speech delivered by Stalin that pointed to the inevitability of war 
breaking out between capitalist states.674
Perhaps the most important manifestation of American suspicion towards the Soviet Union was charge 
d’affaires to Moscow, George F. Kennan’s ‘long telegram’, an 8,000 word dispatch sent on February 22, 
1946. In the realms of diplomacy it is rare that one document, written by one individual can encapsulate 
ideas of such significance. The telegram was an investigation of the basis of American-Soviet relations 
during and after the Second World War, and suggested that the integrationist approach adopted by President 
Roosevelt had been incorrect and potentially damaging. Soviet leaders saw the world beyond their borders as 
“evil, hostile and menacing”, providing an excuse for action which could be perceived as hostile in the 
United States.675 Furthermore, Kennan indicated that there could be no compromise or permanent resolution 
with a regime that used the specter of an external threat to maintain internal credibility. Kennan prescribed a 
new course of action, a policy of firmness, arguing that the United States should offer no further concessions 
to Moscow, but rather “draw a line” against Soviet expansion and bolster its allies to safeguard them from 
either invasion or subversion. This strategy of “firmness” would come to be popularly known as 
“containment.”676
The ‘long telegram’ was widely read within diplomatic circles and many of its themes were popularised by 
the publication of ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ in Foreign Policy, with Kennan adopting the pseudonym 
‘X.’677 Reflecting on the success of his work, Kennan would write: “if none of my previous literary efforts 
had seemed to evoke even the faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my 
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astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not to die down for many 
months.”678 Although popular, and clearly influential, Kennan’s ideas should not be interpreted as a blueprint 
for action. Rather, as Wilson S. Miscamble has argued, he envisioned a flexible strategy of response on a 
case-by-case basis.679 However, as John Lewis Gaddis suggests, Kennan’s ideas for a limited process of 
containment were gradually rejected in favour of a unified global strategy to both resist the march of 
communism and defend the United States.680 In this sense, Kennan’s emphasis of “firmness and patience” 
was gradually reduced to a focus on “firmness” and constant pressure on the Soviet Union.681 The Middle 
East was identified as an area of particular importance given both its wealth of natural resources and 
valuable position between Europe, Asia and Africa.682 Diplomatic historian James F. Goode proposes that 
Iran itself was readily identified as a key “bulwark against Soviet expansion” and argues that American 
policy makers valued its independence from communist interference for national security reasons.683
Resistance to communist expansion was generally economic, rather than military in nature. As Robert A. 
Pollard suggests, American policy makers saw the expansion and integration of foreign economies as the 
optimum means of securing international peace. By stabilising markets and promoting economic growth, 
material prosperity could be achieved, which in turn would diminish the chances of either open warfare or 
communist infiltration.684 In Pollard’s analysis schemes such as the European Recovery Plan, or Marshall 
Aid, demonstrate the United States’ commitment to international economic stability. Similar conclusions are 
drawn by Leffler and Michael J. Hogan, who suggests that the United States sought to promote collective 
security through a “corporative world order” and the integration of economic, public and political bodies.685
Between 1947 and 1949 the perceived Soviet threat grew increasingly pronounced and populist in tone, 
foreshadowing the McCarthyist ‘witch hunts’ of the early 1950s.686 However, even as the rhetoric in 
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Washington hardened, action remained restrained by fiscal considerations. Projects such as Marshall Aid, the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the Point Four program won support from conservatives, including Edwin C. 
Nourse, chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, for sharing the burden of international defence and 
helping to establish an “economic pattern of security.”687 This view was rebuked by the State Department, 
which identified increased military expenditure as essential for American security. On 29 September 1949, 
the National Security Council released a report suggesting that budget ceilings for the fiscal year 1951 
should be raised by between $1.3 and $2.1 billion, allowing for spending beyond the $17.8 million ceiling.688 
When combined with indirect military spending such as veterans’ payments, military and international 
programmes would constitute over seventy percent of the budget for the new fiscal year.689
As the House of Representatives sought a compromise over the new budget, hawks within the Truman 
administration released their strongest statement on national security: NSC 68, the findings of which were 
substantiated by ongoing developments overseas.690 “During the last six to nine months”, Acheson explained 
in March 1950, “there had been a trend against us which, if allowed to continue, would lead to a considerable 
deterioration in our position.”691 Not only had China fallen to communism, but the Soviet Union had 
successfully tested a nuclear device, raising new questions as to American security. Furthermore, and 
somewhat less tangibly, communism seemed to be attracting support across the globe, particularly in the 
developing world.692 Personnel changes paralleled the hardening strategy. Paul H. Nitze, referred to by New 
York Times journalist James Reston as “almost too ‘hard-charging’ for even his close friend at State, 
Secretary Acheson”, was asked to replace Kennan as head of the Policy Planning Staff and Nourse was 
replaced by Leon Keyserling, a “guns and butter Keynsian”, as chair of the Council of Economic 
Advisors.693 Indeed, Acheson’s own appointment can be interpreted as testament to a hardening resolve 
within the administration.
In Iran the United States’ postwar policy deviated little from the pattern above. As mentioned in chapter 
three, Tehran’s calls for American financial support had been unanimously rejected. Although neighbouring 
Turkey had received aid through the Truman Plan, Iran was not deemed essential to American security, or at 
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immediate risk of communist takeover and the State Department instead recommended that Iran apply to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).694 Iranian advances suffered from the 
IBRD’s cautious approach and unwillingness to loan capital to undefined development goals, however 
Tehran’s initial approach was vital in establishing links between American surveying firm Morrison-Knudsen 
and the Overseas Consultants Inc., with the former becoming a vital cog in devising the Seven Year Plan. 
The OCI was also essential in providing a platform for Max Weston Thornburg, the United States’ foremost 
citizen in Iran.
However, although Iranian efforts to coax aid from the United States were rebuffed the country’s future 
remained under constant review, culminating, in February 1950, with the dispatch of deputy director of the 
Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, William Rountree to analyse the economic and political 
situation there. He noted a scarcity of food and capital, thanks to poor harvests and the Majlis’ refusal to 
ratify the Supplemental Agreement, and suggested that the Seven Year Plan was unduly ambitious for a 
largely agrarian state.695 Rountree also suggested that the Tudeh still posed a threat, thanks to upwards of 
12,000 members and strong ties with Soviet Russia.696 British communication from the same period fails to 
mention the Tudeh in any capacity and Abrahamian argued that the Iranian government perceived the 
organisation to be “dead and buried.”697 A similar view is taken by Homa Katouzian who suggests that while 
fractions of the party remained, they were beset by infighting and lacked strong leadership.698 This suggests 
that Rountree either mistakenly overestimated the Tudeh’s residual strength or did so intentionally to link 
Iran to a wider narrative of Soviet pressure in the developing world, thereby highlighting the country’s 
potential strategic weakness. By drawing links between Iranian vulnerability and the USSR, Rountree was 
able to insure that Iran took on new importance as a potential weak spot where communism could fester.
As American thinking developed, so too did their attitude towards the Anglo-American relationship and 
British interests in the Middle East. In February, Henry R. Labouisse, director of British Commonwealth and 
Northern European Affairs, argued that while American diplomats needed to “understand and recognize, in 
our actions, how difficult it is for the British to accept their decline from a position of world leadership and 
the shift of the centre of power across the Atlantic” they must also regard “harmonious” relations with 
Britain as “fundamental”, stressing that “there is no area of the world we do not need British help and 
cooperation.”699 In Iran itself, Ambassador Wiley discouraged American firms from seeking to become 
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involved in oil excavation and suggested to the Secretary of State that “American petroleum representatives 
should keep out of Iran.”700 Wiley received support from other Ambassadors in the region and minutes taken 
during internal State Department talks in November 1949 demonstrate the depth of American efforts to avoid 
encroaching on British interests.701 Not only were “the general objectives of the United States and [the] UKG 
[United Kingdom Government] basically the same”, but the United States “had no desire to compete with or 
to hinder the United Kingdom in the Middle East.”702
This view was reaffirmed in a memorandum from March 1950, prepared in advance of talks between 
Acheson, United States’ Ambassador to Douglas Lewis W. Douglas and Britain’s Ambassador in 
Washington, Sir Oliver Franks. In this document, Britain was identified as the nation which “best meets the 
test of being reliable, basically friendly and having the same long-run objectives.”703 However, it also noted 
that “the British must make efforts to enlarge the scope of their consultation with us. Since it is clear that the 
British cannot recapture a sound economic, or for that matter political and strategic position, without the 
support of the US they must accept wholeheartedly the necessity for collaborative action.”704 This document 
clearly illustrates the United States position towards Britain in early 1950: London was still an ally, but its 
goals were secondary to those of the USA and it should avoiding taking an independent approach to foreign 
policy. 
William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson refer to this process as “the imperialism of decolonisation” and 
argue that “British imperial power was substantially an Anglo-American revival.”705 In this sense, the British 
Empire became reliant on serving a utilitarian purpose for the United States, helping them to implement 
policy in regions where they had little direct influence or contact. London was undoubtedly the lesser partner 
in this relationship, as Bevin himself realised: “in all fields in which the United States makes the major 
contribution, whether financial, military or otherwise, it is inevitable that proportionate weight must be given 
to her views.”706 While the Untied States had historically taken a dim view of colonialism, in the era of the 
Cold War it was viewed as a tool for the preservation of order, stability and global capitalism itself.707
In the Middle East specifically, Britain was able to maintain its position of primacy on the proviso that it 
operated in a manner favourable to American interests. In some respects this expectation of British behaviour 
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was a continuation of the spheres of influence approach to international governance proposed by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, and a wider pattern in Anglo-American relations.708 During and after the Second World War 
David Reynolds defined relations as being driven by “competitive cooperation” and “continual maneuvering 
for advantage.”709 These findings are also reflected in Robert Hathaway’s description of an “ambiguous 
partnership” between the two nations: although allies with often interwoven policies their core outlooks were 
not analogous, but rather independent and based largely on national interest.710 In the United States, British 
interests were respected when they were concurrent with Washington’s own policy, and ignored where they 
opposed it.
Max W. Thornburg and the Corporatist Approach to American-Iranian Relations
One particular area of Anglo-American “competitive cooperation” was the control and distribution of 
mineral wealth and raw materials. As Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, Harold Ickes had sought 
to facilitate closer cooperation between the United States government and the oil industry, and in June 1941 
successfully lobbied Attorney General Biddle to suspend antitrust suits against oil companies as a matter of 
national security.711 To strengthen the ties between the state and oil industry, Ickes had staffed his office with 
current and former oil executives, including Ralph K. Davies, senior vice-president of Standard Oil of 
California, who served as deputy coordinator and recruited over three quarters of his personnel from within 
the oil industry; much to the chagrin of liberal critics such as the New York Times.712 According to David 
Painter, those who served under Ickes generally maintained salaries or pensions from oil companies and thus, 
while officially government servants, had a potential conflict of interest.713
In August 1942 Ickes publicly presented a plan for a federal agency to galvanise the oil industry, both 
domestically and overseas. The body, to be called the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW), was rubber 
stamped by President Roosevelt on December 2, 1942 and gave Ickes the authority to govern the production, 
transportation and distribution of petroleum.714 Although Ickes experimented with changes to environmental 
legislation and even federal subsidies to improve domestic oil production, the main thrust of his policy was 
to expand American control of overseas oil resources. By 1943 petroleum products accounted for two-thirds 
of American exports and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board’s study ‘The Importance of Foreign Oil Reserves 
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to the United States’ illustrated the potentially disastrous consequences of stock depletion.715 Between 1939 
and 1943 US oil consumption rose by 28 percent while known reserves increased by just 15.7 percent and 
the reserve/consumption rate fell from a high of 13.18 in 1941 to 11.74 in 1945, raising fears that the United 
States’ consumption rate was unsustainable.716 Initially Ickes had hoped to expand Mexican production, 
however the State Department feared this would risk the United States becoming embroiled in the ongoing 
nationalisation of the Mexican oil industry and instead the focus for American planners became the Middle 
East, which not only contained over one-third of all known oil stocks, but the greatest prospects for future 
development.717
The main obstacle to American expansion in the region was undoubtedly Great Britain. In February 1943, 
Ickes’ confidants W. S. S. ‘Star’ Rodgers, of Texas Oil, and President of California Standard, Henry D. 
Collier, issued a memorandum outlining the challenges faced by American oil companies and suggesting that 
“concern is felt over the rapidly increasing British economic influence in [Saudi] Arabia because of the 
bearing it may have on the continuation of purely American enterprise there after the war.” 718 The 
memorandum also made references to establishing an American monopoly in Saudi Arabia for reasons of 
national security.719 Although Ickes called for the exertion of American strength to force Britain from the 
region, the State Department was unwilling to risk conflict with its ally, but called instead for a bilateral 
agreement to establish spheres of influence there. The Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement was signed on 
August 8, 1944, and, though never formally ratified by Congress, represented a compromise between Ickes, 
the oil industry and the State Department.
Complementing and refining Ickes approach to the United States’ petroleum order was the previously 
mentioned Max W. Thornburg. By the late 1940s Thornburg had some thirty years of experience in the 
international oil business, having worked for firms including Texas Oil Co., Standard Oil of California and 
Bahrain Oil, served as an advisor to the State Department and become a self-styled “foreign industrial 
consultant” to developing nations, including Mexico.720 His time with Bahrain Oil had proven particularly 
fruitful: he had played a key role in securing new concessions in the Gulf State and was rewarded with the 
gift of his own private island, Umm as Sabaan, which he used both as a private residence and the 
headquarters for his Middle Eastern operations. The experience of working both within the American 
government and at the furthest fringes of the United States’ overseas trading network allowed Thornburg to 
become something of a bridge between the two worlds and to develop a network of contacts between them. 
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Additionally, he expanded his influence through a stream of publications on matters pertaining to oil and 
international development.721 
Painter suggests that while the State Department hoped to establish an international petroleum settlement 
with Great Britain, in some respects expanding upon the conditions laid out in the 1944 Anglo-American 
Petroleum Agreement, Thornburg believed in a cooperative policy of mutual restraint between government 
and the private sector.722 Under this system, Washington would not exercise formal control over foreign oil, 
but instead help to develop conditions favourable to overseas expansion through direct investment and 
programmes to enhance international stability.723 In Iran, Thornburg hoped that the State Department and 
American private sector would work together to “graft selected western branches on to the Persian roots” and 
improve social development.724 He suggested that the British had lost control in the country and the OCI’s 
model was the only one that was “based on first building a genuine organization capable of functioning in 
the economic field.”725 In turn, he believed Britain’s informal hold needed to come to an end. Thornburg, 
though recognising the AIOC’s implicit power, felt that their approach alienated “the people” and that the 
self-styled American “apostles of democracy” were required to liberate the oil market and improve the 
circulation of wealth.726 New oil concessions would, he hoped, increase direct investment in Iran and provide 
the capital needed to kickstart development.
It is notable that Thornburg seldom mentioned the role of the Iranian government in improving the country’s 
fortunes. Given his role as an independent “foreign industrial consultant” to a number of administrations in 
Tehran this appears to be perhaps a little paradoxical. However, it is reflective of his belief in the ability of 
private sector investment to raise living standards while simultaneously avoiding the trappings of 
bureaucracy wrought by the state. His role was therefore twofold: guiding Iran along the path to 
development and integrating United States’ security policy with private sector imperative, or “the adaption of 
our free enterprise system to changing world conditions.”727
Historian Linda Qaimmaqami suggests that Thornburg was successful in this endeavour, so much so that he 
was the “catalyst” for the nationalisation of Iranian oil.728 Qaimmaqami’s hypothesis draws support from a 
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wider literature regarding American expansion and the closeness of collaboration between actors from the 
private and public sectors. For example, Robert A. Pollard points to the United States’ emerging “reliance 
upon economic power to achieve strategic ends” as evidence of the growing closeness between diplomacy 
and capital.729 Most vital, however, is Michael Hogan’s corporatist explanation for the European Recovery 
Plan and his suggestion that the reconstruction of Western Europe was imagined and achieved through ready 
collaboration between the public and private sector: establishing a model of economic diplomacy that would 
be utilised internationally throughout the twentieth century.730 Quaimmaqami suggests that Thornburg 
bought a similar approach to Iran, serving American interests there, even though he was not employed by the 
government in any capacity.
In Iran, Thornburg was offered the opportunity to fuse his interest in economic development, petroleum 
control and anti-statism in a single position. As Vice-President of OCI, Thornburg was permanently stationed 
in Iran and from 1949 onwards was perhaps the most eminent foreign citizen there. To the Iranian people, 
and indeed to many Iranian politicians, Thornburg was not a mere businessman, but an envoy of the 
American government. However, although Thornburg was on first name terms with many key figures on 
Capitol Hill, not least Dean Acheson with whom he had been in close contact since the mid-1940s, his 
position as an independent consultant enabled him to serve an advisor while remaining free from the 
constraints of political accountability. However, such autonomy also limited his direct influence both in 
Washington and Tehran. Although Qaimmaqami suggests that Thornburg traversed between the capitals, 
holding court in both, there is limited evidence to demonstrate a sustained influence in either. Rather his 
authority was circumstantial and subject to fluctuation.  
While Thornburg’s maverick approach in Iran was unorthodox, it was not entirely unique, but rather added to 
a pattern of expanding American influence overseas through mercantile activity. Historian of early American 
expansion overseas, Emily S. Rosenberg suggests that “during the 1920s, the Republican administrations of 
Harding, Coolidge and Hoover based their foreign policies on a presumed mutuality of interests of the public 
and private spheres”, which gave way to overseas expansion orchestrated by the private sector.731 Former 
State Department official Herbert Feis concurs, proposing that “the dollar was counted on” to expand 
American influence overseas provided entrepreneurs remained both expansionist and committed to the ideal 
of free trade.732 While the process of assisting and promoting commerce as a means of developing influence 
was most prominent in Latin America, it had also taken place in the Middle East, most notably in Saudi 
Arabia. In his study of American relations with Saudi Arabia, Irvine H. Anderson highlights the previously 
mentioned ‘Star’ Rodgers as a vital figure in the drive for greater American participation in the country’s oil 
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industry. Rodgers was “the prime mover” in efforts to “solicit government funding” and align the goals of 
the American petroleum industry with those of the government.733 Similarly, Everette de Groyler, a self-
made petroleum tycoon, former State Department Advisor and associate at Royal Dutch Shell who had 
grown “bored with making money”, travelled to the Middle East to lobby on behalf of both the American 
private sector and government for cooperation on oil extraction and refinement.734 The oil in the region was, 
a member of his mission informed State Department officials, “the greatest single prize in all history” and 
would help to define the future of international affairs.735 It was, de Groyler believed, essential that the 
United States take an active role in the region, not only to improve private profits, but to prevent competitor 
nations gaining control over “the prize.”736 Acting upon his advice, an agreement between the Washington 
and Riyadh was eventually reached in February, 1944, demonstrating the ability of private individuals to 
influence foreign policy in areas generally deemed outside the bounds of formal American diplomacy.
Throughout the late 1940s American interest in Iran was evolving and becoming ever more expansive, in 
part thanks to Thornburg’s influence. However, despite his best efforts, there was no clear indications that the 
American Government sought territorial or economic aggrandizement there. Rather, Iran continued to be 
envisioned as part of a broader understanding of international relations and the United States’ defensive 
sphere. Although the emerging Cold War gave Iran new importance as an outpost, it was not seen as a 
potential site for investment. No less important, American policy makers did not seek to undermine British 
authority in an area generally recognised as vital to sustaining London’s international position. Rather, the 
Truman government looked to cajole their British counterparts into undertaking a favourable policy, thereby 
helping to maintain a mutual multilateral defensive framework.
However, American officials were not blind to conditions in Iran. Throughout 1950 concern towards British 
mismanagement grew stronger in Washington, running to parallel to wider fears of civil and economic strife 
opening the door to communist insurgency across the developing world. Increasingly, new pressure was put 
on London to shape and bend British policies to American designs. Determined to both maintain positive 
Anglo-American relations and a predominant position in Iran, Britain’s policy became ever more fragmented 
and incoherent. With domestic unrest reaching a critical point the United States took a greater role there, 
emerging as the leading foreign power through necessity, if not design. 
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1950: Continuing British Difficulties in Iran
The Sa’ed Government and Shepherd’s Arrival
The first month of 1950 was challenging for Anglo-Iranian relations. On January 12 the government 
resigned, forcing Prime Minister Muhammad Sa’ed to assemble a new, uneasy coalition.737 The popular 
reaction to this was undoubtedly negative: Ambassador Le Rougetel suggested that “most papers [are] taking 
the line that this is not a government from which a serious improvement in the state of the country can be 
expected.”738 Fearful of rising nationalism, Sa’ed opted to exclude these factions and instead relied on 
confidants and cronies to form his cabinet, hindering “any great hopes of reforms or progress.”739 The 
veteran Prime Minister did, however, maintain support from the Royal Court. In correspondence with 
Clement Attlee, Le Rougetel suggested that the Shah “went as far as to say that Muhammad Sa’ed was 
probably the only man who would undertake to submit the present agreement to the Majlis...because he had 
given his word to that effect.”740 Sa’ed, it seemed, was willing to fall on his sword and carry out an 
unpopular policy for what he saw as the good of Iran. He was, according to Le Rougetel, the only figure 
“prepared to shoulder the unwelcome responsibility of accepting even this increase of royalty payments in 
settlement of all outstanding grievances.”741 The second challenge was Le Rougetel’s decision to succeed Sir 
George Rendel as Britain’s Ambassador to Belgium. Although his tenure had come during a time of near 
unprecedented difficulties in Anglo-Iranian relations, Le Rougetel had proven himself to be an adept 
administrator, whose approach was typified by sober realism and objective reporting. He had, unlike his 
immediate predecessor Reader Bullard, refused to rely on orientalist stereotypes, despite the propensity of 
British officials to do so. If his time in Tehran had one noticeable failure, it was undoubtedly his inability to 
build strong communication links with the still-rogue Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
Le Rougetel’s replacement was Sir Francis Shepherd who, despite a long career in the diplomatic service, 
had little expertise in Middle Eastern affairs and was, in the words of Roger Louis, “a man of modest and 
stable intellect, and he possessed the British virtue of imperturbability.”742 His previous posting had been in 
the Dutch East Indies, where he had endured ongoing civil unrest and an attempt on his life. With this in 
mind Bevin promised his next posting would be in “a place where we never have any trouble with the 
natives”, a statement that highlights undeniable naivety towards conditions in Iran.743 In the weeks following 
his appointment Shepherd travelled to Tehran via Cairo, Beirut and Baghdad to “get the atmosphere of the 
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place.”744 Upon arriving in Iran, Shepherd’s views of “the oriental character” quickly became clear.745 In 
April, having been in Tehran for little over a month, for example, he recorded that “Persian cynicism and 
pessimism, combined with a tendency to confess to their own shortcomings, is apparently less a passing 
phase than a permanent weakness.”746 This focus on a perceived lack of fortitude amongst the Iranian people 
and complacency towards Britain’s position there was routinely reinforced throughout Shepherd’s tenure and 
mirror similar comments made by Reader Bullard during his time as Ambassador.747 Leading American 
diplomat and former Ambassador to London, Averell Harriman would later comment that Shepherd had a 
“nineteenth century colonial attitude about Iran” and was something of an “unimaginative fellow...[who] 
seldom saw the mathematics of things.”748 He, and indeed the British government generally were, “about a 
year late, or nine months late, in everything they did.”749 As will be demonstrated, Harriman’s assessment 
was largely correct and Shepherd, blindsided by prejudice, proved unable to grasp the gravity of the crisis 
facing Britain in Iran until it was too late.
With Shepherd in transit, charge d’affairs Valentine Lawford was left to continue negotiating details of the 
Supplemental Agreement with the Shah. He reported to Bevin that the Shah remained resolute in his 
determination to improve social and economic conditions throughout Iran, but “had come to the conclusion 
that unless and until the Supplemental Agreement were [sic] dealt with by the Majlis and got out of the way, 
there was little hope of putting his ideas in practice.” 750 This was not solely a matter of finances, rather the 
Shah recognised that “it was desirable to get the agreement out of the way before instituting reforms which 
would be bound to incur strong opposition in the country.”751 
However, despite his supposed support for the Supplemental Agreement, the Shah was “not at all optimistic 
about its chances of being accepted by the Majlis as it stood” and instead proposed that “the Majlis might be 
brought to express their willingness to ratify it on the understanding that the government would ensure that 
certain modifications were made in it.”752 At no point were these modifications plainly outlined by the 
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Iranians, leading Lawford to question whether “he had any clear idea” on this matter.753 Despite this 
ambiguity and the Supplemental Agreement’s widespread unpopularity, the Shah saw it as essential to 
stabilising the economy and realising the goal of modernisation. His nod to the “decentralisation” while 
meeting with Lawford hints that he wished to take an active role in the legislative process, weaken the 
Majlis’ grip on power and dispense with the factionalism, which he saw as sustaining economic 
uncertainty.754 
The perilous economic situation in Iran did little to ease political tension or pressure on Sa’ed. In March, 
Shepherd warned that rial circulation was falling rapidly, leading to a revival of the barter system.755 Just as 
damagingly, the Ambassador suggested that there was “a general dissatisfaction...with the Sa’ed 
government’s lack of energy and with the existing state of the administration.”756 Key points of contention 
included unrepresentative and corrupt Majlis officials and a growing sense that state legislative processes 
had come to a near-total halt. In a fragile, agrarian economy like Iran’s systemic failures such as these could 
have an immediate and deep impact on the national psyche and help to fuel a sense that the state was failing 
in its most basic duty to maintain normal functions. Against a backdrop of popular discontent Sa’ed’s 
position became untenable and on 22 March he resigned.
The Mansur Government and the National Front
The Shah opted to replace Sa’ed with Ali Mansur, previously chair of the Seven Year Plan Organisation and 
a veteran of Iran’s back room politics. He was not only close to the Royal Court, but had a reputation as able 
to build alliances. British opinions on Mansur’s abilities and character were clearly conflicted. While 
Shepherd referred to his “reputation for being too keen on personal gain”, he also noted that he was “a man 
of some determination” and praised his tenacity.757 Similarly, H. A. Dudgeon of the Foreign Office 
commented that “while not being by any means free from the traditional Persian vices, private and public, 
Ali Mansur doubtlessly has the necessary ability and qualifications for his new post.”758 Somewhat less 
charitably Le Rougetel had dismissed Mansur’s chances of ever becoming Prime Minister on the basis that 
“he lacks the necessary personal integrity...[although] qualified in other respects.”759 Despite his recognised 
shortcomings Mansur was seen as an able political operator who, unlike his predecessor Sa’ed could bully 
and coerce the Majlis into accepting the Supplemental Agreement. Indeed, Shepherd felt confident enough in 
his abilities to inform Alan Leavett of the Foreign Office “that there is now reason to hope that the agreement  
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will be driven through the Majlis within about two months.”760 The Ambassador’s bullishness is an early 
demonstration of his weak grasp of Iranian politics. Mansur’s support in the Majlis was weak, an uneasy 
alliance cobbled together by favours and, alleged bribery. The new Prime Minister also lacked popular 
support and the National Front was not only gaining strength on the street, but also legitimacy.
In April 1950, following allegations of electoral malpractice and the resubmission of ballot papers, two 
additional National Front members won Majlis’ elections in Tehran, bringing the organisation’s total to eight 
of the capital’s ten seats.761 Although this was little under ten percent of the national total, the Front’s 
representatives formed a vocal and clearly identifiable coalition that drew tacit support from other Majlis 
deputies. Having “displayed considerable activity in the preceding week” Mussadiq was invited to meet with 
both the Prime Minister and the Shah and treated with the kind of respect usually reserved for high-ranking 
deputies.762 This ability to exert influence demonstrates just how misplaced Shepherd’s confidence was. 
While the National Front was numerically small in the Majlis, it attracted support from across society and 
was the most visible embodiment of Iranian nationalism. 
The situation was becoming so severe that Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee referred to it as a 
“crisis”, stressing that “if unchecked by positive American action” Iran risked falling into “domination by the 
Soviet Union.”763 Britain’s failure to make compromises on the terms of the Supplemental Agreement came 
under particular criticism and McGhee stressed that stronger efforts be made to “solicit” British cooperation 
in establishing a “united front to the Iranians” devised by Washington.764 McGhee’s critical analysis is a clear 
indication of the American belief that Britain’s policy in Iran was not only failing, but could be beneficially 
to the Soviet Union. It is also notable that while British Embassy staff remained complacent, the State 
Department was aware of the threat posed by Iranian nationalism and actively planned to contain it.
Shepherd’s inability to grasp the finer points of Iranian politics can be viewed as part of a wider malaise 
within the Foreign Office and the lack of direction within this department. Previous efforts to reform and 
modernise Iranian society in tandem with the country’s trade union movement had fallen by the wayside and 
had not been replaced. While the Colonial Office was leading development projects with a sustained focus of 
an estimated “twenty or thirty years” across Africa, nothing of this nature existed in Iran or elsewhere in the 
Middle East.765 Despite being an area of vital economic importance there was little impetus to invest in an 
area that officially remained beyond British control and, following the failure of trade union reform, new 
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projects were limited to the point of nonexistence. Shepherd’s insular attitude also reflects the narrow 
confines of British diplomacy and the wider attitudes of many of its creators. Although the proudly working-
class and largely autodidact Ernest Bevin was Foreign Secretary, the department he presided over remained 
mainly the preserve of a male, upper-class elite who, raised on stories of imperial grandeur, seemed 
incapable of recognising the growing zeal for self determination across the world.766 American political 
scientist Richard Cottam notes that “the British...for practical and psychological reasons...persisted in their 
antiquarian conviction that the Iran of 1951 differed little from the Iran of 1901.”767 This unbending 
approach to the Iranians seems to have permeated the Foreign Office and the Embassy in Tehran, institutions 
whose outlook seemed defined by historical continuity.768
Anthony Adamthwaite’s ‘Britain and the World, 1945-1949’ provides one of the most comprehensive studies 
of how Bevin’s Foreign Office was organised and functioned. It is notable, he suggests, that “there was no 
Cabinet foreign affairs committee”, giving the department’s “ministers and manchurians” total control for the 
direction of policy and adding to a sense of “close knit” insularity.769 Similarly, though Bevin had been 
critical of the department’s blue blooded recruitment policy, he carried out no substantive action to change it. 
Indeed, historian Valerie Cromwell would later comment that he not only “refused to carry out a purge”, but 
became “more devoted than any of his predecessors to the Career Diplomat.”770 It is noticeable that during 
the Second World War Labour leaders, including Attlee and Bevin, worked almost solely on domestic issues, 
Attlee in a non-departmental post and Bevin as Minister of Labour. Concurrently, internal party discourse 
focused predominantly on matters pertaining to domestic reform.771 Given the limited discussion of foreign 
affairs within the party and his own inexperience in this field, it is perhaps unsurprising that Bevin came to 
rely on career diplomats and, thanks to the multitude and depths of the problems he faced, failed to develop a 
long-term plan for British foreign policy in Iran.
Bevin had demonstrated strong leadership when responding to the Tudeh, but he proved uncertain in 
managing nationalism, a less tangible issue. The fiscal constraints and pressures placed upon Bevin by the 
Exchequer following the devaluation of sterling limited his flexibility, as did his failing health. Energetic and 
creative in his early years as Foreign Secretary, by 1950 he was, according to, Under-Secretary of State, 
Kenneth Younger “only a shadow of his real self. I think what carries him on is his stupendous egotism.”772 
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Bevin’s “egotism” led to “indispensability” and without him, Younger suggested, “there was no ‘message’ of 
any kind that the office wanted to put across.” Rather, the direction of policy was shaped by Bevin alone, the 
Foreign Office providing, what Kenneth O. Morgan called, an “echo” of his ideas.773 Privately, Younger 
mused on whether Attlee should now involve himself in Foreign Affairs to establish some direction. 
However, he was concerned that Attlee was too cautious, suggesting that the Prime Minister approached 
foreign policy “like a piece of fretwork, when it is really a passion play.”774
It would be a mistake to suggest that there were no talented individuals within the Foreign Office. However, 
they were, like Sir Oliver Franks and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, often confined to diplomatic postings overseas (to 
the United States and United Nations, respectively) and had little opportunity to shape the broad direction of 
British foreign policy. Institutionally, the department appeared, without Bevin’s dictatorial swagger, zeal and 
imagination short on ideas and sapped of energy.775 Grand designs for Britain’s place in the world were 
severely lacking with just one conference on the economic, social and political future of the Middle East held 
by the Foreign Office under the Attlee government.776 Roger Louis notes that the conference focused on 
economic development and the “interaction between economic planning and the British quest for 
stability.”777 This was unquestionably important, but appears to have been to the detriment of discussions of 
the Middle East’s immediate future. Key issues like nationalism and British interaction with it as a force 
outside the economic sphere, for example, were entirely ignored.778 Foreign Office planners, it seems, were 
willing to put their faith in improving material wellbeing to quell political unrest with the institution of a 
dictatorial leader seen in some quarters as a fall back plan.779 Moreover, the fundamental nature and future of 
the postwar empire appears to have been discussed only in passing.780 
A comparison between how policy was approached in the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office is striking. 
While the former seemed almost entirely dependent on Bevin for direction, the latter was defined by 
pluralism. In particular, it drew upon the expertise of specialists who had dedicated much of their lives to 
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understanding colonialism and colonial society. The Labour Party Colonial Advisory Committee, set up in 
1942, and the Fabian Colonial Bureau, founded in 1940, were well established forums in which “the British 
socialist attitude towards imperialism” could be discussed and strategies for the future created.781 According 
to Creech Jones “the Labour Ministers sent to the Colonial Office had long identified with the popular 
movements struggling to express colonial freedom” and had long experience of reformulating policy in 
“constructive and positive terms.”782 Labour’s colonial policy also reaped the rewards of collaboration with 
the Trade Union Congress. As early as 1938 General-Secretary Walter Citrine, referred to by John Callaghan 
as “an influential voice in the policy-making bodies of the party”, was engaged in discussions with the 
Colonial Office as to the role of colonial trade unions in future development projects.783 By 1942, following 
TUC advice, a Colonial Labour Advisory Committee had been established, providing yet another forum in 
which the labour movement could discuss the empire.784 H. N. Basilford, writing in a Fabian Society 
pamphlet published in 1945, favourably commented that the Second World War had offered Labour the 
“leisure of mind to do something” and to “plan more for the progress of our empire.”785 
Plans “for progress” included shaping nationalism in the colonies. In 1947 Andrew Cohen, head of the 
Colonial Office’s African Division, suggested that while the “rains of nationalism” had not yet become a 
flood, it was on the horizon and the aim had to be “not to dam the flood, but to divert it into useful 
channels.”786 According to Heinlein, the Colonial Office recognised the swelling strength of opposition to 
continued British rule and began to forge a policy whereby “nationalism was to be met with diplomacy and 
cooperation, not intervention and force.”787 Colonial Office leaders recognised and accepted the burgeoning 
thirst of self-governance and began to forge appropriate policies to work alongside, and not against, new 
national governments. In August 1947, for example, the “Colonial Office Summer Conference on African 
Administration” was held at Queens College, Cambridge. During this meeting over 180 attendees were 
divided into study groups and tasked with studying a particular aspect of colonial governance. Subsequently, 
their findings were confidentially published by the Colonial Office. In the words of prominent imperial 
historian D. K. Fieldhouse, “the list of speakers at the first conference reads like a roll call of all the great 
and good in contemporary colonial affairs” suggesting a clear effort to engage with experts and develop 
strategies based on the best and most innovative ideas available.788 This sophisticated strategy was the result 
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of years of nuanced analysis and critical thinking which had simply not taken place in the Foreign Office. 
Incapable of establishing a long-term vision and limited by a lack of plurality, it struggled to come to terms 
with the ongoing turmoil in Iran.789
In the years that followed the Second World War the United States came to recognise the British Empire’s 
potential power as a bulwark to communist expansion and as a tool to preserve stability. However, 
deteriorating conditions in Iran raised questions as to whether a more proactive American policy was 
required, particularly after George McGhee’s incendiary April memorandum for the Secretary of State.790 A 
clear degree of uncertainty existed in the Foreign Office regarding how new Prime Minister Ali Mansur 
should be handled. While some officials expressed uneasy confidence in his abilities, there were few gilt-
edge indications that he had the skills needed to either force the Supplemental Agreement through the Majlis 
or build new bridges between Tehran and London. Perhaps more damagingly, however, there is little to 
demonstrate that British diplomats understood the depths of their malaise in Iran, the potential for unrest 
there, or the limitations of viewing Anglo-Iranian relations solely through the prism of informal control. 
International conditions provided little respite with Cold War tensions exacerbating fears of communist 
insurgency.
Ali Mansur, the Grady Mission and the Supplemental Agreement
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, triggering the most 
serious international crisis since the end of the Second World War. In Washington calls for decisive action 
were immediate. Convinced that the Soviet Union had “mounted, supplied and instigated” the attack and 
aware of its potential consequences, Truman and Acheson sought to replicate the exercise in strength used 
during the 1948/49 Berlin Blockade without risking wider conflict.791 The outbreak of violence also led to a 
wider reassessment of strategies designed to prevent future communist gains.  First, it was believed that as 
the USSR would utilise satellite states in any future conflict, defensive procedures against these should be 
bolstered, particularly in Eastern Europe. Second, the National Security Council concluded that internal 
subversion remained a key weakness and that incidents of internal unrest or economic discord should be 
quashed as quickly as possible.792 
The latter suggestion reinforced the necessity of co-opting Britain’s strength in the Middle East and utilising 
it to achieve wider American policy goals. In May 1950, on McGhee’s recommendation, Anglo-American 
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discussions on the future of Iran took place in London and while they ended “without commitment on either 
side”, it was agreed that mutual efforts would be made to “raise morale...to which end any measures of 
material assistance recommended should be directed.”793 During these discussions it became clear that 
American officials were skeptical as to the likelihood of the Supplemental Agreement being ratified. 
Tellingly, a Foreign Office note suggested that their American counterparts had “expressed doubts as to the 
chances of the Supplemental Agreement being ratified in its present form and urged us to examine whether 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could not make them more palatable to the Persians.”794 In response, British 
delegates had argued that “the Persian Government had at no time suggested specific modification.”795 
However, while factually correct, this statement failed to comprehend the basic American complaint that the 
agreement was, at its core, balanced firmly in Britain’s favour and failed to take account of decades of 
economic exploitation.796 The Foreign Office’s inability to recognise this speaks volumes as to the differing 
views held by each nation.
A secondary concern was that the Supplemental Agreement, and the virulent nationalism it helped to fuel, 
could eventually lead to communist insurrection in Iran. On July 1, the United States’ National Security 
Council circulated a draft report entitled ‘The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to 
Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation’ analysing the possible course of Soviet 
foreign policy in militarily vulnerable regions. The report concluded that unless the Soviet Union was 
preparing to engage in international conflict on an unprecedented scale, it would avoid direct aggression 
against border states and instead operate through satellites and proxies. Most disturbing to Washington was 
the fear that the Soviet Union could make “a strong effort...by means of subversion, sabotage and civil 
disorder” and test American “firmness” in areas of political and economic vulnerability, including the Middle 
East.797 
The report’s circulation coincided with Ambassador John Wiley’s resignation. Although closely aligned with 
the Shah and the Royal Court, Wiley was left frustrated by his time in Iran and suggested: “I’ve been 
defeated in this country by one word, the word ‘yes.’ They say to me ‘yes, Mr. Ambassador, yes’ and nothing 
happens.”798 In a frank report to McGhee, Wiley commented that the United States was at a crossroads in 
Iran and warned: “we must write Iran off or take effective action of some kind.”799 Although “still in the 
formative stage”, the Seven Year Plan received some praise and was singled out as a possible avenue for 
investment. However, Wiley was highly critical of “the corruption and ‘do-nothingism’ of high officials”, 
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suggesting it was “an Iranian tradition of high standing.” Entrenched corruption and other “psychological 
factors” were “more significant than the purely political” and a “sense of hopelessness in the minds of most 
of the people [offered] a fertile field for communist agitators.”800 Westad suggests that this fear of communist 
subversion through social unrest was engrained within the Truman administration. NSC 51, a report on 
American policy towards Southeast Asia presented to the National Security Council in March 1949, for 
example, stated that the United States struggle with the Soviet Union in the Far East was “ideological” and 
that decolonisation may create a situation in which Moscow could exploit the competing tensions of 
“colonial imperialism versus military nationalism.”801 As in Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War 
Two, the developing world was identified as a canvas for ideological warfare between the United States and 
Soviet Union and little distinction was drawn between nationalist and communist revolutionary forces.
Wiley’s replacement was Henry F. Grady, a former economist at the University of California, who had served 
as American Ambassador to India, Nepal and, most recently, Greece. Although described by James A. Bill as 
“a hard-headed, short, baked potato-like figure”, Grady was a hardworking rationalist, described by a State 
Department briefing document as “unusually strong in financial and economic qualifications” and a firm 
believer that stability rested on direct investment and proper fiscal management.802 It was hoped that his 
experience in developing economies could help to improve Iranian efficiency, promote fiscal stability and 
ease domestic unrest.803 It should also be noted that allied to Grady’s belief in capitalism was an avowed 
suspicion of imperialism and imperialists, possibly influenced by his Irish ancestry. As he would later record 
in an unpublished memoir, he saw Iran as suffering under “economic colonialism” orchestrated not only by 
the AIOC, but the British government itself.804
Aged sixty-two upon his arrival in Tehran, Grady believed that a successful stint in Tehran would see him 
sent to Tokyo as the United States’ first postwar Ambassador to Japan.805 While Grady’s long, and largely 
successful, diplomatic career demonstrate that he had the skills required to become Ambassador to Tehran 
they also helped to inflate his ego, which at times made collaboration difficult. Britain’s charge d’affairs to 
Iran, George Middleton would later recall that “Henry Grady was not a professional...he said to me on one 
occasion: ‘I was the savior of India; I shall be the savior of Iran.’” In typically diplomatic fashion Middleton 
referred to these claims as “being a little bit splendid.”806 In later years, Averell Harriman would comment 
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that he “didn’t feel that Grady really was at grips with the situation”, a conclusion Dean Acheson agreed 
with.807  
According to Sir Oliver Franks, Grady’s selection was “an indication of the importance which they attach to 
doing something about the Persian situation” and a demonstration of a hardening attitude towards Iran in 
Washington.808 Although the promise of a State Department-led economic mission seems to support this, the 
United States was not looking to supersede Britain’s position, but rather sought to change British policies to 
help achieve their own geopolitical goals. For example, the State Department “declined to authorise the 
United States Ambassador in Tehran to intervene in any way in regards to the Supplemental Agreement” on 
the grounds that this was “entirely a business arrangement between the United Kingdom and Persia.”809 
Similarly, there were indications that a greater American presence could help to strengthen Britain’s position. 
For example, correspondence between the Foreign Office and British Embassy, Washington, reveals the 
importance placed on unspecified “additional funds” to aid Iran’s flagging economy.810 
However, Qaimmaqami identifies such optimism as ill conceived and suggests that the Grady mission 
weakened British power in Iran. Most notably, she argues that Grady hoped to expand Max Thornburg’s role 
and establish stronger links between the Iranian government, State Department and American private sector. 
In doing so he would engineer greater investment opportunities for American firms, harbour economic 
growth and in turn achieve domestic stability.811 Interestingly, Qaimmaqami also suggests that Thornburg 
had lobbied for Grady’s appointment, suggesting a degree of interdependence between them. The two men 
not only had a similar outlook on the role of the private sector in overseas development, but close personal 
links with Grady serving as Thornburg’s mentor during his time at University of California.812 This position 
of trust, according to Qaimmaqami, allowed Thornburg to exert undue influence over both Iranian and 
American policy: he was, for example, an early leading proponent of General Ali Razmara’s appointment as 
Prime Minister and pushed Grady to make the case for official State Department aid for the Seven Year 
Plan.813 To Thornburg, Grady’s appointment marked a shift in American attitudes and a demonstration of 
their commitment to Iran’s security and stability. 
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The highly personal links between the Americans stationed in Iran is redolent of Robinson and Gallagher’s 
description of an “official mind” within the Foreign Office and the importance of private relationships in 
creating public policy, as identified by Cain and Hopkins.814 Given the similarities between these networks it 
might be expected that analogous patterns of behaviour would emerge with diplomacy becoming intertwined 
with private sector imperatives. However, despite the networks which existed within the upper echelons of 
American political and economic society there is limited evidence of operational interdependence between 
Grady and Thornburg. Rather, Grady acted as a servant of American diplomacy alone and was not coerced 
by Thornburg into adopting an interdependent policy. Similarly, despite strong personal links, Thornburg 
lacked both the capital and the infrastructure to truly challenge the United States official position in Iran and 
establish himself as a radical alternative source of power. It is telling that in correspondence between the 
Tehran Embassy and the State Department Thornburg is rarely referred to outside of his official OCI duties, 
and, especially towards the end of his time in Iran, is identified more as a figure of intrigue than a powerful 
representative of the American private sector.815 
At the beginning of June, Shepherd commented that the “political situation [was] showing signs of 
developing.” Importantly, Mansur had “shown himself surprisingly sensitive to pressure from the National 
Front...and...in consequence his influence [had] waned.”816 The Ambassador had previously championed 
Mansur’s “determination” and was left disappointed by his suggestion, during discussions on 30 May, that 
“some inducement” was needed before the Supplemental Agreement could go before the Majlis.817 Again, 
the Prime Minister could not identify in concrete terms what this might be, adding to suspicion that he was 
trying to delay taking the agreement before the Majlis to preserve his own position. While Shepherd 
promised London that he was “trying to ginger him [Mansur] up into energetic support of the agreement”, he 
reluctantly stated his fear that “it will be put forward in a very lukewarm manner”, if at all.818 Three days 
later, in a message to G. W. Furlonge of the Foreign Office’s Eastern Department, Shepherd reiterated his 
concerns, suggesting that he was speculating “without any success, as to the kind of political lubrication 
[which] might be practicable.”819
Mansur’s unwillingness to take the Supplemental Agreement before the Majlis and his sensitivity to the 
National Front were interpreted in London and Washington as signs of weakness and the limitations of his 
support base. A reputation for machination had helped him win political power, but it had won him few 
friends, and led the Shah to question whether he could maintain political stability.820 In discussions with 
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Shepherd, the Shah indicated the “necessity for a strong government” and suggested that Mansur had shown 
himself to be “weak, vis-a-vis the National Front.”821 The Ambassador agreed with this and, in a report for 
Minister of State to the Foreign Office Kenneth Younger, warned that the “moral ascendancy of the National 
Front over the government and the bulk of the Majlis has continued to increase.”822 Shepherd also suggested 
that while other political groups lacked cohesion, the Front’s “narrow nationalism”, focus on the single issue 
of oil and “contempt for the methods and practices, both of the Shah and of recent Persian governments” 
allowed them to gain undue political influence and to “vent its nationalist sentiments at our expense.823 
With Mansur unwilling, or unable, to take control of the Majlis, transatlantic discussions turned to who could 
replace him with General Ali Razmara quickly emerging as the favoured candidate. A Foreign Office report 
found that Razmara not only represented “the best chance of securing the measure of resolution and 
efficiency required”, but that he could be “restrained” by Anglo-American representatives thanks to his 
“dependence” on their “good will.”824 Shepherd, while admitting that he had had “little opportunity of 
forming a personal judgement on him”, reported that “he impresses favourably everyone he meets” and 
referred to the wealth of respect he had garnered as head of Iran’s military.825 
The Shah also thought favourably of Razmara. In talks with Shepherd, he revealed that he was “more 
convinced than ever of the necessity for a strong government”, a clear hint of his support for the General 
who, thanks to his military background, was seen as an ally by the Royal Court.826 Privately, the Shah hoped 
that Razmara would challenge the more rebellious elements in the Majlis and force through legislation to 
decentralise the state, establishing a “large measure of autonomy in each of the ten provinces.”827 The Royal 
Court would then be able to take a central role in the legislative process, as the body to which each regional 
council would report. Although the Shah’s plans were not yet fully formed they indicate a clear depth of 
ambition and suggest that he saw the National Front as a challenge not only to foreign power in Iran, but also 
his own. When the Shah’s proposals became publicly known Mussadiq was quick to react, demanding that 
the Royal Court “not to interfere in [the] politics of administration” and warning that the Shah “must not 
alter [the] constitution.”828 In transmitting these messages to London it is notable that Shepherd’s comments 
were kept to a minimum with no examination of what the Shah’s proposals would mean for Iran, or their 
feasibility. This lack of analysis reinforces the notion that little time was dedicated to understanding the 
complexities of Iranian politics.
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With his resignation seemingly inevitable, the only question left to discuss was whether there was any 
possibility Mansur could be coerced into taking the Supplemental Agreement before the Majlis in his final 
months in office. Alan Leavett of the Foreign Office noted that Shepherd had reported that “points of 
difference between the government and the company [were] narrowing” and warned that if the agreement 
were not passed by the present Majlis it could be “many months” before it was resubmitted to the 
parliament.829 However, he also recognised that Mansur was “unlikely to present the agreement with any 
conviction” and that if rejected “re-negotiation would be unavoidable.”830 On 26 June, Shepherd informed 
Younger that “the Ali Mansur government is evidently far gone in a decline, but it is not yet clear how long it 
can survive, or whether it will pass quietly away of inanition or be given a treatment of euthanasia by the 
Shah.”831 Despite the uncertain tone of Shepherd’s message, Mansur’s tenure continued for less than a day, 
the Shah having privately asked Razmara to form a new cabinet.832 In the Ambassador’s view, Mansur’s time 
in office had “done nothing to improve conditions in Iran” and he had “fought shy of defining his attitude 
towards the Oil Agreement.” In a final salvo, Shepherd accused him of “giving priority to certain measures 
proposed by the opposition” and of actively seeking to damage British interests in Iran.833  
The vitriol which emanated from Shepherd’s message was testament to Mansur’s unpopularity in British 
diplomatic circles. The Prime Minister’s time in office had been one of great disappointment for London. 
Not only had he proven unable to force the Supplemental Agreement through the Majlis, but he had failed to 
offer the faintest opposition to the onset of nationalism. Despite not being a formal part of the British Empire 
there seems to be an underlying sense that the Iranian Prime Minister had a duty to follow the course 
preferred by London, regardless of the implications this could have to their domestic standing. Given the 
National Front’s popularity it seems remarkable that Mansur faced accusations of timidity for failing to take 
the Supplemental Agreement before the Majlis. Had he done so there is little to indicate that it would have 
been ratified or that it would have received any support from the public.
The arrival of Ambassador Grady also posed new questions as to Britain’s resilience in Iran. Although 
confident that they could maintain their monopoly over oil, Grady’s tenure added to an emerging pattern of 
tacit American pressure on Britain and suggested a degree of uncertainty in Washington as to their allies’ 
long-term prospects there. This was reinforced in a message from the charge d’affaires in Tehran, Arthur L. 
Richards, which stated that the “stubborn dispute” over the terms of the Supplemental Agreement was 
accelerating the “deteriorating conditions” in Iran.834 However, one source of optimism for London was 
General Razmara’s ascent to the premiership. He was seen as incorruptible and iron-fisted, the kind of leader 
needed to force the Supplemental Agreement through the Majlis and simultaneously quell nationalist unrest. 
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There were, however, no guarantees that Razmara would be a successful in this endeavour. He was 
politically inexperienced and perhaps too closely aligned with the military and Royal Cour. That such faith 
was placed in him demonstrates the anarchic nature of Iranian politics and Britain’s inability to exert 
influence. In an environment with high corruption and a rapid turnover in governments, a firm, assured and 
disciplined leader was undoubtedly something of a rarity.
Unbalanced Budgets and Continued Disorder: General Razmara and the Search for Stability
Understanding Razmara
Ali Razmara became Prime Minister aged forty-seven, the youngest lieutenant-general in Iran and something 
of a rising star in Iranian society. He had trained at the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, served as a 
Cossack under Reza Shah and was viewed not only as hardworking, but also incorruptible.835 His military 
background saw him marked out as something of a strongman and rumours circulated that he eventually 
hoped to lead Iran as a dictator. His desire for power was such that a State Department report suggested that 
“if Razmara becomes Prime Minister, it will be with the firm intention of remaining so indefinitely. It seems 
probable that he will resist by every legal or illegal means any attempt to remove him.”836 Although clearly 
hungry for greater power he also recognised Iran’s inherent weaknesses, not least its dysfunctional economy, 
reliance on agriculture, and need for modernisation. These dual characteristics made him an attractive 
proposition in London and Washington and it was hoped that he could dispense with the corruption of 
traditional Iranian politics and force through much needed reform. A longtime supporter of the General, Max 
Thornburg referred to his appointment as “one of the tidiest bits of political housecleaning the Middle East 
has seen for some time” and speculated that he would quell unruly fractions in the Majlis and create the 
conditions necessary for an overhaul of the most antiquated aspects of Iran’s economy.837
Razmara used his first press conference as Prime Minister to set out a manifesto focusing on political reform 
and economic development. He supported the Shah’s calls for greater decentralisation, but promised to abide 
by the Constitution.838 This effort to ingratiate himself with the Royal Court was unsurprising. He had been 
parachuted into a position of power without either popular support or experience in the rigours of 
parliamentary politics and saw the Majlis’ royalist faction as a potential source of support. Correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and Ambassador Franks reveals a recognition that the General’s appointment was 
“likely to result in a postponement, perhaps for a long period of the ratification of the Supplementary Oil 
Agreement”, but, given his “character”, the benefits of his tenure would “likely outweigh this 
disadvantage.”839 With this in mind, it is fair to suggest that the British were cautiously optimistic towards 
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Razmara. He was viewed as reliable, not revolutionary, and as a steady presence in the otherwise chaotic 
world of Iranian politics. This image was reinforced when he was offered a vote of confidence by the Majlis 
of ninety-four votes to eight with three abstentions.840
In the first months of his tenure Razmara sought to build up support for decentralisation. Explaining the 
proposed reforms to Bevin, V. Lawford suggested that “these regulations provide that in each of the 
administrative units into which the country is divided there shall be an elected council of local people with 
jurisdiction, power of discussion and decision on a wide range of subjects.”841 While these councils wouldn’t 
engage with issues of foreign policy, education or customs, they would hold power over local rates of 
taxation and allow for economic determinism at a local level. Although not discussed in great length, 
decentralisation received some support from within the Foreign Office. L. Barnett of the Eastern Department, 
for example, felt that it could help to “lessen the Central Government’s authority” and ease Anglo-Iranian 
relations.842 
In the United States support for decentralisation was strong with Assistant Secretary of State George 
McGhee suggesting that it was “a long overdue reform which may correct a situation that has been a major 
contributing factor in the helplessness of previous Iranian governments.”843 For McGhee this assessment was 
made on the basis that it would lead to greater stability. He felt that the “principal danger to Iran” came from 
internal unrest and that any action that could alleviate this risk, regardless of how undemocratic, should be 
taken.844 McGhee’s analysis demonstrates that while the British had to contend with the commercial and 
social realities of AIOC activity in Iran, the United States was able to view the country more dispassionately 
and as one component in a regional security policy. 
Barnett’s suggestion that a publicity campaign alone could win public support for Razmara’s proposals 
seems to misunderstand the weight of opposition to decentralisation, not least from the National Front, who 
suggested that not only was it a step towards the “dismemberment of the country”, but also that it had been 
forced on Iran by “the imperialists” who sought to “tear Persia apart.”845 To Mussadiq decentralisation was a 
continuation of the regionalisation policies first proposed by the British government in the midst of the 
Azerbaijan crisis and reflected their entrenched, but intangible hold over Iranian politics. The depth of 
Mussadiq’s feelings towards Britain were revealed during discussions with American representatives in 
Tehran, in which he suggested that: “you do not know how crafty they are. You do not know how evil they 
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are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch.”846 He repeatedly referred to Razmara as a 
British stooge and criticised the “bitter tasting military dictatorship” that was inspired by foreigners.847  Most  
provocatively he interrupted the new Prime Minister during an address to the Majlis and shouted: “America 
and Britain brought you to power! Get Lost! Shut the door and don’t come back.”848 
Such sharp imagery helped to galvanise Mussadiq’s support and promote a sense of unity that crossed 
religious, racial and socioeconomic lines. As Westad suggests, the “othering” of foreigners was a common 
tool in the formation of “national organizations” and helped to create a separation between “native” or 
“traditional” societies and their foreign oppressors.849 This mirrors the impulses that drove the Tudeh’s 
success, particularly independence from foreign powers and a desire to “guarantee national unity.”850 A 
parallel may also be drawn between Mussadiq’s statement and Gellner’s previously mentioned description of 
nationalism as an effort to achieve “the dignity and self-respect arising from the elimination of ‘second - or 
nth class citizenship.’”851 In this instance, Mussadiq was able to use his emotion as a weapon and depict the 
British in the basest terms possible to rouse support and draw a sharp line between the Iranian people and the 
evil outsider forces that kept their country poor.
In the American media, Razmara’s appointment and early policies won great acclaim. The New York Times, 
for example, triumphed his potential to “hamper an advance southwards” by the Soviet Union and suggested 
that the Prime Minister had proven himself to be a “bitter opponent of the hesitation, confusion and half-
measures that have characterized the Iranian administration.”852 As noted previously, McGhee keenly 
supported the General, stating that he was capable of “coping with any internal disturbance that may 
arise.”853 Perhaps his greatest champion, however, was Max Thornburg, who offered his services to the new 
Prime Minister as a private advisor and mediator with the AIOC.854 In a terse meeting with American 
Embassy staff in Tehran, Thornburg “emphasised the necessity of making one man responsible for oil policy 
discussions” and identified himself as the individual most capable of “feeling out the AIOC people on the 
possibility of revising certain provisions of the Supplemental Agreement.”855 While Thornburg was adamant 
that the United States could break Britain’s monopoly over Iranian oil, there appears to have been little 
support for this approach within either the State Department or the American Embassy in Tehran. 
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Indeed, despite the bold suggestion that he alone could cajole the AIOC into a revision of the Supplemental 
Agreement and his links to both Razmara and Ambassador Grady, there is little evidence to indicate that 
Thornburg had any lasting influence over either. While he has even been described as the “catalyst for 
nationalisation”, Thornburg’s most important role was as a manifestation of the potential role the US private 
sector might be able to play in both Iran and the Middle East more generally.856 However, at this stage he 
was simply not powerful enough to challenge British supremacy in Iran, or indeed to shape United States 
policy there. His role was thus reduced to probing entrepreneurial opportunity and providing a constant 
demonstration of the American private sector’s interest in expansion into an area it had previously been 
excluded from. 
By mid-1950 the United States and Great Britain were in broad agreement on two issues. First, they both 
recognised the necessity of supporting General Razmara as Prime Minister, viewing him as the strong leader 
needed to oppose nationalism and force the Supplemental Agreement into law. Second, it appears that 
Britain’s primacy in Iran was still realised. However, their relationship was far from harmonious and suffered 
from a number of fissures. The United States recognised Britain’s interests in Iran, but this was not 
unconditional. Indeed, policy makers in Washington were gravely concerned that London was following the 
wrong path in Iran, risking not only their own interests, but also those of the international community. It was 
therefore felt that sterner action was needed to ensure that British policy did not endanger Iranian stability. 
However, this action was limited, restrained by fiscal pressures and an unwillingness to risk over stretching 
American influence.
The Limits of American Support
Henry Grady’s appointment had raised hopes that, despite their limited direct interests there, American 
economic aid to Iran would be forthcoming and perhaps even on a par with spending in Greece and Turkey. 
However, the Ambassador’s arrival coincided with the outbreak of war in Korea and on August 28 President 
Truman informed Acheson that aid for the Middle East would be cut in favour of spending in East Asia.857 
Other forms of foreign aid were also cut: Marshall Plan funds, for example, were slashed by $200 million, 
roughly fifty percent of their total.858 In these circumstances Grady’s role was redefined and limited to 
preventing the overexertion of American resources and harbouring Iranian development through preexisting 
mechanisms and strategically targeted capital, not least in the form of Export-Import Bank loans. As 
spending fell efforts to mould British policy in Iran were redoubled with London’s influence identified as 
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vital in staving off economic collapse and insurgent communism859 Stability, as outlined by George McGhee, 
remained the most important American goal.860 Summarising their position George Woodbridge, of the State 
Department’s Economic Section wrote “our interest is emphatically not economic....we have in fact only one 
interest in Iran: the maintenance of its independence.”861
Washington’s need for British support in the Middle East can be compared to relations between the two 
states during the Korean War. Michael F. Hopkins argues that while Britain sought to limit its involvement in 
Korea to the dispatch of Royal Navy vessels, the Truman government insisted that a task force of British 
ground troops was dispatched to demonstrate support and give American action greater international 
legitimacy.862 Faced with growing diplomatic pressure and fearful that a failure to comply could jeopardize 
relations with Washington, Hopkins argues the Attlee government acquiesced to American demands as a 
means of “displaying their value as a partner.”863 While the United States recognised the need to alter British 
policy in Iran, there is no evidence to suggest that they sought to displace them there, despite the efforts of 
Max Thornburg.864 Rather, Iran was seen as part of a general defensive perimeter with Britain acting as a 
safeguard against unrest, disorder and communist insurrection. This partnership, as envisaged in the USA, 
rested on the assumption that British policy was malleable and would not undermine the goals set on Capitol 
Hill.865 In Korea, an area of little intrinsic value to the British economy, the Attlee government had been 
willing to follow the path set by the United States, but in Iran they remained determined to follow their own 
course. Iranian oil was unquestionably a vital economic asset and it was widely seen as essential that Britain 
avoid “demotion from Protagonist to attendant Lord.”866 The AIOC shared this view and there were no 
indications that the firm’s board of directors would accept losing their monopoly, regardless of pressure from 
the USA. 
The limits of American support for Iran were made clear following the submission of a $25 million loan 
request from Tehran to the Export-Import Bank. This request was supported by Grady, who hoped that it 
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would form the first of four installments, eventually totaling $100 million.867 However, despite the 
Ambassador’s support, the State Department refused the request immediately, highlighting the Truman 
administration’s constraints on overseas spending and latent skepticism as to the Iranian government’s ability 
to spend such sums responsibly.
While British policy continued to be viewed as ill-conceived and ineffective, the United States were 
unwilling to waver from their established policy of using Britain and its assets as proxies in achieving their 
goals.868 While Louis and Robinson have established that the State Department and Pentagon found their 
most “important collaborators in the British and their Empire-Commonwealth”, the success of this policy 
was highly variable.869 It is clear that “much of the prewar Empire survived locally and was slotted into the 
postwar design”, but that this pattern could not be replicated in areas where American and British goals were 
at odds with one another.870 Iran was one such area. While the State Department felt that stability should be 
given primacy regardless of the impact this had on British prestige and oil revenue, the Attlee government 
remained intent on protecting its economic interests at all costs. This fundamental difference grew ever more 
pronounced during the summer of 1950. Although confidence abounded in Razmara’s abilities, the National 
Front remained a challenging proposition. Finally, Iran’s economic position was far from secure, raising 
questions in Washington as to whether the Supplemental Agreement could be modified to help improve 
conditions there.
Iranian Economic Dislocation
In May 1950 Britain’s Commercial Secretary in Tehran, John Walker, warned that the United States may 
request that Iran be allowed to service any loan repayments using sterling.871 Walker suggested that the 
Iranians not only had “no dollars available at present for this purpose”, but also a chronic shortage of rials.872 
Evidence from the United States supports Walker’s summations. In March, for example, W. Kopolowitz of 
the State Department’s Eastern Division suggested that Iran’s short term dollar assets had fallen by half since 
1943.873 A report published eight months later went further and outlined their dire currency shortage, stating 
that Iranian imports from the United States totaled “approximately $60 million...while exporting only about 
$2 million worth.”874 It also warned that the country’s current deficit was rising at a rate of over 16 percent 
per annum, leading to a dollar position deemed “considerably more unfavourable than its overall balance of 
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payments position.”875 Iran’s wider financial woes were made clear in August when Shepherd reported that 
Iran’s deficit had topped £16.5 million during the previous financial year.876 In a report for Acheson, 
McGhee suggested that economic and political uncertainty had resulted in a “critical situation” and 
“economic depression which has resulted in substantial and growing unemployment, business bankruptcies 
and, in some areas, actual starvation.”877 Though the latter claim seems fanciful, agricultural production had 
crashed and the barter economy first described by Shepherd in March remained in place.878 With rial 
circulation in free fall an immediate cash injection was urgently required.879
McGhee felt that there was now a “demonstrable need for some form of foreign aid” and that efforts to push 
Britain towards adopting a “united front” in Iran be redoubled.880 With tacit support from Ambassador 
Grady, Razmara put forward a series of modifications to the Supplemental Agreement. These, he argued, 
would guarantee its passage through the Majlis and provide the cash needed to stave off total economic 
collapse. The Prime Minister’s demands included that the AIOC begin to pay royalties at the new, higher rate 
stipulated in the Supplemental Agreement before ratification and that back payments on all production since 
July 1949 be made as an immediate cash sum.881 
The idea of changing the terms of the Supplemental Agreement had already been suggested by American 
delegates at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting. Though their British counterparts suggested 
that the Iranians were simply in need of a “general gingering up”, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 
Raymond O’Hare cast doubt on whether the Majlis would ever be able to pass the Supplemental Agreement 
in its “present form”, announcing himself “worried by [the] UK’s take it or leave it attitude.”882 It was 
suggested that the British had “got into too rigid [a] framework” in negotiations and needed to make 
substantial concessions, possibly including “economic assistance.”883 Although the British delegates agreed 
to “put these points...to their Embassy [in] Tehran”, the Foreign Office remained obstinate.884 In particular, 
they remained adamant that “the problem is primarily one of raising morale” and cast doubt on “whether we 
could justifiably ask the company to consider any modifications.”885 The British seemed collaborative in 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
155
875 Ibid.
876 Sir Francis Shepherd to FO, 27 August 1950, FO 371/82342 NA.
877 Shepherd to FO, ‘Report on Economic Conditions in Persia, April to May 1950, 27 July 1950 FO 371/82332B NA.
878 Shepherd to Foreign Office, ‘Report on Economic Conditions in Persia, December 1949-January 1950,’ 20 March 1950, FO 
371/82332B NA.
879 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Secretary of State, 25 
April 1950, FRUS, 1950 Vol. V The Near East, South Asia and Africa, 522.
880 Ibid., 522-525.
881 The Ambassador in Iran to the Secretary of State, 13 July 1950, FRUS, 1950 Vol. V The Near East, South Asia and Africa, 568.
882 The United States Delegation at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State, 16 May 1950, 
FRUS, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, 546-547.
883 Ibid., 546.
884 Ibid, 547.
885 Foreign Office to British Embassy, Tehran, 6 May 1950, FO 371/82311 NA.
direct negotiations with the United States, yet their attitude behind closed doors was markedly different. The 
American proposals were largely dismissed offhand and marked as potentially damaging to British interests. 
The idea of Britain seeking to avoid American intervention of any sort is reinforced in a Foreign Office 
Minute from 25 May 1950, which suggested that “any pressure by the United States on the Persian 
Government to ratify the Supplemental Agreement would be most undesirable since this was entirely a 
business arrangement between the UK and Persia.”886 Rather than engage in the United States’ proposals 
constructively, it appears that the Foreign Office’s attitude was to ignore them. 
Notably there is no record of Bevin passing comment on these proposals, suggesting either that his attentions 
were directed elsewhere, or that American suggestions were actively suppressed within the department. If the 
former suggestion is correct, it is perhaps unsurprising. In June Bevin had become extremely ill, a kidney 
operation leaving him bedridden, “only half alive” and unable to take an active role in the Foreign Office’s 
day-to-day management.887 That the department looked so rudderless in his absence indicates a clear over 
reliance on the talismanic Foreign Secretary, something that was undoubtedly exacerbated by his highly 
personal approach to policy. However, if the latter was the case, it casts a long shadow over the Foreign 
Office’s personnel and raises questions as to their suitability to conduct British policy overseas.
British intransigence did not go unnoticed in Washington where fears persisted that their domineering 
attitude, as demonstrated by the AIOC, could have long term ramifications for security in the Middle East. In 
July, Joseph Wagner circulated ‘The Peculiar Position of the British in Iran’, a report that proposed that the 
company “act[ed] as a law unto itself.”888 He insisted that the United States needed to adopt a firmer line 
towards the AIOC, suggesting that “the Tehran officials of the oil company [have] operated upon the 
principle of disregarding Americans. This is changing today.”889 Additionally, Wagner called on the State 
Department to encourage the British government to use its “absolute veto power” to curb the company’s 
worst excesses and force them towards a more conciliatory position.890 The report was widely circulated 
within the Truman administration and illustrates their hardening position. A tougher stance was even adopted 
by Acheson himself. He privately warned that that AIOC “intransigence” could be detrimental to 
international peace and warned Embassy staff in London that State Department officials were “at [a] loss [to] 
understand AIOC attitude, in view of seriousness [of the] present situation.”891
Determined to influence their allies course, McGhee was dispatched to London in September 1950 to discuss 
collaboration to safeguard Greece, Turkey and Iran from communist subversion. During these discussions it 
became clear that the United States saw the Supplemental Agreement as vital to Iran’s future and that to 
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achieve its passage the British should agree to two modifications.892 First, “the UK simply had”, according to 
McGhee, “no alternative [other than] to provide the Iranians with their dollar requirements”, especially 
because the AIOC’s operations were “exceptionally profitable.”893 This would be achieved through a 
guarantee that all future royalty payments would be freely convertible. Second, it was made clear that the 
British should endeavour to provide direct assistance to the Iranian government, preferably in the form of an 
advance of AIOC royalties.894 
It is notable that while the Under-Secretary recognised the Supplemental Agreement’s ratification as an 
“essential element in strengthening the country and in maintaining the Razmara government”, he was 
scathing that the AIOC had not shown the “same sense of urgency about the matter” and had failed to engage 
with successive administrations.895 McGhee found support for his views from the American oil industry. A 
former seismologist with a wealth of experience excavating oil fields through his firm the McGhee 
Production Company, McGhee undertook discussions with leading executives who suggested that 
“compliance with it [the Iranian government] would be a sound commercial proposition.”896 
McGhee’s transatlantic mission is important as an example of the United States’ efforts to push Britain 
towards a more amenable position. It demonstrates that while the USA was not willing to commit itself 
financially to maintaining Iranian stability, it recognised the country’s strategic importance and, despite their 
differences, was resolute in its determination to use London as a proxy to secure them.897 In recognition of 
this pressure, the British response to McGhee’s mission was slightly more malleable than had previously 
been seen. Leading Treasury official M. E. Ashe agreed to the introduction of “temporary convertibility” for 
Iran as a “quite exceptional” measure and a means of increasing time for negotiations between Tehran and 
the Export Import Bank.898 Similarly, Bank of England officials offered their support on the condition that 
any dollars earned through Iranian exports be used for noncommercial requirements and the servicing of 
foreign debt, which would in turn help to maintain sterling’s position and demand for British products.899
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Concurrently talks on the Supplemental Agreement continued between the AIOC and the Iranian 
government. Shepherd warned the Foreign Office that the Iranian government’s “only income” came from 
oil royalties, but that the £5 million it had received in advanced royalties in July 1949 had already been spent  
and, as a result, they were looking to secure £8 million as an “immediate advance on [future] royalties from 
the AIOC.900 Although Foreign Office officials had previously floated the idea of “arranging assistance e.g. 
in the form of a bank loan on the London market secured against AIOC royalties” they now made clear that 
Shepherd should “take the opportunity when you call on Rasmara [sic] of pointing out that all these financial 
difficulties would be solved by ratification of [the] Supplemental Oil Agreement and of ascertaining what his 
intentions in that regards now are.”901 This message was repeated during meetings between Treasury and 
Foreign Office staff in which Furlonge “stressed that the British loan should be used as an incentive to 
ratification of the Supplemental Agreement” and the idea of using a loan as leverage for the Supplement 
Agreement’s passage through the Majlis subsequently received AIOC support.902 McGhee’s reaction to these 
proposals was to suggest that the company “had not shown the same sense of urgency” he had expected 
before ridiculing suggestions that it was short of capital because “there was little it could not afford to agree 
to.”903
In perhaps his most insightful piece of correspondence as Ambassador, Shepherd addressed Furlonge’s 
proposals, noting that “the question is no longer purely commercial or financial but involves [the] fate of the 
most promising government Persia has had since the war” and warning the “opposition has...launched a 
petition to cancel the oil concession altogether.” Rather than force Razmara into a potentially disastrous 
settlement, he called for greater flexibility during negotiations and an immediate advance of £5 million “in 
royalties at 1933 rates.”904 The Ambassador also met with the Prime Minister himself and again insisted that 
the “simplest method of obtaining the necessary funds would be to secure the immediate ratification of the 
Supplemental Agreement.”905 In a message to the Foreign Office, he suggested that Razmara “had been 
counting on loans from the United States” and that with the much expected capital as yet unforthcoming, 
Britain needed to take a greater role in preserving stability.906 
While Shepherd’s tenure may be criticised for his insular and, at times, ignorant analysis of the Iranian 
people, it appears that he recognised the benefits of bowing to American pressure and making some 
concessions to Iran. Throughout 1950 the United States’ calls for London to modify its approach in Iran had 
grown louder, and yet the Attlee government had shown only limited appetite for change. It is clear that 
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without some form of financial support Razmara’s government faced ruin and Iran risked spiraling into 
anarchy. This would not only force the United States to reassess Britain’s worth as a strategic partner, but be 
disastrous for the AIOC. Following Shepherd’s advice, the Foreign Office agreed to a revised approach and 
proposed that royalties be freely convertible “to enable Razmara to balance his budget and promote the 
execution of the Seven Year Plan.”907 Additionally, it was suggested that talks reopen on the possibility of 
both the company providing financial assistance in the form of a cash advance on royalties and the Iranian 
government auditing the firm’s records. In one of a dwindling number of comments on Iran, Bevin noted that 
Razmara was employing “the bazaar method of negotiating” and, though it was felt that there was “little 
chance of Persia going communist”, the United States’ “increasing impatience” necessitated a reevaluation of 
the Supplemental Agreement’s terms, whatever the ramifications for Britain’s economic position in Iran.908 
However, as McGhee feared, the greatest bulwark to any such action remained the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company itself. 
The Oil Company Responds
AIOC Deputy-Chairman Basil Jackson dismissed calls for any further discussions on the Supplemental 
Agreement, suggesting that Razmara’s proposed modifications were ill conceived and that “the company 
could not”, for example, “have their books audited by Persians, since this would give infinite opportunities 
for troublemaking.”909 Jackson also quashed any hint that the AIOC could provide financial support to Iran, 
on the basis that “the company was not a bank [and as such] it could not lend money.”910 Moreover, the 
AIOC’s board of directors appeared unable, or perhaps unwilling, to recognise Iranian complaints of inherent  
unfairness within the company. For example, lingering complaints that the AIOC’s leadership was entirely 
British were brushed off on the grounds that “ninety-seven percent” of the company was “already 
Iranianised.”911 Similarly, claims of AIOC meddling in Iranian politics were ignored completely.912 
With the company unwilling to entertain the notion of lending money to Iran, other methods of supporting 
Razmara’s government were discussed. Furlonge, for example, suggested that a “bank loan or a direct 
governmental loan” should be considered.913 Although he noted that there were “serious obstacles” to this 
approach and that it could even “require [new] legislation”, he also recognised that American “anxiety” 
towards “the question of aid to Persia” required action previously deemed extreme.914 His message was 
given even greater resonance following talks between Britain’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
159
907 Foreign Office Minute ‘Financial Assistance to Persia,’ 19 September 1950, FO 371/82342 NA.
908 Bevin to Franks, 12 August 1950, FO 371/82375 NA; G. W. Furlonge to Young (Treasury), 18 Sept 1950 FO 371/82342.
909 Foreign Office Minute ‘Basil Jackson on Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s Position Regarding Principal Modification,’ 14 September 
1950, FO 371/82342 NA.
910 Ibid.
911 Ibid.
912 Ibid. 
913 G.W. Furlonge to Young (Treasury), 18 September 1950, FO 371/82342 NA.
914 Ibid.
Gladwyn Jebb and Secretary of State Acheson. Jebb informed Bevin that the State Department considered 
“arrangements for the loan [as] practically complete” and had “been proceeding on the assumption that the 
Persians would be able to convert sterling into dollars for the servicing of the loan.”915 Jebb also alluded to 
the Secretary of State’s growing frustration, suggesting: “Mr. Acheson [had] said that the sum involved in 
dollars was a relatively small one and the United States Government hoped that in view of the political 
importance to both countries of taking all possible steps to counteract Soviet pressure on Persia His 
Majesty’s Government would be prepared to waive their objections and agree that the Persians should be 
allowed to convert the necessary amount of sterling into dollars.” He also stressed that the matter was one of 
“considerable urgency.”916 
Acheson’s recollections of autumn 1950 reveal a growing obsession with increasing French, German and 
British participation in international defence, and the creation of “viable” regional partnerships.917 Against 
this background of burgeoning cooperation it is perhaps unsurprising that he, and the American 
administration more generally, looked for Britain to make sacrifices in Iran for the benefit of wider 
international security.  In a September report entitled ‘Anglo-American Differences Over Aid to Persia’, 
counsellor to the British Embassy, Washington, B. A. Burrows, suggested that the Americans felt that “no 
real progress [could] be made in the economic rehabilitation until this [ratification] is accomplished” and that 
the British government should force the AIOC to make conciliatory amendments to the Supplemental 
Agreement to ease its passage through the Majlis.918 Indeed, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and 
Iranian Affairs William Rountree recorded his surprise towards what he saw as London’s obstinate position 
“despite the present world situation.”919 To the Director, it was unfathomable that Britain was so single 
minded and refused to take into full consideration the threat to democracy posed by the Soviet Union. 
Referring to London’s approach as “nonsense” Rountree urged that Washington be more bold and seek to 
“introduce an element of realism into British thinking.”920
In the State Department discussions as to the best course of action in Iran grew deeper and more intense. A 
September position paper emphasised the potentially “adverse results of the loss of Iran” and warned that 
communist unrest there could take one of four distinct forms: “direct Soviet invasion”, “the establishment of 
a communist regime in Azerbaijan”, the “establishment of a communist regime in the whole of Iran” and, 
finally, “the fermentation of serious troubles in the oil fields.”921 Such was the perceived threat that even 
action deemed “provocative to the Soviet Union” was regarded as an “acceptable risk”, including stationing 
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British and American troops in Iraq and southern Iran itself.922 However, despite American promises to 
“continue vigorous Cold War action in the Middle East”, the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff remained 
adamant that they “would not send forces to this are”, even in the event of invasion by the Soviet Union.923 
This statement, made during transatlantic military discussions, illustrates the continued limitations of the 
United States’ Middle Eastern policy. Although Iran was now deemed an area of strategic importance there 
was no desire to commit either men or capital there, despite Grady’s claims of their necessity. Instead the 
United States was forced to rely on Britain as a defensive shield against communist subversion and redouble 
their efforts to shape British policy where necessary i.e. by insisting upon a “favourable AIOC settlement” as 
an “important Cold War measure.”924 This reinforces both Alex Danchev’s description of a “functional” 
relationship between the two nations and Kathleen Burk’s identification of the USA’s “new appreciation of 
the value of the British Empire”, despite finding aspects of it unpalatable.925
The Limits of British Influence
On 2 October, Shepherd informed the Foreign Office that Razmara would publicly endorse the Supplement 
Agreement, provided five modifications were made. These were piecemeal and designed as a sop to 
nationalist factions. For example, a clause that “Persian royalties would never be less than those of Iraq” and 
an unspecified level of “control” over exports.926 Other modifications included the free use of gas produced 
during oil extraction, the receipt of “oil equal in quantity to that used by the company itself in Persia” and 
“complete Persianisation in ten years, except for certain chiefs of departments, and other high posts, and 
necessary experts and technicians.”927 Shepherd suggested that the Shah had instructed Razmara “to take 
immediate steps to solve the oil question” and that the Prime Minister did not expect to “get all he has asked 
for.”928 Rather, the proposed additions served to assuage the Parliamentary Oil Commission and dissuade 
them from making further requests “which will only be turned down.”929 Privately, Shepherd described the 
Prime Minister’s approach as being a “sort of bogus cock fight in the course of which one feather would be 
lost...and this the Prime Minister would stick triumphantly in his cap.”930 Foreign Office officials were  
confident that the AIOC would not “close the door on discussions with Razmara”, provided the Prime 
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Minister did not request any “fundamental modifications” to its terms.931 Although they maintained that the 
agreement was “wholly fair”, they recognised that minor changes might be needed to “clinch matters” and 
ease its ratification in the Majlis.932 
This view was reflected by the company’s chief representative Ernest Northcroft. Northcroft admitted that he 
was authorised to agree to certain concessions, including increased quarterly royalty payments and a 
reduction in the prices charged to the Iranian government of products including lubricating oil and bitumen, 
but urged Razmara to focus on the “solid benefits” that would follow ratification, rather than modifications 
the Majlis could dismiss as “trivial.”933 Northcroft’s admission can be interpreted as demonstrating the 
AIOC’s softening attitude towards Iranian demands and the Attlee government’s success in bringing the 
company into line. However, as Northcroft himself admitted, the agreed modifications were unlikely to stand 
up to close public scrutiny.934 As such it is unsurprising that he urged Razmara to force the agreement 
through the Majlis before any opposition could articulate itself. The dangers of this approach are illustrated 
by communications between the Foreign Office and Tehran Embassy, which hinted at “interpellations” 
against Razmara on the grounds of his covert discussions with the AIOC and perceived disrespect for the 
Majlis.935 There is no evidence to indicate that Shepherd investigated these rumours, rather his 
correspondence from October 3 onwards focused solely on the terms of the Supplemental Agreement. 
As Britain’s principal figurehead in Iran Ambassador Shepherd undoubtedly should have developed a better 
grasp on domestic politics. Had he done so, he may well have recognised that Razmara had grown 
increasingly unpopular, even amongst his former supporters. Homa Katouzian suggests that while Razmara 
had the support of Iran’s military behind him, he was seen as an enemy of “the entire religious leadership and 
community, whether the conservative religious establishments or the radical religious tendencies.”936 
Similarly, Katouzian argues that Razmara operated solely within the elite political class and failed to 
comprehend the growing weight of opposition to his leadership coming from both the bazaar and the 
National Front.937 Mary Ann Heiss has also charted opposition to Razmara, proposing that by late 1950 a 
broad, united struggle against “the court-military complex” was emerging at a popular level, “their 
immediate goal was rejection of the Supplemental Agreement; their ultimate aim was the implementation of 
parliamentary reforms...that would lead Iran to democracy and real independence.”938 
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Although Shepherd had an astute awareness of the United States’ interest in Iran and concerns towardsBritish 
policy there, the disdain he felt towards the Iranian people and his unwillingness to engage in domestic 
politics hindered the quality of his reporting to London. A clear example of this was his characterisation of 
Iran’s opposition groups as “numerically small and vocally stentorian.”939 While the National Front’s 
representation in the Majlis was undoubtedly small they had gained control over the Majlis oil committee 
with Mussadiq serving as its chair.940 This oversight hindered the quality of his reporting and led to 
complacency as to the strength of Razmara’s position. Shepherd also grossly underestimated Mussadiq’s 
abilities as a leader, suggesting not only that his ascent could be a “blessing in disguise because he will prove 
a failure in a very short time” but also that “he seemed to be more of an extreme nuisance than a serious and 
constructive statesman.”941 The Ambassador went as far as to cast aspersions on his character, suggesting 
Mussadiq “diffuses a slight reek of opium...and he gives the impression of being impervious to argument.”942 
Though economically important, Iran remained at the fringe of Britain’s world view. The Foreign Office 
lacked a clear programme of policies there and there appears to be little to no external monitoring of the 
political climate, raising the importance of the Embassy’s judgement. Repeatedly, Shepherd demonstrated a 
tendency to underestimate the depth of opposition, to both continued British participation in the country and 
the Razmara government. His focus on Mussadiq as a suspected drug user, rather than the figurehead of an 
increasingly popular nationalist movement highlights a misplaced focus on trivial details and inability to 
engage with wider political realities. With Bevin incapacitated and the Foreign Office uncreative and lacking 
in energy, Shepherd missed an opportunity to influence policy from the ground up and to provide adequate 
guidance for London on conditions in Iran.
Shepherd’s failure to understand Iranian politics may also be attributed to the limited number of identifiable 
political bodies in the country. As discussed in the previous chapter the AIOC, British Embassy and Iranian 
government had made successive efforts to exert greater control over the trade union movement, under the 
pretext of establishing a more regulated system of exchange between workers, employers and legislators. 
The result had been catastrophic as workers, skeptical of the true aims of the new state-sponsored unions, 
rejected joining them en masse. Razmara’s appointment entrenched this view further. As Chief of General 
Staff Razmara had undertaken union busting acts and had “advised” independent trade unionists to avoid 
action which could “break up ESKI” by drawing workers to other unions.943 
An increase in antiunion measures taken by the AIOC had not helped matters. In a July exchange with the 
Foreign Office, Shepherd noted complaints that they had a “policy of subcontracting work previously 
performed by Company employees” and a “hostility to workers’ organisations.” As a result the Oil Workers 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
163
939 Shepherd to Bevin, 24 November 1950, FO 371/82343 NA.
940 Katouzian, Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, 90-91.
941 de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, 160; Shepherd, Never Trouble Trouble, 42.
942 Shepherd to Furlong, 6 May 1951, FO248/1514 NA.
943 American Embassy Tehran ‘Monthly Labour Report,’ 1 December 1949, RG 84/2257 NARA.
Union had “practically ceased to function.”944 Though numerically small, the Iranian trade union movement 
had played a vital role in providing a voice for workers and a rallying point for the country’s largest 
disenfranchised working classes. Trade unions had also served as a barometer of Iranian dissatisfaction and 
helped to shape British policy to counter this. However, action to limit the power of independent unions and 
replace them with state-sponsored equivalents had diminished workers’ representation and silenced the 
collective voice of many. This result was the opposite of what Bevin had hoped to achieve and effectively 
silenced one of the few political outlets available to ordinary Iranians. 
It should be noted that between 1945 and 1950, the AIOC registered profits of over £250 million with the 
British government receiving in excess of £90 million in taxes.945 Further still, the AIOC’s total net worth 
was estimated by the State Department to be £82 million at the beginning of 1950.946 With Britain’s 
economic position still somewhat precarious it seems remarkable that so little attention was paid to 
safeguarding this asset. While the decline of trade unionism and a lack of identifiable political bodies may 
have made it harder to understand the depths of Iranian dissatisfaction, the levels of vitriol displayed against 
Britain, both in the streets and the Majlis, should have prompted alarm bells. Ambassador Shepherd was 
undoubtedly a guilty party in this. Blinkered by orientalism, he simply failed to get to grips with Iranian 
nationalism. 
Although the Foreign Office had agreed to modify the Supplemental Agreement, American officials 
remained unsure of their allies’ commitment to an equitable settlement in Iran. In his strongest statement to 
date, Dean Acheson noted his “disappointment...on the question of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
Supplemental Agreement.”947 When privately assessing the situation, the Secretary of State suggested that 
not only was Iran “directly exposed to internal and external communist aggression”, but also that the 
“absence [of] other western powers able or willing to furnish [the] needed assistance prompts US [to] render 
military and economic assistance.”948 This was an early, though still implicit, suggestion that the United 
States could take a more active role in Iran. It can be interpreted both as a warning that Britain risked losing 
its foothold in Iran and also that Washington had lost patience with Whitehall’s inability to reach an 
agreement with Tehran. This situation is redolent of Christopher Thorne’s description of a “close and yet 
particularly strained” relationship between the two powers and of Hathaway’s suggestion that mutual 
suspicions, divergent goals and misapprehensions prevented the establishment of an interdependent policy 
between them.949 
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Acheson undoubtedly viewed the AIOC as being the crux of the problem. Not only did the company help to 
create political instability, but it had retarded economic development.950 In a warning to Sir Oliver Franks, a 
diplomatic contemporary, but also a close friend, Acheson mentioned “in the utmost confidence” the 
“financial demands [made] upon the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco)” by the Saudi Arabian 
government, demands which, if they became known to the Iranian government, would “make the position of 
[the] AIOC in relation to [the] financial terms of the proposed agreement far more difficult.”951 
Aramco, Nationalism and the Necessity of an Agreement
The proposal alluded to by Acheson above would change the nature of oil control in the Middle East and see 
the Saudi Arabian government enter into an equitable profit sharing agreement with Aramco, the first of its 
kind in the region.952 To McGhee an agreement of this nature was inevitable because “the Saudi’s knew the 
Venezuelans were getting 50/50...and why wouldn’t they want it too?”953 Acheson recognised that if details 
of the Aramco-Saudi deal became publicly known Iranian resistance to the Supplemental Agreement would 
not only increase, but provide a basis for a complete renegotiation of its terms. Daniel Yergin suggests that 
the company had been made aware of the agreement’s terms before the British government and had sought to 
expedite the Supplemental Agreement’s passage accordingly.954 A more subtle, but no less important, effect 
of Aramco’s proposed settlement was that it presented, according to Paul C. Parke, the US Treasury’s 
representative to the Middle East, an opportunity “to develop a new basis for stability in the oil picture in the 
Persian Gulf and at the same time take positive action which may improve the situation in Iran.”955 Like 
McGhee, Parke believed that the Aramco deal would become the standard throughout the Middle East. 
However, he also added that the AIOC’s weak bargaining position offered a valuable opportunity for 
American firms to expand into a previously closed region. Parke’s approach was revolutionary. Not only had 
he recognised Britain’s weakness, but he hoped to capitalise upon it too. 
Given his earlier role as the foremost demonstration of American private power in Iran it is perhaps 
surprising that Max Thornburg was not given a more central role in Washington’s policy there, especially 
given Parke’s outlook, which closely mirrored his own. However, by late 1950 Thornburg was seen as a 
potential hindrance to the successful implementation of American policy. According to Grady, Thornburg 
had “irritated many people here” and was “inclined to take things into his hands that do not concern him.”956 
Perhaps more importantly fears existed that Thornburg was “spread[ing] himself out into political matters” 
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that did not concern him and could arouse suspicion of the USA’s intentions in London.957 Grady suggested 
that Thornburg’s time in Iran had had its successes, not least in providing a visible manifestation of 
American interest there, but with control becoming formalised there was “no harm whatsoever” in him 
leaving voluntarily, or indeed being removed.958 Grady’s concern was undoubtedly raised by Thornburg’s 
decision to take up an advisory role with the Iranian government, enter into talks with AIOC staff in London 
and, subsequently, “report” directly to Razmara on his findings.959 While Thornburg had at one stage 
declared himself the person most capable of “feeling out the AIOC people on the possibility of revising 
certain provisions of the Supplemental Agreement” his power in Iran had seemingly ebbed.960 Partly this was 
the result of Iran’s economic deterioration and the limited resources available for investment and reform. 
However, Thornburg’s decline in influence also rested on the State Department’s growing interest in Iran, 
which depleted the space available for informal diplomatic actors to exert their influence and diminished his 
ability to move freely between posts. 
In a last ditch effort to maintain his position, and despite his previous advocacy of Razmara, Thornburg made 
overtures to the National Front, including a meeting with Mussadiq with whom he “discussed the oil 
problem” and future foreign investment.961 Critically, Thornburg suggested that the State Department was 
“knuckling under” British pressure and undermining the image of fairness that Washington sought to 
display.962 Alarmed that Thornburg was looking to “promote a job for himself”, regardless of the effect it 
could have on a “proper solution” to the oil question, Grady requested that the State Department ask him to 
return to the United States.963 The Ambassador would later muse that Thornburg had attempted to “distort” 
the situation and maintain space for private sector investment, even if it was to the detriment of the United 
States’ diplomatic efforts.964 While Thornburg’s zeal for private investment opportunities had once been seen 
as offering Iran a path to modernity, it now appeared illusionary, the day dream of a man whose claims and 
potential for power never quite reached fruition.
Despite repeated American warnings, neither the AIOC or the British government were willing to change the 
fundamental terms of the Supplemental Agreement. Rather, they looked for alternative means of assuaging 
State Department fears towards their Iranian policy. Aid was readily identified as a means of not only 
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winning popular support, but also of aiding Razmara’s vulnerable economic position.965 However, while 
Shepherd hoped to deliver £3 million to Tehran as a one-off payment, his offer received a “cool reception” 
from Razmara, suggesting the Prime Minister hoped to avoid being identified as working too closely with 
the British.966 Instead, Bevin suggested that British policy become one of “offering advice” to the Iranians on 
development issues, thereby “avoiding the error...of appearing to dictate to these tiresome and headstrong 
people.”967 
These conflicting suggestions demonstrate the lack of clarity within British policy in Iran and reinforce the 
sense that there was an absence of a longterm vision there. While some modifications to the Supplemental 
Agreement had been encouraged, they were to be limited in scope and there was little discussion of how they 
would be received in Iran itself. Similarly, although aid was offered to Razmara, it was not in a form that 
would allow him to avoid charges of collusion from the Majlis’ more reactionary factions. In part, these 
conciliatory offers were a response to American concerns that Britain’s policy in Iran was counterproductive 
and inflammatory, but they did little to soothe Washington’s concerns and Secretary of State Acheson 
remained a consistent critic of Britain’s “divergent” strategy in Iran.968 
It is telling that Acheson has been referred to as the “British accent in American foreign policy” by John T. 
McNay, and as a consistent friend to the Attlee government.969 It is undoubtedly true that Acheson had strong 
personal links with both Ernest Bevin and British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks.970 However, 
his support was not unconditional, but rested on the qualification that British policy be of benefit to the 
United States. In Iran this did not appear to be the case and by the end of 1950 the United States was casting 
a weary eye over its allies’ approach to a country seen as ever more susceptible to economic collapse and 
communist insurrection. While Iran, and indeed the Middle East, had previously been identified as an area of 
British primacy, this was no longer the case and, as nationalist tension grew stronger, Washington’s 
confidence in British capabilities diminished. 
The Anglo-American relationship seems at its heart to be one of functionality and British policy no longer 
seemed to be serving, but was perhaps even threatening, American goals in Iran. The British Embassy in 
Tehran and the AIOC seemed impervious to the challenges posed by Iranian nationalism, yet the United 
States were keenly aware of them, not least the potential for geopolitical instability and Soviet advancement. 
Hathaway’s suggestion of “prostate England” engaging in policy that drew the ire and, eventually, the 
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intervention of the Untied States is particularly appropriate.971 As functionality, the key feature of the Anglo-
American relationship, waned, so too did American patience. Ominously, in one of the American Embassy’s 
final cables to Washington in 1950, interim charge d’affairs Richards warned the Secretary of State that the 
first press releases demanding oil nationalisation had been made by The Organisation of Tehran University 
Students (OTUS) and unnamed religious leaders, suggesting increasingly organised opposition to British 
policy.972 
OTUS’ statement was followed by others from ever more powerful sources. The faculty of Tehran University 
submitted a Majlis resolution demanding “the assertion of national sovereignty over the oil industry” while 
Mussadiq, addressing a crowd of over 12,000 in Tehran, called on the Majlis to reject the Supplemental 
Agreement whatever its form, arguing that the “conflict would not be resolved until the entire oil industry 
was nationalised.”973 Those taking part in the protests were generally drawn from Iran’s urban middle class 
who, literate, aware of changing international conditions and fiercely patriotic, stood as a vanguard against 
British rule. The process of “social mobilisation” that succinctly described the Tudeh’s emergence was in full 
effect as revolutionaries, drawn mainly from the metropolis and often well educated, came together to 
challenge what they saw as colonial oppression.974 A regional comparison can between the social makeup of 
Iran’s young revolutionaries and the “effendis” class in Egypt, as identified by Guy Laron.975 Laron proposes 
that Britain’s administrative control over Egypt inspired “young, educated, angry men” to become the 
vanguard of protests against foreign rule and their country’s traditional, collaborative political class.976 The 
“general hostility towards foreigners” described by Laron bears clear similarities to the nationalist fervour 
whipped up by Mussadiq his cohorts. Similarly, Laron proposes that Bevin’s postwar policy towards Egypt, 
although initially tinged with language to promote economic development and the empowerment of the 
masses, was stymied by the necessity of exploiting the country’s economic potential. In short, Ernest Bevin’s 
“benevolent schemes” were to come to a ruinous and “tragic” end.977
  
Writing in ever graver tones, Shepherd warned of a growing “feeling of tension” and increasingly “violent 
attacks on oil companies and on Great Britain.”978 These statements reported a growing zeal for measures 
previously deemed impossible. While the British viewed the Supplemental Agreement as a means of 
preserving the status quo of informal empire, Iran’s political class had become revolutionary. Razmara’s 
inability to keep control of the Majlis was assured on 26 December when he collected just forty-five 
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signatures for a bill authorising continued negotiations with the AIOC, thirty short of the number needed. 
Despite a “spirited defence of [the] Supplemental Agreement...in the face of uproar on the floor of [the] 
House, supported by journalist in [the] gallery”, the Prime Minister was humiliatingly forced to withdraw it, 
raising questions as to his own authority.979 In talks with Shepherd Razmara stated that “it was impossible to 
work with this Majlis”, indicating his loss of parliamentary authority.980 With a palpable sense of tension 
rising he suggested that “his only reasonable course of action was to advise the Shah to dissolve 
Parliament.”981
1951: The Beginning of a Revolution 
Mussadiq: A “Demagogue” or “a Gandhi”?
The language used by the National Front highlights what Mussadiq called the “moral aspect” of oil 
nationalisation and enabled them to dispense with the “economic aspect” of this measure.982 To the National 
Front’s supporters, ownership of Iranian oil, rather than its profitability for the country was the key question. 
For Iran to develop, they argued, the country must have total control over its resources and be free from the 
yoke of informal dominance. There was, quite simply, no room for compromise, but only the clear 
distinction between freedom and oppression. A brief analysis of the terms of the Supplemental Agreement 
demonstrates its potential benefits for the Iranian economy. Under the terms of the 1933 Concession Iran 
received little over £9 million in 1948 and approximately £13.5 million in 1949.983 However, under the 
Supplemental Agreement these figures would have been £18.7 and £22.9 million respectively.984 If Britain 
were to suspend dividend limitation completely or if new oil sources were uncovered, there was potential for 
these figures to increase greatly. Indeed, the American Embassy, Tehran predicted that even with the ongoing 
disorder in Iran, total royalties for 1950 would top £26.4 million if the Supplemental Agreement was 
ratified.985 
Iran also lacked the capacities needed to run the oil industry. In a meeting with Shepherd the Shah revealed 
his concern that if nationalisation went ahead Iran would not be able to “organise the export of oil.”986 
Continuing, he stressed that “they had not the experience and technical ability either to extract and refine the 
oil or to organise, for instance, a large fleet of tankers...it was therefore incumbent on the Parliament to take a 
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reasonable attitude towards the oil question.”987 The Shah’s outlook mirrored Assistant Head of the Eastern 
Department Lancelot F. L. Pyman’s suggestion that “almost no Persian seriously claims that Persia could 
manage the oil industry without foreign help.”988 However, while Pyman felt that “these sentiments result in 
a permanent feeling of resentment towards the concessionary company and the British Government”, the 
National Front’s supporters were adamant that the short-term economic consequences of nationalisation were 
greatly outweighed by the long-term benefits of sovereignty and self-determination.989 
Henry Grady recognised this phenomenon and the strength of Mussadiq’s allure. He had, the Ambassador 
wrote, become “to the Iranian people a Gandhi. They feel he is fighting for their independence from British 
domination and they will make any sacrifice to support him.”990 The first British analysis of Mussadiq’s 
philosophy, written by Pyman in November 1950, drew quite different conclusions, suggesting that the 
National Front’s position was driven mainly by envy: “It is so intensely irritating to Persian national pride 
that the country should have to depend on foreigners for the development of its most important national 
resource and that the only large-scale, efficient and humanely-run industry in the country should be foreign-
controlled.”991 This note misread Iranian antipathy and negated any British responsibility for the breakdown 
of Anglo-Iranian relations. Additionally, Pyman’s focus on Iran’s “inferiority complex” did little to promote 
constructive negotiation, but instead fed into preexisting orientalism.992
To the AIOC’s directors, and particularly chairman Sir William Fraser, the National Front’s attitude was 
impossible to understand. Foreign Office officials suggested that Fraser appeared “to have all the contempt 
of a Glasgow accountant for anything which cannot be shown on a balance sheet.”993 Hyam argues that 
Fraser’s “dour, ungentlemanly” approach meant that he “never won the confidence of ministers or civil 
servants” for whom he had a “fire-eating contempt.”994 This soured relations between company and 
government, hindering communication and the formation of viable policies. To his contemporaries, Fraser’s 
image was little better. A “Scotsman to his fingertips”, he was described by The Times as an “obstinate, 
narrow old skinflint.”995 To Fraser the terms of the Supplemental Agreement were not only a fair 
compromise, but even generous, given that it would assure Iran’s financial stability for the foreseeable 
future. 
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Mussadiq’s highly personal and emotional approach was also misunderstood by the British media and 
political establishment. While The Times suggested “he weeps with sincere emotion at the spectacle of his 
own patriotism, which is as genuine as it is hysterical, and if ardent love could make Persia strong and 
prosperous without the help of knowledge, sagacity or diligence, Dr. Mussadiq would be an ideal Prime 
Minister”, Anthony Eden referred to him as “the first real bit of meat to come the way of the cartoonists 
since the war.”996 Mussadiq was well known for his eccentric behaviour, frequently greeting guests dressed 
only in a pair of silk pajamas, and was keenly aware of the power of theatricality in politics. During 
speeches, whether in public or the Majlis, he would sob, groan in pain and even faint, metaphorically 
flagellating himself as he collapsed to the ground. Such tendencies saw him referred to as a “lunatic”, “a 
demagogue” and “a windbag” in London, while Shepherd identified him as “cunning and slippery.”997 
Seeing the positives in these attributes, Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested that he was “a great actor 
and a great gambler” whose emotional contortionism masked deeply held beliefs nurtured over a long 
political career.998 Mussadiq’s theatricality also provided a mask for Machiavellian tendencies. Responding 
to the threats of violence, which hung over almost every aspect of Iranian politics, and with direct reference 
to the Prime Minister he publicly stated “As God is my witness - even if they kill me, tear me to shreds - I 
won’t submit to this sort of person...I will strike and I will be killed! If you are a soldier, I am more of a 
soldier. I’ll kill you right here! I’ll shed blood!”999 These claims were given greater resonance when 
Ayatollah Kashani, a firebrand cleric with links to fundamentalist Islamist groups, such as Feda’iyan-i-Islam 
(Warriors of Islam), issued a fatwa calling “all sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the 
enemies of Islam and Iran by joining the nationalisation struggle” and proclaimed that Prime Minister 
Razmara’s pen should be snapped, a metaphor for his execution.1000 
Razmara Falters
Razmara’s inability to muster support for continuing discussions with the AIOC placed him in an untenable 
position. On January 11, in the clearest demonstration of his waning power, the Majlis passed a motion 
rejecting the Supplemental Agreement and instructed the oil committee to make recommendations on how to 
proceed within two months.1001 Seemingly, the only options available to the Prime Minister were to request 
that the Shah dissolve Parliament, and hope that he could rely on the support of the military and the Royal 
Court, or surrender his position to the increasingly vociferous National Front. Although the former was 
unpalatable and perhaps even dangerous, the latter was, to a man of honour, simply incomprehensible. In a 
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clearly diminished position, Razmara boldly vowed to continue as Prime Minister, promising that “after my 
death the people of Iran will put up my statue!”1002
Despite their previously obstinate stance, by the end of 1950 AIOC officials were showing some signs to 
suggest that they recognised the need to broker a more pliant concession. That this was the result of 
nationalist pressure seems unlikely. Rather, as Geoffrey Furlonge, head of the Eastern Department, suggests 
the “harm which Aramco could do” had been noted and the company, fearful of the Americans “poaching on 
our private reserves”, now needed to respond.1003 Ambassador Shepherd also appears to have finally realised 
the threat facing Britain. On December 7 he responded to George McGhee’s accusation that the “Persians 
had been for some years...been getting rather a raw deal” by admonishing the lack of American “sympathy” 
shown towards the British government, which had “in fact done what they could to secure that the AIOC 
should not adopt too rigid an attitude.”1004 However, following the withdrawal of the Supplemental 
Agreement from the Majlis, he admitted that the time for “palliatives” was over and that that an “imaginative 
solution” was needed, along with “pressure brought on the company...at the highest level.”1005 He reinforced 
this call on January 10, asking Foreign Office officials to “exert such pressure, as may seem called for” to 
bring the AIOC into line.1006 Bevin, in an increasingly rare comment, acknowledged that the situation in Iran 
was getting out of hand and suggested that there was “dynamite” in the cacophony of demands for 
nationalisation.1007
An interdepartmental meeting between the Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry and Fuel of Power, the first 
of its kind, was convened on 13 January, 1951, where it was decided that “there might be advantage[s]” to 
pushing the company towards greater flexibility, as the question of Iranian oil could no longer be “treated on 
a basis of finance or normal commercial practice.”1008 Foreign Office petroleum specialist, E. A. Berthoud 
crystalised the new, more robust approach to the AIOC by suggesting that the company could be forcibly 
divided into two companies: one to manage Iranian oil and one to manage all other interests.1009 The former 
could then distribute half of its profits to the Iranian government along similar lines to those established in 
Saudi Arabia by Aramco and include representatives of the Iranian government on its board of directors.1010
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Even as British policymakers woke up to their predicament, conditions in Iran continued to deteriorate. 
Razmara, hoping to claw back some control in the Majlis, proposed that a commission be formed to draw up 
a new Supplemental Agreement that could then be put before the AIOC. Unsurprisingly, Mussadiq and his 
supporters shouted down this suggestion immediately, adding to the sense that Razmara was very much 
alone in his quest to continue negotiations with the British.1011 The original oil committee then met on 19 
February, a meeting that Mussadiq used to call for the nationalisation of all AIOC assets in Iran.1012 Fearing 
that publicly opposing this measure would be political suicide, Razmara countered with a compromised 
formula that, while not ruling out nationalisation “as a long term solution”, requested that the committee 
enter into discussions on the basis of an equitable division of profits and warned that premature 
nationalisation could be economically ruinous.1013 This suggestion followed private discussions with AIOC 
representative Ernest Northcroft and the Shah in which the company not only agreed to a fifty-fifty division 
of profits, but also offered the Iranian government an immediate £5 million advance, followed by ten 
monthly payments of £2 million, to ease ongoing fiscal constraints.1014 Mussadiq, however, was unequivocal 
and cooly contended that “the moral aspect of oil nationalization [sic] is more important than its economic 
aspect.”1015 His message was incredibly simple, but entirely ignored by the British.
For a generation of civil servants raised on stories of imperial glory, the notion of British property in an 
underdeveloped nation likes Iran being nationalised seemed like the stuff of fantasy. Mostafa Elm uses a 
letter sent from Mostafa Fateh, AIOC’s assistant general manager and one of the highest ranking Iranians at 
the Abadan refinery, to director E. H. O. Elkington and the Foreign Office on January 27, 1951 as evidence 
of Britain’s inability to understand the situation they faced. In his letter, which ran to some twenty-three 
pages, Fateh urged the AIOC’s management to show a “breadth of vision, tolerance for other people’s views 
and clear thinking to avoid disaster.” He also called on the company to understand the “awakening 
nationalism and political consciousness of the people of Asia” and warned against pursuing a “Curzonian 
policy” that would allow “leech-like bureaucracies to rule.”1016 The themes discussed by Fateh bear clear 
resemblance to those analysed by Colonial Office officials during the 1947 Summer Conference on African 
Administration and Andrew Cohen’s suggestion that nationalism could be directed into “useful channels.”1017 
However, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Foreign Office opted to dismiss the comments out of hand, noting only 
that “Fateh is not to be trusted.”1018 The AIOC’s response was similarly derisory, they chose to ignore the 
letter completely.
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Publicly the British government remained steadfast in their commitment to negotiating a new Supplemental 
Agreement, a point made clear in the House of Commons by Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, Ernest Davies on 21 February.1019 It seems that Britain’s leaders were simply unable to conceive of 
their power slipping away and of the system they grew up with and trusted crumbling to dust. In the words of 
British historian Corelli Barnett “political leaders and the governing Establishment, conditioned as they had 
been from the Edwardian childhoods to take it for granted that Britain stood in the first rank of nation states, 
simply could not accept that British power had vanished amidst the stupendous events of the Second World 
War, and that the era of imperial greatness....had now ineluctably closed...They were resolved to restore and 
perpetuate Britain’s traditional world role.”1020 Their unwillingness to accept the changing face of Iranian 
politics and determination to cling onto the attitudes of the past was undoubtedly their greatest failure. 
This tendency to dwell on the past was not helped by the lack of leadership within the Foreign Office. Since 
falling ill in June 1950, Bevin had proven unable to dictate foreign policy in the manner with which he had 
previously accomplished. Having grown reliant on the Foreign Secretary and without an overarching vision, 
British policy in the Middle East and elsewhere became rudderless and lacking in any sense of direction. 
This wasn’t helped by Bevin’s poor health, which by February 1951 had deteriorated so much that Younger 
privately recorded: “he cannot possibly do a full day’s work...He looks and sounds weak...Whatever he may 
have been when he was a fit man, he is a pretty pathetic old wreck now.”1021 The leadership void was 
exacerbated when, despite protests from Grady, Sir William Fraser and Michael Wright of the Foreign 
Office, both elected to take one month vacations in January, decisions the Ambassador referred to as “typical 
of the manner in which this vital question has been handled by the Foreign Office and the top officials of the 
AIOC.”1022 Even as one of Britain’s most vital assets teetered on the edge of disaster neither the Foreign 
Office or the AIOC seemed willing or able to take control of the situation. To the United States this was 
simply remarkable and a further indication of the need for stronger action on their part. As James A. Bill 
notes, Mussadiq was a “magnificent negativist in that he had the courage to challenge, but lacked the 
capacity to construct.”1023 By aligning himself so closely with militant tendencies, Mussadiq had created a 
zero sum game in which compromise through drawn out negotiations would be difficult. Grady was well 
aware of this and, fearing that Iran could plunge into civil unrest, called on Acheson to force London towards 
a “parallel policy” with the United States.1024
In Iran details of the secret discussions between Razmara, the Shah and the AIOC were released, sparking 
rumours that the Prime Minister was in thrall to the AIOC and acting under the influence of coercion and 
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bribery.1025 On 3 March, in a meeting with the oil committee, he spoke at length about Iran’s inability to 
manage its own oil industry, drawing upon expert testimony from a range of domestic advisors. 
Subsequently, he told a press conference that those in favour of nationalisation were behaving irrationally 
and risked both the country’s financial future and general stability.1026 Mussadiq’s retort came in the form of 
a manifesto personally attacking the Prime Minister as a British stooge and suggesting that the evidence had 
been doctored to discredit the case for nationalisation. Tensions reached a crescendo on March 7 when 
Razmara was shot three times while visiting a Tehran mosque.1027 His assassin, Khalil Tahmassebi, was a 
member of Fida’iyan-i-Islam and had links, not only to Ayatollah Kashani, but allegedly to Mussadiq 
himself. Drawing from Iranian sources Christopher de Bellaigue suggests that there is “strong evidence that 
Mussadiq had prior knowledge” of the assassination and that the leader of Fida’iyan-i-Islam had discussed 
the matter not only with Kashani, but National Front leaders and allies of Mussadiq including Hossein 
Makki.1028 Although Mussadiq never acknowledged his involved in the plot his reaction to it was certainly 
cool: upon being informed that the Prime Minister had been killed he responded “well, he shouldn’t have 
made that speech” before returning to his work.1029 Kashani’s reaction was even less ambivalent and he 
referred to the assassination as a “brilliant stroke of great courage and virtue” before suggesting that “other 
traitors” should be “similarly struck down.”1030
Razmara’s assassination marked the end of one of the most tumultuous reigns of any Iranian Prime Minister. 
Blighted by international tension and local unrest his time in office had proven fruitless. Not only had the 
Supplemental Agreement collapsed, but nationalism had swelled. His death was also something of a 
watershed and demonstrated the end of Britain’s informal power in Iran. London had backed Razmara and 
saw him as the strongman needed to force the Supplemental Agreement through the Majlis. As the Prime 
Minister became isolated British prestige fell and by the time of his death was at a nadir. Not only did they 
lack any viable support in the Majlis, but they were roundly despised by the public. Little work had been 
done to engage with the Iranian people or to offer them a stake in deciding their country’s economic future. 
When coupled with the AIOC’s rapacious image, it is not difficult to see why the British were so hated. 
That the AIOC, a nominally private enterprise, bore such great responsibility for representing British 
interests in a nation with key strategic assets demonstrated a lack of forward planning or recognition the 
Iranian nationalism could become a destabilising force. The company was clearly unwilling to reach a 
compromised solution and Whitehall failed to push them to a more conciliatory position. Had a firmer hand 
been taken to reign in the AIOC’s work excesses, while also extending an olive branch of cooperation to the 
Iranian people at an early stage in the crisis, it is possible that the outcome may have been quite different.
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
175
1025 Heiss, Empire and Nationhood, 50-51.
1026 British Embassy, Tehran to Foreign Office, 4 March 1951, FO 371/91523 NA.
1027 Berry Memorandum, 14 March 1951, FRUS, 1952 -1954, Vol. IX The Near and Middle East Pt. I, 9.
1028 De Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, 151.
1029 Ibid.
1030 Heiss, Empire and Nationhood, 53.
Britain’s lowly position was compounded by Mohammed Mussadiq’s nationwide popularity and, having 
become a titan of Iranian nationalism, he seemed the most obvious candidate to become Prime Minister. 
After six years in office the Labour government looked tired and short of ideas. Previously reliant on their 
ally to provide security and stability in Iran, the United States now cast weary eyes towards London, raising 
questions as to whether Washington would begin to take a more active role. Indeed, following Razmara’s 
assassination Ambassador Grady warned that “the implications are too serious for us to remain aloof any 
longer” and requested formal intervention from the Secretary of State.1031 The next six weeks would 
underline the extent of Britain’s relative decline and illustrate that the old-order of informal control in Iran 
was truly at an end.
Nationalisation, March - April 1951
The gap between the National Front and the British rested mainly on their disparate perceptions of what the 
Supplemental Agreement represented. To the British, it was purely a business transaction, a monetary 
exchange that would ensure that the Iranian government had a source of income and the AIOC a plentiful 
supply of oil. However, to Mussadiq, his cohorts and a large percentage of the Iranian people, control over 
oil went far beyond this with nationalisation serving as a means of securing “the rights of the Iranian 
people.”1032 In simple terms, the informal empire constructed through the 1901 D’Arcy Concession and 
maintained by the 1933 Concession was incompatible with the wave of nationalism sweeping through Iran. 
While American policymakers had long recognised the desire amongst the Iranian people to determine the 
destiny of their oil, the British had not and were now in a jeopardised position.
Razmara had no designated successor and, despite Mussadiq’s popularity, the Shah appointed Hossein Ala, a 
close ally of the Royal Court, as Prime Minister. Ala, like his predecessor, had little authority over the 
National Front in the Majlis and was unable to prevent them from legislating, even as he resisted the motions 
they submitted. On March 9, the oil committee, under pressure from National Front supporters unanimously 
agreed to a plan for the nationalisation of all AIOC assets held in Iran. The unanimous support for unilateral 
nationalisation greatly diminished the company’s bargaining position and destroyed the British strategy of 
drawing out negotiations until a favourable compromise could be reached.
Ambassador Grady referred to this nationalisation a “most serious” development, and blamed Britain’s 
failure to adopt a “statesmanlike approach” to the oil question for the unruly scenes in the Majlis.1033 His 
condemnation was reinforced by Acheson, who refused to castigate the Iranian government’s action, but 
instead underlined the United States’ recognition of the “rights of sovereign states to nationalise”, provided 
they offer “just compensation.”1034 The Secretary of State’s approach was clearly designed to achieve two 
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goals. First, it would assuage Iranian fears that the United States planned to intervene on London’s behalf, 
action which would potentially force Mussadiq into alignment with Moscow. Second, it would make clear to 
Britain that they needed a complete rethink of their policy in Iran. The latter point was made clear by 
Acheson’s comments that the British needed a “skillful, fresh” approach to their relations with Iran.1035 
However, although the Secretary of State was concerned about the geopolitical implications of 
nationalisation, he remained unwilling to usurp Britain’s position in Iran. He not only recognised the “great 
importance [of] Iran[ian] oil to [the] UK”, but also insisted that American oil companies would not be 
allowed to intervene there until the situation was resolved.1036 Historian John T. McNay is extremely critical 
of, what he considers to be, the Secretary of State’s lenient position towards Britain, suggesting that 
Acheson’s “Ulster heritage” and “nostalgic romance with empire” coloured his relations with London and 
made him over sympathetic to British interests.1037 He was, according to McNay, the “British accent in 
American foreign policy.”1038 In Iran, however, this was not the case. Rather, Acheson’s recognition of Iran’s 
importance to Britain and blanket refusal to consider American firms intervening there appears to be an 
extension of Washington’s policy of utilising British assets to achieve their own goals. The Secretary of State 
maintained hope that a new Anglo-Iranian settlement was possible, thereby rendering expensive and possible 
dangerous intervention from the United States unnecessary.  
However, Acheson’s hopes were dashed by the British government’s failure to recognise their diminished 
position in Iran. On 9 March, Ernest Bevin succumbed to ill-health and stood down as Foreign Secretary. It 
might be expected that his successor would revitalise policy and inject new vigour into the department, 
however, his replacement Herbert Morrison immediately took up a belligerent position based on “baring 
[the] lion’s teeth” and exercising military strength to force a settlement.1039 According to Younger, he 
“hankered after strong-arm methods”, but failed to recognise that “they couldn’t be adopted” in a country 
where Britain’s influence had been imposed by informal actors.1040 Perhaps more damagingly, the Under-
Secretary accused Morrison of being “probably more ignorant of foreign affairs than any other member of 
the cabinet....basically he is a little Englander who suspects everyone who is foreign.”1041 At a time when 
British foreign policy needed leadership, new ideas and an ability to engage with the Iranians, Morrison 
failed to deliver and appears, with the benefit of hindsight, to have been a poor replacement for Bevin.  
In the United States’ strongest action to date, George McGhee was dispatched to Tehran on March 17, for 
talks with Ambassadors Shepherd and Grady, Prime Minister Ala, the Shah and the AIOC leadership. Upon 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
177
1035 Ibid., 26.
1036 Ibid., 25; Statement of the United States Position on Iranian Oil Situation, 18 March 1951, Dean Acheson Papers Box 77, HSTL.
1037 McNay, Acheson and Empire, 9.
1038 Ibid.
1039 Heiss, Empire and Nationhood, 56.
1040 Warner, Midst of Events, 75.
1041 Ibid., 69.
meeting with British Embassy staff, McGhee made the American position plain, the company had “been too 
rigid and too slow to recognise that a new situation had been created in Iran which required a new approach. 
Despite the fact that the British government owned a controlling interest in AIOC, it had allowed Fraser to 
dictate its policy about oil in Iran. We provided more guidance to our companies even though they were 
privately owned.”1042 The negotiations came to little, and McGhee suggested that “the specter of death and 
impending chaos” hung over Tehran “like a dark cloud”, rendering fresh action impossible.1043 
Despite McGhee’s claims to the contrary, the Foreign Office was adamant that the National Front had “no 
solid grievances to feed on” and rejected American efforts to mediate a constructive settlement with Iran to 
provide “some flavour or facade of nationalisation.”1044 On his return to Washington from Tehran, McGhee 
stopped in London for emergency talks with Morrison, during which he made clear that as long as the crisis 
in Iran remained unresolved, the security of the Middle East was at risk.1045 The Foreign Secretary bullishly 
shook off McGhee’s attempts to lean on him and condescendingly referred to Britain’s “long experience of 
the Middle East” before stating that London’s sole focus was to “take care to protect their essential oil 
supply.”1046 A similar stance was taken by Sir William Fraser who refused all American advice because it had 
been determined “on the basis of wrong information” and failed to recognise the “dubious practicality” of 
cooperation with the Iranians.1047
To officials in the State Department, Britain’s unshakeable attitude was baffling. McGhee noted that the 
Foreign Office continued to take “too optimistic [a] view of the situation” and failed to understand that any 
proposals derived from the abortive Supplemental Agreement “would have no chance of success.”1048 In late 
April, during talks with British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, the Under-Secretary of State 
made his frustrations clear, stating that the British government was letting the AIOC’s economic position 
“take precedence over the more important question of keeping Iran free and independent.”1049 While he 
insisted that the State Department was “anxious to help”, he warned that Britain’s continued insistence on 
using “financial or other pressures” to force the Iranians into an agreement made it difficult to do so.1050
An alternative policy to that being pursued by the Foreign Office was offered by Franks himself. In 
discussions with Paul Nitze and Acheson on 27 April, the Ambassador raised the question of working to 
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separate the “various elements which appeared to comprise the nationalist movement” by engaging in 
discussions with the individual groups which made up the National Front.1051 Franks believed that Mussadiq 
was at heart a pragmatist who could be made to recognise the danger of alignment with religious zealots and 
work towards a constructive settlement. He also hoped that these discussions could help to provoke splits 
within the Front, weakening their resolve and making a negotiated settlement more likely. 
Franks’ suggestion was something of a departure from Britain’s usual policy towards Iran and would 
encourage much needed engagement and mediation. However, it was rejected offhand by Acheson as a risk 
to Iran’s internal stability. He felt that the “Persians might be crazy enough” to risk their long-term economic 
security to guarantee the removal of all foreign influences and that a divisive policy could exacerbate this 
process.1052 Nitze concurred, suggesting that there was “a real psychological force behind the mutually 
supporting nationalist drives in the religious movement, the university movement and the straight nationalist 
movement.”1053 Forcing a wedge between these disparate groups was likely to lead to an unravelling in 
Iranian society, providing conditions which would allow communism to fester. The residual fear of 
communism making inroads in Iran was persistent.  In February, a hastily compiled telegram from Tehran 
warned of the “real danger of communism”, stressing that the government’s “weakening authority” and 
“POLIT[ical] confusion” was creating conditions favourable to “establishment [of] COMMIE or COMMIE-
dominated regime.”1054 This message illustrates of the underlying impulses that drove American policy in 
Iran. Although Britain faced losing a vital economic asset in the AIOC, this was seen as secondary to 
protecting the nation from communism and maintaining stability. Franks’ suggestion, a last roll of the dice to 
claw back some of Britain’s waining power, was seen as threatening this delicate balance and could thus not 
be taken forward.
Conclusion
On 27 April, as Franks met with Nitze and Acheson, the Majlis oil committee submitted a nine-point 
resolution to the Majlis that would arrange for the nationalisation of the AIOC. Prime Minister Ala was 
constitutionally powerless to block its ratification and Ambassador Grady conceded that it would “probably 
become [the] law of Iran within a few days.”1055 Recognising that he had no authority to continue 
negotiations with the AIOC, Ala resigned as Prime Minister. Despite Shepherd’s protests that London would 
have “no confidence” in his appointment, the Majlis selected Mussadiq as Ala’s successor by seventy-nine to 
twenty-one votes.1056 As a precondition of his acceptance, Mussadiq demanded that the Majlis ratify the 
nine-point resolution for nationalisation immediately. Although Morrison fired a bellicose warning against 
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“unilateral or precipitate action” his threats appeared impotent and, on 1 May, 1951, the Shah signed the new 
law ratifying the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.1057
Dean Acheson would later record that “never had so few lost so much so stupidly and so fast”, a clear 
indictment of a policy the United States saw as hardheaded to the point of being dangerous.1058 In under 
eighteen months Britain had spurned successive opportunities to “graciously” find a new agreement with the 
Iranian government and now found itself in a previously unthinkable position.1059 Virulent nationalism had 
been a force in Iran since the Tudeh inspired riots of 1946 and its specter had loomed large since the National 
Front’s formation in October 1949. However, it was largely ignored by the Attlee government, which 
maintained the illusion that British power in Iran was guaranteed, if only because the Iranians were incapable 
of managing the extraction and refinement of their assets. Throughout 1950 the United States, seeking to 
preserve stability and limit Soviet intrigue in an area of strategic vulnerability, had encouraged the British 
government and the AIOC to adopt a more malleable attitude, an approach that had failed repeatedly. 
While active cooperation was a hallmark of Anglo-American relations in Europe, in the Middle East their 
partnership was less harmonious, indicating that the ‘special relationship’ was one of limitations. Events in 
Iran also demonstrate the restrictions of informal empire. Discord between the AIOC and the British 
government allowed conditions in Iran to deteriorate and made it difficult to establish a clear response to 
emerging nationalism. Adding to this problem was the failure of British officials, both in London and Iran 
itself. Ambassador Shepherd repeatedly failed to recognise the emerging threat to stability there and 
routinely portrayed Iranian nationalism in unduly negative terms. Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin, consumed with events in Europe and in an increasingly poor state of health, failed to adequately 
direct British policy or provide avenues for others to do so. It is telling that even after the collapse of the 
Supplemental Agreement, the most creative solution for how to approach the crisis in Iran came from the Sir 
Oliver Franks, Britain’s Ambassador in Washington, rather than from Whitehall.
With nationalisation now enshrined in Iranian law two key questions remained to be answered: would the 
United States now usurp Britain’s position and become the dominant foreign power in Iran, and would 
Britain be able to salvage any stake in those assets formerly held by the AIOC?
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Chapter V: Conclusion
The Aftermath of Nationalisation, 1951-1953
Even after the AIOC’s nationalisation the misplaced orientalism that had coloured British policy in Iran 
remained entrenched. In a report commenting on Britain’s position, head of the Eastern Department Geoffrey 
Furlonge suggested that Mussadiq’s success, far from being an indication of popular unrest, was the result of 
the efforts of “a small band of extremists” who were culpable for “silencing the voices of reason.”1060 
Convinced that Mussadiq represented a self-interested and opportunistic cabal, the Foreign Office looked to 
convince what it perceived as the minority of “intelligent Persians” that nationalisation was the first stop on a 
road to ruin: an absurdist adventure that would have no positive outcome.1061 In legalistic tones they warned 
that canceling the AIOC’s concession was an impossibility and that its status in any future agreement must 
be guaranteed. In response, Mussadiq, directing his message to Prime Minister Clement Attlee personally, 
argued that nationalisation would enable Iran to end “general poverty and dissatisfaction” and undertake the 
necessary “social reforms” previously refused by the British.1062 It is telling that Mussadiq pointed to the 
issues of social and economic development as examples of London’s shortcomings. The Foreign Office had 
initially hoped that raising living standards in Iran would improve relations between the two nations and 
bring them together in a closer bond. Clearly this policy had failed.
Mussadiq’s cool exchange speaks volumes about the differences between British and Iranian perspectives in 
1951. The former saw control of oil as an economic necessity and a right enshrined in legislation. In simple 
terms, Iranian oil was a British asset that had to be defended. In contrast, the latter identified the AIOC as the 
greatest hinderance to national emancipation, a colonial yoke that permeated all aspects of society and 
needed to be removed at all costs. Mussadiq vocally denounced the validity of the 1933 concession itself, 
arguing that it was an agreement made by an autocratic dictator and lacked the legitimacy of a popular 
mandate. The fundamental disparity between Britain and Iran’s respective outlooks is central to the events 
that preceded and followed nationalisation.
In a bid to reject nationalisation, the AIOC began formal arbitration before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on 8 May 1951. Again the United States looked primarily to preserve stability and act as a mediator 
between the two countries. Rejecting Britain’s central argument that monopolistic control was enshrined in 
law, Ambassador Grady referred to nationalisation as Iran’s “indisputable right” and called for British 
collaboration and malleability in agreeing a fair compensation scheme.1063 The United States had previously 
tried to coerce London towards a more equitable agreement with Iran, but they were now able to employ 
blunter methods. With Britain’s strength in Iran depleted to the point of nonexistence, the USA took control 
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of the situation and the Foreign Office, still lacking clear leadership, was left to bemoan the American 
“practice of twisting the lion’s tail.”1064 
In early July, the ICJ issued a temporary injunction freezing all AIOC assets and demanded a halt in oil 
production. However, the Iranians refused to comply and the Majlis passed a law that anybody found guilty 
of “sabotage or inattention” would be executed.1065 As the oil pumps continued to run, the company’s 
headquarters were ransacked as part of a wider effort to remove all trace of British influence from Iran. 
Abadan was occupied and Mehdi Bazargan, Dean of Engineering at Tehran University, appointed director of 
the state-run Iranian National Oil Company.1066 Scrambling to preserve its position, the British government 
considered Plan Y, armed intervention to size AIOC assets in Iran. Defence Minister Emmanuel Shinwell 
made an impassioned plea for action and argued that if Mussadiq was allowed to proceed “the next thing 
might be an attempt to nationalise the Suez Canal.”1067 To Shinwell, Iran was a domino, which if allowed to 
fall would see the collapse of British power across the Middle East.
The United States’ response to the discussion of armed intervention was swift with Dean Acheson 
dispatching Averell Harriman to Iran to mediate a peaceful settlement. On 4 October the few remaining 
AIOC employees abandoned Abadan, a humiliating climax to six years of turmoil and one that underlined 
Britain’s loss of power in Iran. Just three weeks later, on 25 October, 1951, Winston Churchill returned to 10 
Downing Street as Prime Minister of the new Conservative government. In talks with President Truman, the 
aging Churchill railed against his predecessor’s weakness in Iran, bemoaning that had he been in command 
Mussadiq would have faced a “splutter of musketry” and the AIOC’s interests defended with all Britain’s 
might.1068 Like Bullard, Shepherd and a host of others, he saw the situation through an orientalist lens, 
identifying the Iranians as a weak adversary whose natural cowardice and need for British leadership would 
see them cowed by the mere hint of gunfire. This outlook was, in the words of Dean Acheson, “depressingly 
out of touch with the world of 1951” and yet it persisted, even amongst the last AIOC employees to leave 
Iran.1069 They bemoaned the “indignity of having Iranians ‘push them around’” and suggested that the British 
government was a culpable accessory to their plight.1070
Despite its antipathy towards Britain’s policy, the American government was guarded against the Iranian’s 
taking sole control of their oil supplies. Instead, following the advice of American oil companies including 
Texas Company and Standard Oil of New Jersey, they looked to broker a settlement that would, according to 
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David Painter, “keep in mind the strategic and political consequences of the loss of Iran to the West” while 
guaranteeing a more equitable division of profits.1071 It was hoped that this policy would reduce the risk of 
Tehran aligning itself with Moscow and ensure that the Iranian oil industry continued to operate to a high 
standard.1072 Although the British government was publicly adamant that it would not comprise with 
Mussadiq, it was faced with little other choice given it now lacked any significant presence in Iran. Under 
pressure from Washington, Churchill opened discussions with his Iranian counterpart in the summer of 1952, 
again mediated by the State Department. However, these talks were unsuccessful with the British still 
adamant that Mussadiq’s proposals were “unreasonable and unacceptable.”1073 
With no agreement forthcoming and an embargo preventing the export of oil still in effect, domestic 
economic conditions deteriorated rapidly. By 1953, growing social unrest had prompted new fears of 
communist subversion, leading the newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower to offer his support for 
Operation Ajax: the forcible removal of Mussadiq from power and establishment of the Shah as a 
dictator.1074 Recognising that it would be impossible to return to the pre-1951 status quo, a new consortium 
agreement was brokered in Washington and the Iranian Oil Participants Ltd. (IOP) was founded. The AIOC 
received a forty percent stake in this enterprise with an equal share split between five American firms. 
Meanwhile, Royal Dutch Shell took fourteen percent and the French firm Compagnie Francais de Petroles 
the remaining six percent.1075 Although ownership of Iranian oil remained in the hands of the state-owned 
National Iranian Oil Company, industrial operations were carried out by the foreign firms listed above, 
which then paid royalties to Tehran. These terms were strikingly similar to those made between Aramco and 
the Saudi Arabian government in 1950. 
The toppling of Mussadiq was an unsatisfactory conclusion to a tumultuous period in Iranian modern history. 
Although the hated British no longer dominated the country, national control of oil was again out of reach. 
Worse still, one of the few genuinely popular, successful leaders in Iran’s recent past had been replaced by a 
dictator who, though widely respected by the Iranian people, had little mandate to govern. The political 
turmoil that had developed after the Second World War, from the rise of the Tudeh to the fledgling trade 
union and nascent national movement, had at its core a desire for self-determination. Even if it is not the role 
of the historian to pass judgement on the past, it is difficult to ignore the ramifications of ill-conceived 
British policy towards Iran between 1945 and 1951. While Ernest Bevin had hoped to raise living standards 
and forge a European-style civil society, his approach stymied domestic efforts to create a new political 
settlement. Similarly, the British government’s unwillingness to take on and curb the AIOC’s worst excesses 
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was born out of fiscal necessity and yet, somewhat ironically, saw their control over Iranian oil unravel and 
collapse.
Reflecting on the Collapse of British Power in Iran
In the six years that followed the Second World War, Britain’s position in Iran was reduced to a shadow of its 
former self. In 1945 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed a monopoly over the extraction, refinement 
and distribution of Iran’s vast oil supplies and yet the British government proved unable to safeguard the 
venerable, though informal, influence this offered. Instead, Iranian nationalism had been allowed to develop 
a strength and popular resonance that London had previously deemed impossible. The Foreign Office and the 
British Embassy in Tehran repeatedly failed to recognise this phenomenon and struggled to develop an 
appropriate policy to oppose it.
The first stirrings of nationalist unrest can be seen in the emergence of the Tudeh and the associated trade 
union movement in 1945 and 1946. Both served as vehicles through which the Iranian people could proclaim 
their sense of nationhood. These sentiments were far removed from the insular, traditional forums of power, 
like the Majlis and Royal Court, and manifested themselves most forcefully on the streets and in the bazaars. 
Britain’s reaction to the threat posed by the Tudeh and trade unionism was twofold. First, Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin, a passionate believer in the necessity of organised labour, looked to develop a new, national 
trade union movement that would allow for more formal interchange between employees, employers and the 
state. Second, the British government, in tandem with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, attempted to improve 
the working and living conditions of the Iranians who worked in the oil industry. These policies were 
designed to strengthen Britain’s links with an otherwise peripheral state and increase goodwill towards 
London. 
However well-intentioned these endeavours, they fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Iranian politics 
and society. The British government struggled to recognise that nationalism was central to the Tudeh’s 
support and had deep roots across Iranian society. Meanwhile, orientalism coloured its views of the Iranian 
people and their capabilities. Too often they were characterised as naive and in need of guidance from 
abroad. In turn, the opinions and grievances of the Iranians, no matter how legitimate, were relegated to a 
status of minor importance. As a result, plans for development and reform in Iran were conceived without 
consulting the Iranian people themselves. Meanwhile, the Seven Year Plan devised by the Iranian 
government, in conjunction with the Overseas Consultants Inc., was dismissed out of hand. This markedly 
topdown approach was heavy handed and lacked legitimacy due to limited local support. As Britain’s 
economic position deteriorated, overseas development was sidelined with Chancellor Sir Stafford Cripps 
placing an ever greater emphasis on increasing the immediate returns of Britain’s overseas assets. 
Development in Iran was also hamstrung by a general lack of creativity. In Africa, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones was a dynamic force who helped to implement a radical series of projects 
designed to improve conditions locally while also raising capital for the Exchequer. Creech Jones had 
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dedicated much of his life to understanding and theorising colonial development, but in Iran, and the Middle 
East more generally, no similar figure existed. By 1948, Britain’s policy there appeared rudderless. Colonial 
Office policy was supported by a wide cast of experts, many of whom had dedicated their lives to 
understanding the issues faced by the colonies. Again, such a pool of talent was not present in Iran.
While Ambassador John Le Rougetel was an able servant of the crown and an adept link between London 
and Tehran, he showed no desire to formulate development policy in Iran, but rather became a lone voice of 
concern regarding alienating the Iranians themselves. Bevin, a keen advocate of raising living standards at 
the fringes of empire, also failed to accept this mantle. It is notable that although the Foreign Secretary was 
the driving force behind early reforms in Iran, he quickly became sidelined by events elsewhere and by his 
own failing health. The Foreign Office under his stewardship was overly centralised and the overarching 
problems facing Iran were seldom discussed.
The weaknesses of British policy and leadership in Iran were exposed following the rejection of the Qavam-
Sadtchikov Agreement and the subsequent negotiations as to the terms of the new Supplemental Agreement. 
Throughout the negotiations, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company - tacitly supported by the Treasury - displayed 
levels of obstinacy that belied its status as a nationally owned enterprise. Negotiations between the British 
and Iranian camps were stymied by the condescending attitudes of company officials and the Foreign 
Office’s inability to influence AIOC leaders. Sensing that Britain sought to bully Iran into a settlement and 
concerned that the domestic economic situation was deteriorating, nationalist factions grew in number and 
volatility. The strongest amongst these was Mohammed Mussadiq’s National Front. However, even as unrest 
bubbled beneath the surface, the AIOC and the Treasury refused to offer conciliatory measures.  The Foreign 
Office hoped that General Ali Razmara could tame the nationalists, but, faced with ferocious opposition, was 
unable to achieve this. As deadlock set in, a cycle of mistrust and discord was created, one that the British 
seemed unable to fully comprehend.
As British power in Iran waned, the United States began to take a more active role there. It would be a 
mistake to see this as a piratical move on Washington’s part, rather it fell into a wider pattern of Cold War 
defence. The United States attempted to utilise the British Empire and, where possible, to shape British 
policy to suit its own interests. Within the State Department it was widely believed that communism would 
prosper not through open warfare, but through disorder and dislocation. As such, preserving stability became 
their most important goal. In Iran, British heavy-handedness was seen as a direct threat to this, necessitating 
intervention from the United States.
The Attlee government hoped to resist losing its foothold in Iran, but British action was ponderous, even as 
Iranian nationalism reached fever pitch. It is notable that even as the National Front gained support in the 
Majlis and on the streets, Ambassador Shepherd chose to view it as a political inconvenience, led by “an 
extreme nuisance” in Mussadiq.1076 By the end of 1950, Britain’s position was becoming untenable and 
within four months the AIOC had been nationalised and Mussadiq extolled as a national hero.  There is little 
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evidence to suggest that the British government or the AIOC recognised that this event loomed on the 
horizon. Rather, British policy makers appear to have been blinded by complacency and the misjudged 
notion that the Iranians would be unable to survive and prosper without their guiding hand.
The Limits of Informal Empire and Dangers of Mismanagement
In his 2001 study The United States and Imperialism, Frank Ninkovich argues that empires are built by the 
“effective control of an outside power”, including “the workings of private social forces without overt 
political control.”1077 British power in Iran, largely orchestrated and maintained through the Anglo Iranian 
Oil Company, provides a shining example of this phenomenon of ‘informal empire’. Reflecting on 
imperialism in Africa during the 19th century, John Mackenzie suggests that expansion took place through 
“subimperial” agents, “peripheral Europeans, settlers and ‘men on the spot’ [who] cajoled and eventually 
convinced their mother governments to extend its imperial rule.”1078 However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the AIOC acted in a similar manner. Rather, the company established itself as an independent 
power, detached and free from Whitehall’s guiding hand. Although the economic might carried by the 
company created an informal empire in Iran, its leaders felt little by way of responsibility for managing and 
maintaining it. Instead, their motivations were fixed firmly on maximising profitability.
Successive British governments had been deferential to the company, allowing it to operate freely and to 
dictate its policy towards successive Iranian administrations. In times of stability this arrangement was 
favourable to all parties. When the AIOC was able to freely extract, refine and export Iranian oil the 
Exchequer enjoyed a steady flow of taxes, the Royal Navy received a consistent source of oil and the 
Foreign Office benefitted from a support network in a distant, easy-to-overlook corner of the world. 
However, the challenges posed in the postwar era demonstrated the limitations of managing an empire 
through informal means. Private enterprise may have been useful in the process empire building, but it 
proved a hindrance when managing its decline. The Labour government believed that the AIOC needed not 
only to improve conditions in Iran, but to agree to a more equitable concession with Tehran. In doing so, it 
was hoped that the Anglo-Iranian relationship could be strengthened. Unsurprisingly, the company, focused 
as it was on profitability rather than diplomacy, was obstinate in its refusal. As the pressure of domestic 
nationalism increased the differences between the respective goals and ideals of the AIOC and the British 
government not only grew wider, but increasingly conflicted with one another.
Throughout the postwar period the Labour government found that its goals were aligned with the company’s 
position. In July 1946, Ambassador John Le Rougetel stated that “every effort should be made to improve 
living standards for all categories of workers [in Iran].”1079 The Ambassador’s message mirrored a wider 
impulse within the British government and a desire to improve conditions across the informal and formal 
The Attlee Government and the Collapse of British Power in Iran, 1945-1951
186
1077 Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, 5.
1078 John Mackenzie, The Partition of Africa and European Imperialism, 1880-1900, 39.
1079 Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, ‘General Appreciation/Recommendations,’ 1 July 1946, T 236/220 NA.
empire alike. It was hoped that these efforts would strengthen ties between Britain and its foreign interests 
and improve output, the rationale being, in the words of J. P. Bancroft, that “a worker’s productive power is 
enhanced in direct ratio to an improvement in his social conditions.”1080 Particularly strident in his calls for 
Iranian development was Foreign Secretary Bevin who called on the AIOC to approve the “vigorous 
application” of a “social programme” to include reformed trade unions and improved living conditions.1081 
Bevin, a self-styled titan of the working class and a fervent believer that “if you get men talking 
together....nationalism decreases and occupation and life interest takes its place” failed to recognise the 
difficulties he would have in persuading the AIOC to work to achieve these goals, or how they may conflict 
with an organisation driven by profit, rather than wider strategic imperatives.1082 Blinded by an inability to 
look beyond his own experience, little thought was given over to engaging with the AIOC or devising a 
strategy to which the company would agree. A similar pattern emerged in disagreements over the terms of 
the Supplemental Agreement. While Bevin was ill at ease with the AIOC autonomously undertaking 
negotiations with the Iranian government, Le Rougetel was exacerbated by the AIOC’s bullish approach, one 
that could “only work against us.”1083 The British government and the company were repeatedly divided on 
their preferred tactics in engaging with Iran, but even under pressure from the United States, their most 
important ally and a key financial benefactor, the former still struggled to influence the latter’s approach. 
The AIOC’s lack of malleability was a salient feature of this period. Iran’s perilous economic circumstances, 
which helped to drive nationalism, were well known, yet the company’s leadership resisted efforts to 
alleviate them. In negotiations with both the British and Iranian governments they were hardheaded and 
acted in their own interests, rather than in the spirit of transnational cooperation. The discovery that the 
company was “hawking” itself to investors on Wall Street lends weight to the suggestion that its leadership 
was determined to follow an independent path, despite Whitehall’s fears that “selling out to the Americans” 
could be “interpreted as a sign of British decline” and the Foreign Office’s determined belief that they should 
change course.1084 Underlining their fundamentally divergent positions was the AIOC leadership’s profit-
focused orientation and refusal to view themselves as a cog within Britain’s diplomatic framework. This 
situation supports Nicholas J. White’s assertion that “the thinking of imperial business was generally at odds 
with many of the tenets of postwar imperial policy”, but also that “many business leaders were contemptuous 
of public servants and politicians.”1085 It also helps to illustrate an inherent limitation of informal empire and 
provide evidence to bolster John Darwin’s suggestion that “status, merit honour and success were judged 
very differently” in the diplomatic and commercial spheres.1086 
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However, differing goals alone do not fully explain the dysfunctional relationship between the AIOC and the 
Attlee government. Even as the crisis in Iran intensified, no formal mechanisms for communication were 
established between them and no mutual contingency planning was undertaken. Indeed, while Ernest Bevin 
publicly suggested as early as 1947 that the company had “room for improvement” no substantive action was 
taken to correct this.1087 Ronald Hyam traces the division between government and the AIOC to the latter’s 
chairman, Sir William Fraser, whose “dour [and] ungentlemanly” attitude hindered closer cooperation and 
exposed a sharp rift in what he calls “the myth of gentlemanly capitalism.”1088 Given the company’s 
importance to Whitehall, as both a source of income and representation of power, more should have been 
done to improve communication and, where possible, to mitigate their respective differences. 
In the United States the dispute between the AIOC and the British government was viewed not only as petty, 
but also as potentially dangerous. Within the State Department it was believed that a “favourable AIOC 
settlement” was an “important Cold War measure” and one that the Labour government could do more to 
achieve.1089 In the words of President Truman, the AIOC behaved like a “typical nineteenth century colonial 
exploiter” and required more robust instruction from Whitehall.1090 Given this perspective, it is little surprise 
that in the wake of the company’s nationalisation Dean Acheson recorded that “never had so few lost so 
much so stupidly and so fast.”1091 This was a damning charge against the British government and AIOC alike 
and an indication of the frustration the Americans felt towards their ally. 
The fundamental disunity between the AIOC and the British government was undoubtedly a key ingredient 
in undermining British power in Iran. However, Britain’s position there was also undone by the more general 
issue of mismanagement, particularly on the part of the Foreign Office and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. 
Although popularly remembered as a leading architect in Europe’s postwar recovery, Bevin’s tenure had a 
number of weaknesses, not least his Iranian policy: a blend of social and economic reforms, which were 
designed to strengthen ties between London and Tehran, but hinged on maintaining the AIOC’s cooperation. 
As William Roger Louis makes clear, Bevin’s strategy was part of a wider effort to preserve Britain’s 
“paramount position” in the Middle East, but, given the disunity between government and company outlined 
above and Bevin’s own personal limitations, questions must be asked as to its appropriateness.1092 According 
to British diplomat Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Bevin “could only look at events through the spectacles of his own 
experience” and as a result failed to recognise the likelihood of resistance to his programme of trade union 
reform and other measures that could be perceived as paternalistic.1093 Although Bevin’s general approach 
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has won praise from Kenneth O. Morgan, for whom it was “a calculated, long-term policy based on more 
equal partnership” others are less charitable.1094 Pete Weiler, for example, notes that Bevin “wrongly 
assumed that the countries of the Middle East would understand that they needed British guidance”, creating 
a schism between British administrators and local populations.1095 Relations were not helped by popular 
perceptions of British mismanagement. Iran’s perilous economic position, for example, was widely blamed 
on the British and, whether achieved through incompetence or malice, helps to bolster Fieldhouse’s 
suggestion that “economic mismanagement...was so continuously bad as to strain belief.”1096 
Bevin also suffered from a tendency to involve himself in every aspect of his department’s life and 
micromanage those who worked under him, rather than establishing a vision or framework within which they 
could operate. This was clear not only when devising trade union policy, but also in more general 
development efforts and during the Azerbaijan Crisis. While this is not negative in and of itself, the Foreign 
Office became excessively centralised and too dependent on his instruction. As Morgan notes, “Bevin was a 
dominant, transcendent, creative force…he was the personal originator of foreign policy in the style of 
Canning, Palmerston and Salisbury….Bevin’s policy was not invented by a phantom army of Sargents, 
Warners, Furlonges and Troutbecks…Bevin’s foreign policy was vividly his own.”1097
From 1947 onwards, however, the Foreign Secretary became increasingly focused on issues in Europe and, 
coupled with his deteriorating health, struggled to direct policy in Iran. Contemporaries reported that as the 
crisis in Iran reached its nadir Bevin was “only half-alive” and “a shadow of his former self” as ill health 
rendered him bed bound. However, thanks to “his stupendous egotism” Bevin refused to leave his post.1098 
Debilitated, he was no longer able to craft overseas strategy and with no alternative figurehead available to 
take the reins, British policy in Iran stuttered ignominiously. 
According to Anthony Adamthwaite the department was undone, in part, by “close knit” insularity and a 
tendency of the Foreign Secretary to surround himself with advisors who, while often immensely talented, 
were only listened to when their ideas matched his own train of thought.1099 It is notable that Britain’s 
development plans in Iran failed to move beyond trade union reform and even this project, one in which 
Bevin had initially taken a personal interest, was marred by difficulties from the outset. It seems that while 
development was a desired goal in the most abstract terms, there was little by way of substantive planning as 
to how it would be achieved. 
A further example of Britain’s inability to establish a clear strategy towards Iran can also be seen in the wake 
of General Ali Razmara’s ascent to Iran’s premiership. Although Foreign Office officials noted, in a cable to 
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British Ambassador in Washington Sir Oliver Franks, that Razmara’s appointment was “likely to result in a 
postponement....of the ratification of the Supplementary Oil Agreement” no analysis was undertaken as to 
the impact this would have on Iranian nationalism, a phenomenon previously deemed by Le Rougetel to be 
directly related to delays in the Supplemental Agreement.1100 It is notable that while Razmara was held up as 
“the best chance of securing the measure of resolution and efficiency required” to govern Iran successfully, 
little analysis of his character, or that of other leading figures in Iranian politics took place.
Inconsistent with his sharp analysis of the critical situation in Europe, Bevin failed to recognise the threat to 
British power in Iran. He keenly understood that Iran was “one of our most important strategic interests”, 
listing it alongside Germany, Palestine and Australasia in terms of importance, and yet he failed to enshrine 
this outlook in policy, negating even to establish a Cabinet committee on foreign affairs.1101 British 
paramountcy in Iran was assumed to be a permanent state, impervious to opposition. In part this 
complacency was driven by what P. S. Gupta terms the Foreign Office’s “Victorian racial-cultural 
typology.”1102 Corelli Barnett’s suggestion that the Foreign Secretary and his department were in thrall to the 
“imperial myth” of indefatigable British power overseas is particularly pertinent when explaining the course 
of events in Iran and Britain’s inability to recognise the limitations of their power.1103
Orientalism and the Collapse of British Power
Orientalism was deeply pervasive. Commenting on Soviet advances in Azerbaijan, the British Military 
Attache’s December 1945 report plainly stated: “Persia...is not renowned for that dogged brand of courage 
which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances” and stressed that London’s intervention was 
therefore required.1104 These views were reinforced by Ambassador Reader Bullard, who argued that the 
Iranians were inherently “selfish and slothful” and “undisciplined, incapable of unity, and without a 
plan.”1105
Similar views were shared by the AIOC’s leadership, colouring their interactions with the Iranian 
government. Neville Gass’ suggestion that official Iranian delegates lacked “properly organised procedure” 
and therefore could not enter into discussions as to the terms of the Supplemental Agreement is one example 
of this.1106 Gass’ comments were unfounded, but indicate an overarching belief that representatives of the 
Iranian government lacked legitimacy and were incapable of meeting arbitrary, though undefined, standards 
set out by the British. Even as Ambassador John Le Rougetel attempted to offer a more thoughtful analysis 
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of the challenges facing Britain in Iran, his efforts were repeatedly undermined by the company’s 
representatives. Ruefully, Michael Wright of the Foreign Office noted that “the company’s operations and 
policy are not in any way controlled by His Majesty’s Government”, again demonstrating the challenges 
posed by managing an empire through informal means.1107 
Perhaps most damaging was the collective failure of both the British government and AIOC to recognise the 
emerging strength of Mohammad Mussadiq. In a nation dominated by a small, interconnected political class 
it is quite remarkable that his ascent went almost uncharted. Although mentioned briefly in John Le 
Rougetel’s June 1947 ‘Persian Personalities Report’, the first in-depth analysis of Mussadiq’s political 
outlook, goals and character did not come until November 1950, a matter of months before the AIOC was 
nationalised, and was highly subjective, depicting Mussadiq as driven largely by envy and pettiness.1108 
However, by this stage he had established the National Front as a force on the streets and in the Majlis, led 
the occupation of the Royal Palace, come to dominate the Majlis’ oil committee and united otherwise 
disparate strands of Iranian nationalism. By any measure he was a totemic figure, yet the British chose to see 
him as a crank or ignore him entirely. Reflecting on their action, de Bellaigue accurately proposes that “the 
British regarded Iranian nationalism as political froth, generated by unscrupulous politicians and easily dealt 
with.”1109
David Cannadine suggests that for those who ran it, the British Empire represented “the highest stage of 
hierarchy”, underpinned by racial and cultural classifications.1110 Although Iran was an informal part of the 
empire, this mindset remained omnipresent, supporting Robert McMahon’s suggestion that the “discourses 
of domination and subordination...can be just as pervasive and revealing in informal as in formal zones of 
control.”1111 Cannadine suggests that “[racial] hierarchy offered a cogent and appealing vision of imperial 
society and also, therefore, of imperial purpose.”1112 This outlook was clear in Iran: political unrest was 
dismissed as ephemeral and domestic led development shrugged off as impossible. British orientalism was 
particularly acute in descriptions of Mussadiq. His eccentricities, for example, were seized upon as examples 
of his madness, he was a “windbag”, a “lunatic” and “a demagogue”, but at no point was he seen as a 
substantive leader or as a real threat to Britain’s power.1113 In dismissing him offhand, the British 
government and AIOC alike revealed both their sense of infallibility and collective failure to understand 
Iranian politics or the Iranian people.
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1110 Cannadine, 128.
1111 Robert J. McMahon, ‘Cultures of Empire,’ The Journal of American History 88, No. 3 (Feb, 2013), 888
1112 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 128.
1113 Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, ‘Persia Personalities Report,’ 18 June 1947, FO 371/62035 NA.
Although poor leadership from the Foreign Office and the AIOC was partly to blame for this failure, the 
burden of culpability also falls on the British Embassy, Tehran and Ambassadors Reader Bullard and Sir 
Francis Shepherd in particular. The former’s preferred policy towards Iran would have seen the country 
divided in two and enabled the de facto creation of a Soviet client state, despite fierce, consistent opposition 
from across Iran. These seeds of protest were ignored by Bullard. During his tenure the Tudeh were analysed 
in little detail, despite their burgeoning membership and success in mobilising generally apolitical groups of 
workers. Upon his arrival in Tehran, Bullard’s successor, John Le Rougetel, went as far as to call them “the 
only coherent political force in the country.”1114 Their emergence did not take place in a vacuum, yet formal 
reports of their growth were extremely limited and without understanding the situation on the ground it was 
difficult for officials in Whitehall to respond adequately.
The quality and depth of reporting from Tehran to London improved following Le Rougetel’s arrival. Unlike 
his predecessor, Le Rougetel’s messages were detail oriented and focused on providing the information to 
support wider British goals. He recognised the growing zeal for Iranian development, linking inequality and 
material standards of living to achieving political stability.1115 Perceptively, he recognised the effect of the 
British on the fortunes of Iran’s economy.1116 On reflection this relationship seems obvious, especially given 
Iran’s existence within the informal empire. However, it was rarely appreciated, despite the Foreign Office’s 
focus on improving living standards in the wake of the Tudeh threat. Importantly, Le Rougetel acknowledged 
the limitations of informal rule, identifying the AIOC as “too big for their boots” and adopting policies that 
were detrimental to wider British strategy.1117 This was a key departure from what had gone before and again 
points to the fundamental weakness of informal empire: a reliance on private bodies acting in a manner 
favourable to the government. 
The positive aspects of Le Rougetel’s time in Iran did not continue under his replacement Sir Francis 
Shepherd. Like Bullard before him, Shepherd had a markedly poor command of Iran politics and a tendency 
to rely on preconceived notions as to, what he termed, “the oriental character.”1118 His appointment is 
perhaps surprising, given that he had no prior experience of the Middle East. Similarly, Bevin’s description 
of the post as one where there would not be “any trouble with the natives” suggests that little evaluation as to 
his suitability for it had taken place.1119 Once in Iran, Shepherd failed to recognise the strength of 
nationalism there, or the power Mussadiq was able to wield through his role in the Majlis’ oil committee. 
Like Le Rougetel before him, Shepherd also struggled to improve relations with the oil company. Perhaps his 
greatest success was in recognising American opposition to British policy and the potential ramifications this 
could have. His insights in this area demonstrate knowledge gleaned through a successful diplomatic career 
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and suggest that he was perhaps appointed to the wrong post. While it would be easy to pour scorn on both 
Bullard and Shepherd, their respective tenures were demonstrations of wider problems in Anglo-Iranian 
relations and of British diplomatic mismanagement.
When analysing the decline of British power in Iran the question that repeatedly comes to mind is: could the 
AIOC’s nationalisation have been avoided? The answer seems to be a clear, but complicated, ‘yes.’ Had the 
British government somehow developed closer ties with the AIOC and engaged with the Iranian government 
to establish a more equitable relationship, it is possible that the anger and frustration that fueled Iranian 
nationalism may have been tempered. Without a broad base of support there is little to indicate that Mussadiq 
would have risen to the fore and developed the political power he came to enjoy. Such collaboration would 
not, however, have been piecemeal, but rather based on long-term, structured planning. Given the orientalism 
and mismanagement that pervaded the Foreign Office, Tehran Embassy and the oil company itself, there is 
little to suggest that this would have been possible.
Certainly political engagement in Iran was undermined by a reliance on non-state organisations and actors to 
represent British interests there. The AIOC’s focus on profitability and its determination to act as an 
autonomous entity made it difficult for Whitehall to set the course for Britain in Iran and added a complex 
layer of additional bureaucracy to the Anglo-Iranian relationship. To the Iranian people the AIOC was a clear 
manifestation of foreign domination, one that was difficult to ignore: how could they simply turn a blind eye 
to a London-based firm exploiting their oil and yet returning so little socially or economically? 
The 1951 nationalisation crisis was one of the first major confrontations between the developed and 
developing worlds in the postwar era. It served to highlight Britain’s relative decline in power and to suggest 
that the assumptions that had been used to underwrite their empire no longer held true. It was no longer 
possible to assume that foreign, oriental people were too weak, too passive or too naive to organise, assemble 
and act to take control of their resources and affairs. Similarly, British corporate power could no longer be 
relied upon as a guarantee of overseas representation. Britain’s decline also raises questions as to the 
equitability of its relationship with the United States. Although it may not yet have accepted it, Britain could 
no longer play the role of Prince Hamlet, but had become, in the words of T. S. Eliot, “an attendant 
lord...deferential, glad to be of use.” The Attlee government had simply lost the ability to conduct a totally 
autonomous policy in an area it had historically dominated.1120
While the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is often treated as an afterthought in the annals 
of imperial history, the collapse of British power is a useful case study not only in the capabilities of 
nationalist movements, but in the limits of informal empire and the necessities of creativity and engagement 
in international affairs. The prelude to nationalisation, on reflection, stands as a time of missed opportunities 
and of failures that could have been mitigated, if not avoided.
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